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Foreword 
 
 
The Atlantic Council conference series, Topics in Terrorism:  Toward a Transatlantic Consensus on 
the Nature of the Threat, was born of the conviction that transatlantic cooperation in 
confronting international terrorism will be more effective to the extent that it is built on a 
foundation of shared concepts, frames of reference and fundamental understanding.  As 
specific counter-terrorist measures will inevitably be worked out between governments, this 
series instead proposes to compare and explore different analyses of the nature – and likely 
future development – of the threat.  Each conference, held in Europe, focuses on two or 
three select topics, from likely future terrorist weapons and targets to the “war of ideas”, the 
burgeoning terrorism-drugs-organized crime nexus and other key concerns. 
 
For each topic addressed, the Council commissioned one U.S. expert and one European 
expert to write thoughtful, scholarly papers and to give presentations of their conclusions.  
Those papers are reproduced here, along with conference and panel summaries, where 
possible. 
 
The Council wishes to express its gratitude to the Headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), our local partner organization for this conference.  NATO’s 
generous organizational and logistical contributions were a large part of this event’s success.  
I would stress, however, that the views and analysis contained in the papers presented here 
are those of their authors alone; they do not necessarily represent  an institutional position of 
the authors’ employers, NATO, the Atlantic Council or any of the Council’s sponsors. 
 
I wish to express the Council’s appreciation to John Sandrock, the Director of the Council’s 
Program on International Security, who both spearheaded this effort and participated 
actively in it, as the moderator of three of the conference’s four panels.  Finally, I wish to 
thank Jason Purcell, the Assistant Director of the Program on International Security, and 
Josh Weintraub, a former intern for the Program, for their diligent and thoughtful work in 
reviewing, editing and formatting this compendium. 
 
 
Christopher J. Makins 
President 
Atlantic Council of the United States 
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Executive Summary1
 
John H. Sandrock 
 
I.  Introduction & Panel Topics 
 
The Brussels Conference on “Topics in Terrorism:  Toward a Transatlantic Consensus on 
the Nature of the Threat” was the first of three conferences whose principal purpose was to 
explore specific themes associated with the world-wide effort to cope with and counter the 
threat of terrorists.  Held in three different European capitals (Brussels, Vienna, and 
Budapest), the conferences drew on divergent presenters and audiences.  Each conference 
convened subject-matter experts from the United States and Europe with the express intent 
of considering various perspectives on some of the most difficult challenges facing the 
transatlantic community.  While reaching a consensus on each of the major topics would 
certainly have been a desirable outcome, where a consensus proved elusive, a major 
objective was to gain a better understanding of the divergent views and the rationale that 
underpins those views. 
 
Another major objective of the conference series was to engage a broad spectrum of those 
concerned with the formulation and execution of national and international security policy as 
well as representatives of non-governmental organizations and academia in a broadly based 
discussion of the issues.  Therefore, each conference agenda reserved plenty of time for 
participants to question, present their own perspectives, and to enrich the consideration of 
various points. 
 
The first conference, convened in Brussels with the assistance of the NATO Headquarters  
considered there major topics: 
• Terrorists as an Opposing Armed Force 
• Future terrorist weapons, and 
• Future Terrorist Targets 
 
Three panels of European and U.S. experts addressed the following topics and guidance 
questions: 
 
Panel I:  Terrorists as an Opposing Armed Force 
 
A. To what extent can terrorist groups be viewed as “opposing armed forces”?  What are 
the prevailing views in the United States/Europe?  How does characterizing terrorists as 
an opposing armed force impact the strategies chosen to confront them?  What are the 
international legal implications? 
B. Are other characterizations more helpful in understanding or confronting the problem?  
What are the prevailing views in the United States/Europe?  How do these 
                                                          
1  This Executive Summary is meant to reflect the contents of this volume.  It therefore includes both 
commentary by the author and illustrative excerpts from the papers reproduced herein.  
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characterizations impact the strategies chosen to confront terrorists?  What are the 
international legal implications? 
C. What factors are likely to determine how terrorist groups organize themselves in the 
future?  What are the current trends?  What events might reinforce or weaken these 
trends? 
D. What most worries you about the organization or perceived organization of terrorist 
groups?  What are the West’s biggest challenges? 
 
Panel II:  Future Terrorist Weapons 
 
A. What weapons do different terrorist groups currently have?  What weapons are they 
developing?  Please include discussion of conventional, chemical, biological, radiological 
and nuclear weapons.  What conclusions may terrorist groups have drawn from the 
effectiveness of different attacks (i.e. the 2004 Madrid bombings, the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo 
Sarin attack)?  What factors (i.e. technology, funding, transport, deployability, 
symbolism) are currently influencing terrorists’ choice of weapon?  Do these differ in the 
United States and Europe? 
B. How might developments in the private sector (for example, miniaturization) affect 
terrorists’ options?  Have increased homeland security efforts affected the availability or 
desirability of certain types of weapons? 
C. What factors are likely to determine what weapons terrorist groups seek and use in the 
future?  What are the current trends?  What events might reinforce or weaken these 
trends? 
D. What weapons worry you most (either because of lethality or ease of use/procurement)?  
What are the West’s biggest challenges? 
 
Panel III:  Future Terrorist Targets 
 
A. Which targets are terrorists most likely to strike?  Which are the most potentially 
attractive to terrorists, regardless of likelihood or feasibility?  What factors – or what 
combination of factors – make these targets attractive (i.e. symbolic value, potential 
civilian casualties, sheer vulnerability)? 
B. Which countries in Europe, North America and elsewhere see themselves as most at risk 
for terrorist attack?  Which see themselves as least at risk?  Are these perceptions of risk 
reasonable?  How does the perception of being targeted affect different states’ behavior?  
How are states’ policies and behaviors affected by the perception that certain types of 
cooperation with the United States make them more likely targets? 
C. Have different states’ homeland security efforts made them safer?  Have successful 
homeland security efforts in some countries or regions made other countries and regions 
more likely to be targeted? 
D. What targets are you most worried about (either because of lingering vulnerability or 
potential scope of destruction)?  What are the West’s biggest challenges? 
 
The conference was at the expert level and was deliberately kept small in order to encourage 
the speakers to consider new and innovative approaches to their topics and also to generate 
a lively and in-depth discussion by all participants in an informal and unconstrained 
atmosphere.  The focus of this conference, as well as other conferences organized as part of 
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this series, was to consider various aspects of future terrorist threats based upon a thorough 
analysis of present conditions. 
 
II.  Facing a New Brand of Terrorism 
 
In considering the above topics, panelists were reminded of one Arab analyst’s recent 
comments.  He argued that the attacks on September 11, 2001 represented a new kind of 
terrorism – one that has no political or social objectives.  The “new” terrorists rarely demand 
ransom or specify a political target; rather, they aim to inflict fear on the widest possible 
scale.  The fact that terrorists could use “high tech” means to inflict mass fear and 
destruction helped open the eyes of the world to the “other side” of globalization:  the ways 
in which the free movement of capital, labor and ideas could be exploited for nefarious 
purposes.  The new non-state entities associated with globalization – namely multi-national 
corporations, major non-governmental organizations, the Internet and others – may be 
forming a secondary or substitute international power structure.  That power structure 
challenges the coercive-power monopoly of the nation-state and thus opens new horizons 
for world freedom and interaction, which in turn challenge our current concepts of 
international order. 
 
In short, the “new terrorism” has shown that the nation-state is vulnerable to malevolent 
non-state actors, e.g. terrorist networks, organized crime syndicates and others.  These new 
actors need no geographic base and they abide by none of the traditional “rules” of 
international relations.  Therefore, they are not impacted by strategies of deterrence, 
retaliation or punishment. 
 
Terrorists as an Opposing Armed Force 
 
There is ample evidence now available that prior to and immediately after the September 11, 
2001 attacks on the United States, al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups possessed many of the 
elements of an opposing armed force.  There was a hierarchical structure, a form of 
centralized command and control, and a sophisticated acquisition system.  Several thousand 
recruits attended training camps that featured a curriculum and highly specialized training in 
a centralized location.  Detailed planning preceded each action and targets were carefully 
chosen for maximum tactical and strategic impact. 
 
In contrast, there have also been many smaller-scale terrorist actions that appear not to have 
been carefully coordinated or planned by a central authority.  Whether or not these lesser 
incidents were part of a cohesive plan that included options for autonomous actions and 
local execution, or whether they are strictly independent acts, is less important than the fact 
that they contributed to the general feeling of insecurity of society at large and caused a 
massive defensive response – not only in the United States but also in the broader 
international community.  In other words, whether small or large and whether or not guided 
and controlled by a central authority, the attacks had a synergistic impact that prompted a 
massive and comprehensive response involving all levels of security from the local 
policeman to the highest military and national political authorities. 
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In spite of the fact that many aspects of the terrorist threat appear to support the conclusion 
that terrorists may be considered an opposing armed force, a considerable perception gap 
remains between the United States and some of its European allies.  Many in Europe 
consider preventing and combating internal terrorism a task for local police and security 
forces rather than for military action.  They view the U.S. deployment of an enhanced air 
defense capability – and the use of regular military forces to augment local security forces in 
key locations – as unnecessary and excessive.  Indeed, they have not used their own regular 
military in a similar fashion, nor have they agreed that indigenous regular military forces are 
necessary in a protective role on their home turf.  On the other hand, they cite the fact that 
NATO has deployed military forces to Afghanistan as an example of a counter-terrorism 
action in which the use of regular military forces not only makes sense but is essential 
during, at least, a transitional period. 
 
Future Terrorist Weapons 
 
It is clear that the terrorist threat has evolved over the past several years as the impact of 
counter-terrorist action by the United States and others appears to have limited the 
opportunity for terrorists to engage large and significant “counter-value” targets.  
Nevertheless, there is general agreement that efforts to cope with terrorism cannot be 
relaxed and must, indeed, be strengthened and better coordinated – both within and among 
nations.  There is also general recognition that the threat of a major attack remains. 
 
Suicide Terrorism 
Modern day suicide terrorism began in Lebanon in 1983, but it has not remained limited to 
the Middle East.  Suicide terrorism as a tactic has migrated around the world:  it is used in Sri 
Lanka by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (or LTTE, which perfected the suicide belt), 
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Israel, al-
Qa’ida around the world, numerous groups in Iraq and the Chechen rebels in Russia.  The 
organizational goals of these groups are not necessarily linked to one another, yet across the 
entire spectrum, the use of human bombs has proven to be a powerful tactic in the hands of 
terrorists who are thus able to force concessions from occupying forces – even to the point 
of expelling them – wreak havoc with peace processes, gain international recognition in the 
media for both the sponsoring group and its cause, disrupt daily lives and create widespread 
dread and horror.  Recognition of the effectiveness of this tactic in achieving terror 
organizations’ short-term goals seems to be lending momentum to, and indeed fostering an 
exponential increase in the use of suicide attacks.  Yet, despite this recent increase, suicide 
terror remains the least utilized – if most lethal – means of terrorism. 
 
Human bombs are in essence “smart bombs” that go precisely to their target with the ability 
to detect surveillance and alter their course to maximize damage.  Unlike other forms of 
terrorism, these require no escape plan for the perpetrators.  Suicide terror, when successful, 
also leaves little trace of the perpetrator.  He or she is no longer alive to be tracked down, 
incarcerated and interrogated.  Only the handlers can be discovered – though even this is 
difficult once the suicide is accomplished. 
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The Threa  of CBRN Weaponst  
Terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) devices has come to be 
regarded as a key aspect of the contemporary international security agenda.  The concern 
that terrorist use of a CBRN device could result in mass casualties, mass panic, or both has 
prompted the installation of new, high tech detection systems, special screening procedures, 
the formation of special response capabilities by local and national response forces, as well as 
efforts to control sources of knowledge and supply, transfer of dual-use equipment, and the 
strengthening of pertinent international conventions. 
 
Such attacks as the bombing of community housing in Buenos Aires in 1994, the attack 
against the U.S. government building in Oklahoma in April 1995, the truck bomb used against 
the Central Bank in Colombo in 1996, the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania in 1998 and the bombing of a Moscow apartment complex in 1999 revealed the 
extent of damage and loss of life that could be caused by terrorism.  While these instances 
involved traditional methods of inflicting damage, the use of a nerve agent (sarin) in a Tokyo 
subway in March 1995, though relatively ineffective, has been viewed as representing a 
quantum change in methods.  Other actual and potential future terrorist weapons run the 
gamut from the lone terrorist acting as an assassin to the confirmed effort by al-Qa’ida and 
others to obtain and use chemical, biological, radiological and even nuclear weapons (CBRN).  
Terrorist use of CBRN devices is now regarded as a key aspect of the contemporary 
international security agenda. 
 
In considering future terrorist weapons the basic assumption is that explosives, small arms, 
and other light weapons (such as shoulder-launched anti-tank weapons) will remain in the 
terrorist arsenal.  One may also assume that existing and new conventional weapons will be 
used in novel ways, whether against aircraft, ships or other targets.  However, the potential 
use of CBRN weapons presents the most demanding challenge from the perspective of what 
is currently in, or is likely to come into, the hands of terrorist groups. 
 
The threat of CBRN terrorism, inevitably, will change over time and thus what constituted the 
threat in 1996 is not what constituted it in 2001, and today’s threat will likely evolve over the 
next decade.  The risks and severe consequences of a CBRN attack are real -- policies have 
to be designed and implemented to reduce the risks, thwart attempted attacks, and manage 
the possible consequences if an attack occurs. 
 
Future Terrorist Targets 
 
Turning to the future targets that terrorists may consider vulnerable and in line with their 
objectives, the most commonly recognized are those physical things that we hold most dear:  
the symbols of our civilization that inspire and define our community.  Because the quality 
of our lives is something we value, we also must defend what is now termed our “critical 
infrastructures”.  As with individual citizens, no single element can be declared expendable. 
 
This does not mean that we must defend all equally, all the time.  Those involved in the 
protection of critical infrastructure have been striving diligently to bring a professional 
approach to the concept of risk assessment to allow them to allocate scarce resources to the 
“most critical” of our critical infrastructures.  Surely, the explosion of a major chemical 
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plant, resulting in the deaths of many thousands is somehow worse, more horrible, than a 
more minor attack and the deaths of tens or hundreds.  So, from the perspective of the 
defense, the protective situation calls for something akin to triage, the prioritization of 
otherwise unacceptable outcomes. 
 
What we choose to protect only limits the choices a terrorist might have, and, we hope, 
reduces potential consequences.  The terrorist knows that even a limited attack, if 
successfully accomplished, will produce the anticipated effect of terror – exacerbating 
feelings of insecurity and vulnerability without regard to the relative significance of the 
target.  Indeed, the argument could be made that an attack or a series of attacks on 
necessarily less well-protected facilities could have a greater effect than one larger attack.  
The chemical plant attack is largely driven by perceptions of consequences:  the noxious 
green cloud enveloping and killing the peaceful village.  It would be difficult to argue that 
anyone felt anything for the plant itself. 
 
That is not the case with other parts of the physical target set, where a strike can affect even 
more deeply our perceptions of security and vulnerability.  Some of the most vulnerable 
targets such as schools, as in the case of the tragedy in Beslan, Russia, are also the most 
difficult to protect.  In such a case, scale is, essentially, irrelevant.  A successful attack on the 
smallest pre-school would stir the same feelings of loss and insecurity that would attend an 
assault on a university campus.   
 
III.  Safeguarding an Unknown Future 
 
In sum, military terms such as “counter-value” and “counter-force” appear to have little 
relevance when assessing whether or not terrorists may be considered as an opposing armed 
force, gauging future terrorist weapons of choice or attempting to ascertain the targets that 
may be attacked to achieve terrorism’s objectives.  And yet, available evidence suggests that 
terrorists have, and will continue to concentrate on, what they consider “counter-value” 
targets.  These are soft targets, they are difficult to defend, and they offer the terrorist an 
abundance of choices. 
 
What came crystal clear from the presentations and discussions at the conference is that 
there can be and will be no certain security.  The best that may be achieved is to minimize 
both the risk and the consequences through a series of measures aimed at protecting people, 
protecting infrastructure, and addressing the “root causes” of terrorist violence. 
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Understanding Suicide Terrorism: 
Countering Human Bombs 
and Their Senders 
 
Anne Speckhard, Ph.D.1
 
Suicidal terrorism is one of the fastest growing and least understood threats to peace in 
modern-day democracies.  Currently there is an extremely small empirical research database 
on which policymakers may base their understanding of suicidal terrorism, its genesis and 
prevention.  Yet there has been an exponential growth in suicide terrorism in recent years.  
Peacekeeping and coalition forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan directly confront suicide 
terrorism as it has become a major factor undermining rebuilding efforts and attempts to 
bring peace to the region.  Israel and Russia have been plagued with an increase in suicide 
terrorism, which has been a major security threat to both countries and their regions in 
recent years.  Although yet untouched by suicide terrorism, Western Europe was the staging 
ground for many of the 9/11 bombers, and the United Kingdom has generated three suicide 
bombers (two acting in Israel, the third carrying a bomb in his shoe on an international 
flight).2
 
                                                          
1  Anne Speckhard, Ph.D., is Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Georgetown University Medical 
Center and Professor of Psychology, Vesalius College, Free University of Brussels.  E-mail: 
Aspeckhard@brutele.be.  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Atlantic Council’s, “Topics in 
Terrorism:  Toward a Transatlantic Consensus on the Nature of the Threat” conference, held on 29 & 30 
November  2004, in Brussels, Belgium. 
2   NOTE:  This paper was completed and edited prior to the Jul 7, 2005 suicide attacks in London. 
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I.  The Nature of Suicide Terror 
 
Modern day suicide terrorism began in Lebanon in 1983, but it has not remained limited to 
the Middle East.  Suicide terrorism as a tactic has migrated around the world; it is used in Sri 
Lanka by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (or LTTE, which perfected the suicide belt), 
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Israel, al-
Qa’ida around the world, numerous groups in Iraq and the Chechen rebels in Russia.  The 
organizational goals of these groups are not necessarily linked to one another, yet across the 
entire spectrum, the use of human bombs has proven to be a powerful tactic in the hands of 
terrorists who are thus able to force concessions from occupying forces – even to the point 
of expelling them – wreak havoc with peace processes, gain international recognition in the 
media for both the sponsoring group and its cause, disrupt daily lives and create widespread 
dread and horror.  Recognition of the effectiveness of this tactic in achieving terror 
organizations’ short-term goals seems to lend momentum to, and indeed foster an 
exponential increase in, the use of suicide attacks.  Yet, despite this recent increase, suicide 
terror does remain the least utilized – if most lethal – means of terrorism. 
 
Human bombs are in essence “smart bombs” that go precisely to their target with the ability 
to detect surveillance and alter their course to maximize damage.  Unlike other forms of 
terrorism, these require no escape plan for the perpetrators.  Suicide terror, when successful, 
also leaves little trace of the perpetrator.  He or she is no longer alive to be tracked down, 
incarcerated and interrogated.  Only the handlers can be discovered – though even this is 
difficult once the suicide is accomplished. 
 
Suicide terrorism is a complex individual, psycho-social and organizational phenomenon.3  
To research it properly one must consider all aspects, asking:  what motivates the individual 
to move into a self-sacrificial mode (to be willing to die in order to kill others); how do 
societies come to embrace this tactic; and what role(s) do organizational goals, methods, 
planning, recruitment, training/indoctrination and execution play vis-à-vis suicide terrorism?  
When we consider both the individual and organizational motivations, we cannot forget that 
both are embedded within a psycho-social context and that neither individual nor 
organizational inputs are likely to take off in any strong and consistent form without real 
                                                          
3  Nichole Argo, The Banality of Evil:  Understanding and Defusing Today’s Human Bombs (2003). 
Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill:  The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror (2005).  
Mohammed Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs:  Strategy, Culture and Conflict in the Making of Palestinian Suicide 
Bombers (Unpublished research paper, 2004).   
Ariel Merari, Suicide Terrorism (Unpublished manuscript, 2003), p. 12.   
Assaf Moghadam, “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada:  Motivations and Organizational 
Aspects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26.2 (February/March 2003).   
Assaf Moghadam, Suicide Bombings in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:  A Conceptual Framework (Project for the 
Research of Islamist Movements, Inter-Disciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel: 2002), p. 15., http://www.e-
prism.org/
Anne Speckhard, Soldiers for God:  A Study of the Suicide Terrorists in the Moscow Hostage-Taking Siege.  (Unpublished 
research proposal) 
J. Post, E. Sprinzak, and L. Denny, “The Terrorists in Their Own Words:  Interviews with 35 Incarcerated 
Middle Eastern Terrorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15 (1) (Spring 2003), pp. 171-184. 
Oliver McTernan, ed., The Roots of Terrorism: Contemporary Trends and Traditional Analysis.  (Brussels: NATO 
Science Series 2004). 
                                                                                                                     ANNE SPECKHARD 3 
  
daily-life psycho-social issues causing the message and possibility of the “suicide option” to 
reverberate on both sides of the equation. 
 
The Organizational Component 
 
According to Ariel Merari4, to date no suicide bomber has acted entirely on his or her own – 
that is, assembling a bomb, picking a target and detonating without the aid and support of an 
organization.  However, recent interviews by Nichole Argo5 update Merari’s claim – 
providing data on at least one bomber who acted independent of organizational backing.  In 
any event, it is a myth to believe that a lengthy and in-depth period of training and 
indoctrination is necessary.  Some suicide terrorists receive training and carry out their 
attacks in less than two weeks’ time and, not all suicide terrorists are recruited by the 
organizations that send them.  Many individuals recruit themselves, approaching an 
organization and asking to be sent as human bombs. 
 
From the point of view of the organization, it is clear that suicide bombing has a strong 
impact.  It is a combination of an extremely lethal tactic – in terms of numbers wounded and 
killed – and devastating psychological effect.  It has the potential to create widespread 
changes in mentality, awareness and lifestyle.  For example, suicide terrorism has shown 
itself able to derail sensitive negotiations (such as the Oslo accords); strongly impact the 
political process (Madrid train bombings)6; disrupt military, humanitarian and rebuilding 
efforts (Afghanistan and Iraq); and draw world attention and concern to political issues 
(Chechnya).  Moreover, it is appealing partially because it is “cheap”, requiring only minimal 
equipment and loss of the bombers themselves.7  Whether it is effective in achieving any real 
political gains outside of the community in which it originates – i.e., whether it creates any 
real power base for those who employ suicide terrorism – is yet to be seen. 
 
Thus, while it is still up for debate whether or not this tactic yields real gains vis-à-vis the 
status quo, we do know that its perpetrators and their communities often feel empowered by 
it.  The expressive nature of the act – expressing one’s desperation and making another feel 
one’s pain – as well as its shared meaning as an act of defense on behalf of the community, 
bring both the organization and individual perpetrating it recognition and status within that 
community.  This, despite all else, is a real gain to both parties. 
 
The Psycho-Social Component 
 
While the organizations that make use of human bombs often consciously and purposefully 
promulgate the ideologies supporting this tactic, it is crucial to note that, to be successful, 
their message must find a deeper resonance within both the individuals and the society that 
ultimately embrace these ideologies.  It may be argued that without leadership promoting the 
utility and even morality of suicide terrorism as a tactic, widespread acceptance and use of it 
might never occur.  Yet we must also acknowledge that this is not entirely a top-down 
                                                          
4  Ariel Merari, Suicide Terrorism (Unpublished manuscript, 2003) p. 12. 
5  Nichole Argo, Culture, Society and Martyrdom (Unpublished research paper, 2004). 
6  Some would argue that the Madrid bombings did not involve suicide terrorists as the attackers left their 
bombs and detonated them from afar.  Yet, upon imminent arrest, the bombers did explode themselves. 
7  See Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda:  Global Network of Terror (Columbia University Press 2002). 
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phenomenon in the sense that social indoctrination into the ideologies in support of suicide 
terrorism need not always be intentionally engineered on behalf of an organization or 
religion.  Such indoctrination can simply be a social phenomenon – the result of community 
and individual responses to the circumstances in which they find themselves. 
 
Consider, for instance, the Palestinian experience.  The idea of embracing martyrdom 
(Shudada – the death of innocents) had to gain prominence – from repeated unfortunate 
experiences – before Palestinian culture could embrace and even nurture the concept of self-
martyrdom (Istich’hadin).8  Similarly, suicide terrorism had no place in Chechen society until, 
during the last two wars, the Chechens found themselves increasingly devastated by 
meaningless traumas.  In response to this, many Chechens sought out, embraced and 
constructed – both individually and in groups – ideologies that empowered them, gave 
meaning(s) to their pain, expressed that pain and also allowed them to “fight back” against 
enemies much more powerful than themselves.  Indeed, the phenomenon of suicide 
terrorism in Chechnya – as in all the places in which it has manifested itself since its modern-
day appearance in Beirut – began as a psycho-social reaction to traumatic stress, the 
mentality of being besieged, social marginalization, alienation, and other perceived or real 
sufferings.  
 
Organizations and ideologies find prominence in communities when they meet the psycho-
social needs of the individuals and groups within those communities.  As Maslow9 has 
theorized, individuals strive first and foremost to meet their most basic needs before 
working to meet other needs – up to and including the need for self-actualization, which 
includes a sense of dignity and meaning in life.  When under duress, communities and 
individuals are drawn to groups and ideologies that: 
 
• Respond to their needs; 
• Are empowering; 
• Allow for the defense of their community; 
• Give them a sense of dignity; 
• Provide a means of expression for their pain; and 
• Present ways to realize a desire to “strike back”. 
 
The Individual Component 
 
With respect to the individual, the motivations for carrying out a suicide attack appear multi-
faceted and multi-leveled.  These can be political/nationalistic, religious, ideological, 
economic, community, sociological, psychological, personal, or familial.10  Other factors that 
can potentially operate within the matrix of a suicide terrorist’s motivations are: 
• The individual’s psycho-social history, including his or her indoctrination into, or 
embracing over time of, whatever religious and ideological justifications are given; 
                                                          
8  The author is indebted to Nichole Argo for pointing this out. 
9  Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 2nd ed. (Harper & Row, 1970). 
10  Assaf Moghadam, “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada:  Motivations and Organizational 
Aspects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26.2 (February/March 2003). 
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• The individual’s personal and familial life experiences, including issues of personal and 
secondary traumatization (e.g., a history of incarceration, torture, trauma, etc.); 
• Cultural identification with the concept of revenge and the need for it; 
• Community affiliations; 
• Identifications with the sponsoring group; 
• Notions of sacrifice for the group; and, 
• The use of psychological defenses, including the dissociative defense, which appears 
possibly necessary to carry out the act itself. 
 
These are examined more fully herein. 
 
II.  Choosing to Become a Suicide Bomber:  Trauma & Ideology 
 
The Role of Personal Traumatization 
 
It is clear that the ideologies promoted by the organizations supporting suicide terrorism 
often resonate with the experiences and psychosocial needs of many young people within 
their respective societies.  Witness Hamas’ claims to have thousands of self-recruited 
individual bombers (most of whom it allegedly has to turn away) or the fact that Chechen 
suicide terrorists also appear to be self-recruited.11  In both Palestine and Chechnya, 
experiences of deep personal traumatization and bereavement create in some a vulnerability 
that leads them to seek out the ideological message of those promoting violent and jihadist 
methods.  This message helps traumatized individuals to find a framework for dealing with 
their shattered world assumptions and to address their emotional suffering, survivor guilt, 
and sense of a foreshortened future.12  But the psychological “first aid” offered by these 
organizations is short-lived.  The traumatized individual searching for an “answer” is soon 
overwhelmed by psychic pain13.  He or she then becomes a radicalized bomber willing to 
give his or her life for the cause.   
 
                                                          
11  See: 
Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers:  Talking to Human Bombs,” The New Yorker (November 19, 2001). 
Anne Speckhard, Unpublished interview with Zacharia Zubeidi, leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in 
Jenin, who also claimed to have hundreds of volunteers for suicide missions (March 2005). 
Speckhard & Akhmedova, “The Making of a Martyr:  Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism (2005, in press). 
12  For the Chechen case see:   
Anne Speckhard, “Soldiers for God:  A Study of the Suicide Terrorists in the Moscow Hostage-Taking Siege,” 
The Roots of Terrorism:  Contemporary Trends and Traditional Analysis, Oliver McTernan, ed. (NATO Science Series, 
Brussels, 2004).   
Speckhard & Akhmedova, “Mechanisms of Generating Suicide Terrorism:  Trauma and Bereavement as 
Psychological Vulnerabilities in Human Security – The Chechen Case,” in Jill Donnelly, ed. (NATO Science 
Series, Brussels, 2004). 
Anne Speckhard, Nadejda Tarabrina, Valery Krasnov & Khapta Akhmedova, “Research Note:  Observations 
of Suicidal Terrorists in Action,” in Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 16(2) (Summer 2004), pp. 305-27. 
13  Psychic pain refers to deeply felt emotions that are painful to the individual.  See Edwin S. Shneidman, The 
Suicidal Mind (Oxford University Press, 1996).  Shneidman coined the term “psyche ache,” arguing that the best 
predictor of an individual’s propensity to suicide is the experience of emotional pain as overwhelming and 
inescapable. 
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Still, whatever the ways in which the ideologies promoted by organizations supporting 
suicide terrorism may respond to the psychosocial needs of some, the rationality of the 
choice to become a suicide bomber must be considered.  The bomber might consider quite 
rational the exchange of his/her earthly life for greater eternal rewards, posthumous “life” as 
a hero in the memory of his/her community, and a sense of peace and strength resulting 
from that community’s estimation of him/her as one of its defenders.14  
 
While the severity of the human rights abuses occurring in the Palestinian territories is 
difficult to compare with that of the abuses in Chechnya, Palestinian bombers are also 
motivated by a sense of personal traumatization.15  Many claim that they have personally felt 
their lives threatened by the Israeli Defense Forces; many were incarcerated and became 
involved with terror groups because of the impressions they gained and the friendships they 
made while in Israeli prisons; and a large number identify with, or are grappling with a stress 
overload from the daily humiliations and trials that face Palestinians at checkpoints and at 
work or because of unemployment and the difficulties and limitations of daily life.   
 
However, traumatic stress (or stress overload) alone appears insufficient to cause an 
individual to consider suicide terrorism.  Majorities in both the Palestinian and Chechen 
societies have been deeply traumatized, and yet most individuals in those societies are 
remarkably resilient – carrying on with daily life in the face of enduring emotional pain.  It 
would thus appear that traumatic experiences – that is, life threatening, emotionally 
overwhelming experiences that are inescapable, cause deep psychic pain and for which there 
is little redress – can form the psychological basis within the individual (or society) that is 
receptive to, and even productive of, the ideologies and groups that promote the tactic of 
suicide terrorism. 
 
The ideologies promoting suicide bombing must be present, in a sense, to marry the 
traumatization.  Together, they form a union that provides the individual with a means of 
empowering him to strike back, to defend his community, to express his pain, and to be sure 
that the generalized enemy “other” also feels that pain.  The individual needs to find 
meaning in his suffering, to end his own suffering in an honorable way – exiting the 
community while becoming a hero in it – and, ultimately, to enact justice, from his point of 
view, in a situation in which he, rightly or wrongly, perceives no other pathway to seek 
justice.  All of this occurs in a manner that is justified by the group, by the wider community 
that supports the group, and often by aspects of the community’s religion as well.16
 
Secondary Traumatization & Hidden Traumas 
 
Identification with the traumas of others and secondary traumatization occurring by 
“witnessing”, over the internet or television, vivid images of injustices enacted on others 
with whom one identifies as fictive kin17 (e.g., the brotherhood of Muslims) may also 
resonate with individual feelings of being disaffected.  Trauma psychologists have known for 
                                                          
14  For a more exhaustive review of the rationality of choosing death by martyrdom for a believer, see Quintan 
Wiktorowicz, Suicide Bombings:  Do Beliefs Matter? (Unpublished Paper, 2004.) 
15  Anne Speckhard,  From unpublished interviews with Palestinians. 
16  Although this does raise the issue of those cases of al-Qa’ida-sponsored suicide terrorism that have sprung 
out of societies in which there is little apparent traumatization.  That issue is addressed later in this paper. 
17  See Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science Vol. 299 (7 March 2003),  p. 534. 
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years that witnessing or learning of the deaths or traumas of others can in themselves 
engender powerful feelings of traumatization. 
 
Indeed, terrorism researcher Nichole Argo18 reports the following statement by a Palestinian 
militant leader:  “The difference between the first intifada and the second is television.  
Before, I knew when we were attacked here, or in a nearby camp, but the reality of the 
attacks everywhere else was not so clear.  Now, I cannot get away from Israeli attacks – the 
TV brings them into my living room.  When they are not in my camp, they are in Rafah, 
Gaza City, Ramallah, Jenin …. and you can’t turn the TV off.  How could you live with 
yourself?  At the same time, you can’t ignore the problem – what are you doing to protect 
your people?  We live in an internal struggle.  Whether you choose to fight or not, every day 
is this internal struggle.”  PFLP leader Khan Yunis, June 2004. 
 
Furthermore, it is likely that the security services and societies trying to fight terrorism 
underestimate the negative psychological effects – including traumatization – that can occur 
in young people who are profiled as terrorists simply by race or creed, who are arrested or 
incarcerated or who undergo interrogation and breaking methods that many consider neither 
illegal nor torture, yet are often viewed as “torture lite”. 
 
Self-Sacrifice:  The Interaction Among Social Awareness, Desire for Change and 
a Lack of Legitimate Outlets 
 
Group dynamics, including that of self-sacrifice for the community, are likewise powerful 
individual motivators.  In general, suicide bombers have been found to be socio-
economically better off, and at least as well educated (though often better educated) than 
their peers.19  As a result, they are likely more socially-aware in general, and potentially more 
sensitive to the plights of their communities.  Those, whose education would otherwise 
prompt them to contribute to their societies as leaders, frequently find themselves 
disaffected in their own communities and blocked from pursuing legitimate ways to fight 
injustice – a scenario that makes them potentially more vulnerable to being attracted to using 
the tactic of suicide terrorism.  In essence, feelings of being equipped as a leader and yet 
unable to find legitimate ways to bring about change, coupled with sensitivity to the shared 
pain of one’s community, may powerfully contribute to seeking other available outlets for 
expression. 
 
Likewise, when a cult of martyrdom has sprung up in a society, these vulnerable yet talented 
individuals may feel that it is a burden not to act:  that to fail to take on the martyr role – 
when no other means of affecting change seems available – is in itself a failure.20  This 
phenomenon is more strongly in evidence the closer that traumatization hits one’s family, 
                                                          
18  Nichole Argo, “Combating Human Bombs:  The Sacrificial and Community Aspect of Suicide Terrorism,” 
Paper presented at the NATO Advanced Research Workshop, “Ideologies of Terrorism:  Understanding and 
Countering the Social, Psychological and Political Underpinnings of Terrorism” (Brussels: February 1, 2005). 
19  Scott Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 27:3 (Summer 2004), pp. 67-90. 
Ariel Merari, Suicide Terrorism (2003). 
20  See Nichole Argo, The Banality of Evil:  Understanding and Defusing Today’s Human Bombs, Unpublished Research 
Proposal, 2003.  Hafez, Mohammed, Manufacturing Human Bombs:  Strategy, Culture and Conflict in the Making of 
Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Unpublished Research Paper, 2004). 
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community or home, especially if the culture in question has embedded within itself a duty 
to avenge the loss of loved ones. 
 
III.  Factors that Facilitate the Decision to Become a Suicide Bomber 
 
The Role of Religion 
 
Religion is not a cause of suicide terrorism, but it can be a powerful mobilizer on behalf of 
this terror tactic.  Jihadist Islamic ideologies promote the idea of self-sacrifice to benefit the 
larger community in exchange for otherworldly rewards – including forgiveness of sins, 
salvation and instant entry into “paradise”.  For a troubled, bereaved and guilt-ridden 
individual, the vision of these rewards can constitute strong motivation.  The promise that, 
in paradise, one will be reunited with those who have gone before – especially other martyrs 
– is a particularly powerful draw to those caught in traumatic bereavement.  Moreover, the 
promise that a martyr will be able to intercede on behalf of seventy relatives – securing, for 
them as well, entry into paradise – helps to assuage guilt and grief over leaving loved ones 
behind. 
 
Survival guilt and a sense of a foreshortened future also make martyrdom an attractive 
option; one is freed of guilt by giving up a life that was not going to be long anyway.  
Because suicide is forbidden, but martyrdom is not, suicide terrorism presents a seemingly 
honorable way to escape psychic pain – it is an honored choice.  And having a choice in 
regard to one’s own death has proven alluring to many, especially the fugitive who believes 
that he or she is facing imminent capture, torture, death or imprisonment.21
 
Cult of Martyrdom & Popular Support for Suicide Terrorism 
 
In the Palestinian territories, there currently exists a “cult of martyrdom.”22  From a very 
young age, children are socialized into a group consciousness that honors “martyrs”, 
including human bombers who have given their lives for the fight against what is perceived 
by Palestinians to be the unjust occupation of their lands.  Young children are told stories of 
“martyrs.”  Many young people wear necklaces venerating particular “martyrs”, posters 
decorate the walls of towns and rock and music videos extol the virtues of bombers.  Each 
act of suicide terrorism is also marked by a last testament and video, which are prepared 
ahead of time by the “martyr”, who can later reach great popularity when the video is played 
on television.  Despite the very deep and real grief of the family and friends left behind, the 
funerals of “martyrs” are generally accompanied by much fanfare on the part of both the 
community and sponsoring organization.  Often, the effect of this is confusing to outsiders 
as it can disrupt, delay, and even circumvent the family’s ability to focus on its grief over the 
loss of a family member.  It may also support a family’s claims to outsiders, of joy over the 
                                                          
21  Anne Speckhard, Unpublished Interview with Zacharia Zubeidi, Leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in 
Jenin, who stated that he would rather die than be arrested and imprisoned again (March 2005). 
Speckhard & Akhmedova, “The Making of a Martyr:  Chechen Suicide Terrorism”, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 2005 (in press). 
22  Nichole Argo, The Banality of Evil: Understanding and Defusing Today’s Human Bombs (Unpublished Research 
Proposal, 2003).  
Mohammed Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs:  Strategy, Culture and Conflict in the Making of Palestinian Suicide 
Bombers (Unpublished Research Paper, 2004). 
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loss of its loved one.  This “cult of martyrdom”, which has a strong underpinning in 
longstanding cultural roots (the honoring of martyrs), appears to have developed principally 
over the last decade. 
 
Suicide terrorism first appeared in Chechnya in the year 2000.  Although widespread popular 
support for suicide terrorism does not yet exist, the first pop song venerating a female 
bomber has now made its appearance and is very popular with Chechen youth.  Moreover, 
at least two Chechen suicide attacks have included pre-prepared videos, one of which was 
aired over Al-Jazeera during the Dubrovka siege.  It is possible that, over time and with 
continued societal traumatization, these and other means will be found to popularize support 
for suicide terrorism among the general public in Chechnya – a development that should be 
watched carefully and curbed, if possible. 
 
Dissociation 
 
Dissociative defenses23 are commonly active in survivors of psychological traumas (those 
with acute and posttraumatic stress disorder) and in individuals who grow up under 
repetitively traumatic circumstances, such as those that characterize the lives of many suicide 
bombers.  Dissociation – that is, the disruption of the normally integrated functions of 
consciousness, memory, identity or perception of the environment, as well as the ability to 
enter and make use of a dissociative trance state – is frequently observed in trauma 
survivors.  Traumatized individuals, especially those who have suffered multiple and repeat 
traumas (particularly in childhood), often learn to utilize this defense to detach themselves 
from overwhelmingly horrifying, terrifying, or life-threatening circumstances. 
 
The dissociative function – that is, the ability to enter into a trance-like state and separate 
oneself from dread or grief – seems to be both a facilitator of the act of suicide terrorism 
and a commonly spoken about characteristic of those who commit such acts.  Almost 
universally, individuals who attempted to blow themselves up, but who, for a variety of 
reasons, were unable to do so, describe their psychological state (with their bombs strapped 
on) as one of “floating” or “bliss”.  Some report having “felt nothing”, etc.  Such 
descriptions are consistent with dissociative trance and feature prominently and repeatedly in 
accounts given by failed suicide terrorists to journalists and researchers.24
 
Similar accounts are obtained most commonly in Israel where, at the peak of the second 
intifada, one Palestinian suicide bomber a day was stopped before detonating and 
                                                          
23  According to the American Psychiatric Association, the essential feature of dissociative disorders is “a 
disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity or perception of the 
environment” (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.), American Psychiatric Association, 
1994).  Author’s Note:  in the case of suicide terrorism, “dissociation” means that an emotional barrier is 
unconsciously erected, which walls off the negative emotions generated by choosing to die in this manner and 
can include compartmentalizing the event from one’s ambitions or daily life.  For example, one bomber, when 
planning his attack, is reported to have said that he could not carry a bomb until after his university exams – 
suggesting that while he acknowledged that he was going to his death, he was able to separate this reality from 
the other realities of his life.  
24  Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers:  Talking to Human Bombs”, The New Yorker, Nov 19, 2001.  Haas, 
Amira, “When Death is Normal”, Ha’aretz, October 26, 2004.  Speckhard & Akhmedova, “The Making of a 
Martyr:  Chechen Suicide Terrorism”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2005 (in press).  Speckhard, Anne, 
Unpublished Interviews of Palestinian Militants, 2005. 
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subsequently incarcerated25.  This has created a pool of detainees whom researchers can ask 
about their experiences with bombs actually strapped to their bodies.  For example, Arin, a 
twenty-four-year-old woman interviewed in an Israeli prison by the author, was arrested after 
she had worn her explosive belt for six hours but chose not to detonate.  She recalls her 
mental state with the belt on:  “I was not conscious.  When I meet bad things, I, Arin, move 
away.  I collect the bad things and work out of myself.”  She also recalls, “I felt very nervous.  
I felt my mind stopped.  For six hours I cannot think.  Just at the last moment.  I looked at 
the people.  I looked at the babies.  I saw babies.  I thought, ‘If he dies, what should I tell 
God?  What should I tell Him?  If He wants to cut my life and take my soul okay, but I don’t 
have the right.’ “ 
 
In Arin’s description, one can deduce a dissociative mode that was only disrupted during the 
last possible moments.  Arin’s self-reported motivation for violence began with constant 
humiliations at checkpoints and threatening encounters with security officials on the road 
and in her community.  That motivation culminated in a desire to be a bomber when her 
boyfriend was killed – two months previous to her action.  Arin is still so distressed by her 
boyfriend’s death that she cannot discuss it, but states that, when he was killed, “…my mind 
was stopped.  My life was stopped.  My thought was, ‘Everything is black.’”  She describes 
going to ask for a bomb.  “I wasn’t asked.  I asked to get the belt.” 
 
Here we see a person suffering from an overload of traumatic stress and psychic pain 
choosing to end her life by becoming a human bomb.  However, this decision evokes less a 
“simple” suicide than an act of sacrificial giving – Arin intended to give her life on behalf of 
her community.  “I gave my life just to say, ‘no’!” she reports.  After listing many threats and 
humiliations that she and her community had endured, culminating in her boyfriend’s killing, 
Arin states, “I thought that my home will come in danger, that they [the Israelis] can come 
and fight us.  I have nothing to do as a girl.  I haven’t any weapon.  I have to save my world.  
I have to play my role.  I thought this was the only way to play my role, to carry out my 
responsibility to my nation, my family.”  She describes her mental state during the four days 
she waited between requesting the mission and receiving the belt, “I was not talking to 
anyone, just in my imagination, looking at my aunts, saying goodbye to everything.  I was not 
in a normal frame of mind.  I felt disconnected from them and they felt it.  They asked, 
‘What is going on with you?’ and I said I was sick.  I wrote a letter for them asking ‘forgive 
me, and I’m really sorry – this is my life and I want to end in my own way.’ [sic].”  
Fortunately, Arin’s dissociative mode was somehow disrupted by seeing babies and she 
shifted suddenly back into her normal moral consciousness, which prevented her from going 
forward with the mission. 
 
                                                          
25  According to Israeli security experts, this statistic was valid in 2003/2004.  Since then, however, the 
number of failed suicide bombers arrested and incarcerated has drastically diminished.  This does not 
necessarily imply that a far higher percentage of bombers have succeeded in their missions or that far fewer 
individuals have attempted to commit acts of suicide terrorism.  Among the myriad factors that may have 
contributed to this decrease is the “security barrier”, which some Israeli officials credit as having prevented 
many would-be suicide bombers from being able to enter Israel.  See also:  Isaac Ben-Israel, Oren Setter, 
and Asher Tishler, R&D and the War on Terrorism:  Generalizing the Israeli Experience (Unpublished 
research paper, 2004). 
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Unconscious Activation of the Dissociative Defense 
Likewise, observations suggesting dissociative defenses among Chechen suicide bombers 
have been made by the bombers’ hostages and family members – those who observed the 
bombers just prior to, or while wearing, suicide bombs.26  For example, a Chechen 
respondent recalls that her cousin became withdrawn and depressed following the killing of 
her brother by Russians.  Then, just before going on her suicide mission, this girl became 
euphoric, falsely announcing her need to travel to Moscow in order to prepare for marriage.  
The cousin recalls, “I believed her because she really was very much excited in those days, 
and a shine appeared in her eyes.”  Indeed, just as with other individuals who have 
committed to die thorough “normal” forms of suicide, her depression likely lifted as she 
began contemplating release from psychic pain.  In this way, she appears to have 
unconsciously activated the dissociative defense necessary to carry out her suicide mission. 
 
Given that it is so commonly observed and reported among human bombers, it appears that 
the dissociative defense is unconsciously activated by suicide terrorists to enable them to 
overcome the overwhelmingly negative emotions likely to be engendered by contemplating 
exploding oneself, as well as murdering others as part of that act.  In turn, it is likely that this 
defense prompts a release of endorphins, given that the dissociative state is commonly 
observed and recalled as highly emotionally distanced, drugged, or euphoric. 
 
Dissociative defenses have also been observed by researchers studying non-bombing or 
“normal” suicide.  It seems that a fair number of suicidal persons videotape or audiotape 
their last moments, enabling researchers to observe them as they prepare to take their own 
lives.  Many are reported to enter a highly dissociative trance state before pulling the trigger, 
hanging themselves, or otherwise taking their own lives.27
 
Dissociation Fostered by Indoctrination 
In many of the areas in which suicide terrorism occurs there is no need for 
sponsoring/sending groups to arrange any period of indoctrination as individuals come in 
droves volunteering to be human bombs.  However, it is clear that those sponsoring groups 
that use (or in the past have used) indoctrination periods do so by inculcating hypnotic 
trance and/or dissociative modes.  This is done by manipulating religious symbols, rituals, 
practices and/or ideologies that can induce a trance even in the course of their normal or 
intended usage.  The rich tradition of ritual contained in nearly all mainstream religions is 
capable of inducing a trance and often does so as a means of coping with and even 
transcending the suffering endured in this life.  Organizations that make use of such religion-
based methods to induce a state that enables an individual to strap on explosives and 
detonate him- or herself among civilians gravely abuse those religious traditions. 
 
                                                          
26  Anne Speckhard, N. Tarabrina, V. Krasnov, and N. Mufel, “Posttraumatic and acute stress responses in 
hostages held by suicidal terrorists in the takeover of a Moscow theater,”  Traumatology, Volume 11, Issue 1 
(March, 2005).  
Anne Speckhard, N. Tarabrina, V. Krasnov, and N. Mufel, (2005) “Stockholm Effects and Psychological 
Responses to Captivity in Hostages Held by Suicidal Terrorists” in S. Wessely  & V. Krasnov, eds.  Psychological 
Responses to the new Terrorism: A NATO Russia Dialogue, IOS Press.   
The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (in press). 
27  Bruce Bonger, Suicide Terrorism, Paper presented for Suicide Terrorism: Strategic Importance and 
Counterstrategies, NATO Advanced Research Workshop – Lisbon, June 10-14, 2004. 
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By making use of religious ideology and practices to induce and strengthen dissociative and 
trance states, and by failing to address in any way other than encouraging suicide the traumas 
affecting the populations on which they draw, many sponsoring groups take advantage of, 
and reinforce, the dissociative tendencies of traumatized youth.  Such groups make the 
barrier to becoming a suicide terrorist less overwhelming, and the chances of the bomber 
backing out due to fear, far less likely. 
 
A Necessary Defense 
That dissociation is likely a necessary – or at least a key – aspect of suicide terrorists’ ability 
to move forward toward their own deaths was also borne out in an unusual study.  In a 
Brussels University study of “normal” students from varied international backgrounds, 
researchers were able to induce this same defense simply by asking subjects to take part in a 
thought experiment, in which the students briefly took on the role of bombers who had 
been stopped just before detonating.28  Nearly all of the subjects described their fantasized 
“memory” of having the bomb strapped to their bodies in a highly dissociative manner.  It is 
telling that even individuals with no intent to carry out such an act seemed to find it 
necessary to use a dissociative defense in order to confront imagining their own deaths 
through the strapping to their bodies (and eventual detonation) of lethal explosives. 
 
When Zacharia Zubeidi, the leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in Jenin, spoke to the 
author29 about the mental states of those he sends as bombers, he explained that even he has 
experienced this type of dissociative state.  Recalling a stand-off in which he was surrounded 
by Israeli soldiers – and sure that he could not bear to return to the torments of 
imprisonment, which he calls “a piece of hell” – he decided it would better to die, shooting 
as many soldiers as he could.  Describing his mental state at the time he was facing the 
decision to “martyr” himself, he recalls, “I took a look from the window.  I decided I want 
to die.  But when I got my weapon ready and jumped on them, I decided not to die.  It was 
for a moment, a feeling like – death is a mercy.  I felt like the feeling of being a martyr when 
I jumped on them, but it changed just when I opened the door.  In one flash of any eye my 
feelings changed from asking to be martyred to cursing.” 
 
Zubeidi explains that his traumatic experience with imprisonment was so unbearable that he 
preferred death to arrest.  “Prison, even if only a cage, with no torture – it takes all your 
achievements.  In one moment it all disappears.  You always keep remembering – the 
outside, the outside…you start to hallucinate.”  In freedom, Zubeidi still suffers traumatic 
flashbacks.  He explains, “I get the whole tape rewound, the whole prison, flashbacks of the 
prison.”   
 
The Suicide Bomber:  Locked into an Inflexib e Dissociative Mode? l
                                                          
Like many trauma survivors, Zubeidi often involuntarily moves into a dissociative mode.  
Yet he argues that he is still flexible in his response to stress and that this is the difference 
between himself and those he sends as martyrs.  He argues, “They are completely different 
than us [fighters].  They have only one decision.  We have many options.  The thought of 
running away is always available.  We can [also] go and shoot.”  In contrast, he describes the 
28  Anne Speckhard, Ken Reidy, Val Vanrompay & Beatrice Jacuch, “Taking on the Persona of a Suicide 
Bomber: A Thought Experiment”  Unpublished research paper, 2005. 
29  Anne Speckhard, Unpublished interviews of Palestinian militants March 2005. 
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intended martyrs as locked into an inflexible dissociative mode, caused by traumatic stress 
and leading to one seemingly clear decision.  “Of course they get flashbacks all the time and 
for them death is a mercy.” 
 
While a “normal” person will move between fight and flight responses in reaction to stress – 
employing dissociative defenses only when a threat becomes overwhelmingly horrific, 
terrifying and life-threatening – the individuals sent by Zubeidi to commit acts of suicide 
terrorism would seem, from his own observations, to be caught inflexibly and over long 
periods of time in a dissociative mode.  Explaining his own mode in comparison to theirs he 
says, “For the martyr, all the cells in his mind are dead except for one.”  According to 
Zubeidi, these individuals are in too much pain to find another way to cope and thus 
become totally fixated on carrying out what they view as an act of community defense, an 
expression of pain and an enactment of justice in response to “all that he has seen”.  
Explaining their inflexibility, he states, “When I feel this way, I stay there one or two hours, 
but [for] that one, [the intended bomber,] after all that he has observed there is only that one 
thing [i.e., to end his or her life on behalf of the community].” 
 
Acts of Defense and the Expressive Quality of Suicide Terrorism 
 
When one considers that human bombs tend to be people who: 
 
• Have reached their individual breaking point from traumatic stress; 
• Have become filled with grief, trauma and guilt over surviving when others have not; 
• Are convinced of the futility and shortness of living; and 
• Are locked into a dissociative mode, which gives them the feeling of being “already 
dead”, 
 
It is possible to understand their perception of death as “a mercy” (to use the words of 
Zacharia Zubeidi).  Furthermore, because the religious teachings of so many of these human 
bombs expressly forbid suicide – and because the bombers, even in the throws of a 
dissociative state, are often able to separate themselves enough from their psychic pain to 
avoid suicide – this act can come to be seen by the individual as sacrificial rather than 
suicidal. 
 
Even so, there are certainly parallels between choosing to become a human bomb and 
choosing to commit “normal” suicide.  The traumatized individual who chooses to become a 
bomber has lost his ability to see other options, as the dissociative defense increasingly 
causes him to remain numb and distanced from the many possibilities he might otherwise 
understand to be available to him.  This is similar to the cognitive restriction frequently 
observed in people choosing to commit “normal” suicide in that these come to view taking 
their own lives as their only viable option for dealing with their psychic pain. 
 
Likewise, when one’s society has embraced an ideology that permits – and even promotes – 
suicide bombing, then death in this manner can become a door through which one walks to 
escape psychic pain; circumvent consideration of all other options that, because of traumatic 
dissociation, appear essentially closed-off in the first place; and act heroically in defense of 
one’s community.  Human bombs generally believe that they are defending their 
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communities by acting in this way.  They tend to cite serious grievances as their motivations 
for acting and they value highly the mere fact that they are acting.  The choice to become a 
suicide bomber thus appears, for them, to be a great move out of traumatic depression into 
action, which is highly significant in and of itself. 
 
In becoming suicide bombers, the terrorists use their last bit of psychic energy to act, and in 
so doing express their own pain and that of their community while making their enemy 
“other” experience and feel that pain, too.  Especially in cases where the enemy “other” is 
perceived to be conducting his “war” at a distance – from helicopters, using smart bombs or 
guided missiles and with a minimal loss of soldiers’ lives – taking a bomb into the heart of 
the enemy’s territory can seem a way of “evening the stakes” and can fill a desire to make the 
“other” feel one’s pain.30
 
IV.  Gender Differences:  Women & Suicide Terror 
 
Gender differences can certainly be observed between men and women suicide bombers, 
and these are important to understand.  That being said, however, we have found that 
gender is rarely the central factor in the individual or organizational motivation for choosing 
to become or send a bomber. 
 
The Organizational Component 
 
Certainly, Palestinian terror organizations began to open this option to women as it became 
more and more difficult to send male bombers across increasingly secure checkpoints.  
Women could more easily hide explosives by feigning pregnancy, and respect for the cultural 
mores of modesty at first prevented vigorous searches of women (though with the increase 
in female bombers this has changed).  Additionally, the initial instances of suicide bombing 
carried out by females held tremendous shock value. 
 
There is limited evidence that some sending organizations view women as expendable and 
that they find it expedient to exploit the particular vulnerabilities of women in certain 
societies.  There have been suggestions that the PKK used women as bombers more often 
than in some other capacities because the terror cells needed to relocate fairly frequently and 
women were observed to be slower at hiking and less useful for carrying equipment over 
long distances. 
 
The Debate Over Societal Coercion 
 
Direct Pressures 
In rare cases, there is evidence that both men and women have been exploited by senders 
who use blackmail or outright coercion.  Members of the sending organization may coerce 
potential bombers by threatening to reveal a sexual secret or drug habit, etc., which, if 
exposed, would cause the individual to be killed, threatened with death or severely socially 
ostracized.  Blackmail is generally a more powerful tactic when used against women in 
                                                          
30  Nichole Argo, (2003) The banality of evil: Understanding and defusing today’s human bombs. Unpublished 
research proposal.   
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conservative societies because women are often constrained to live with more numerous and 
rigid moral strictures than are men. 
 
Furthermore, rumors abound of more direct instances of coercion, especially in regard to the 
so-called Chechen “Black Widows”.  Zarema Mujukhoeva, the only Chechen bomber to 
abandon her suicide mission and someone who, unlike all the others, agreed to do so in the 
first place for money, claimed after arrest that the “Black Widows” are forced to carry out 
their missions by a phantom figure she called “Black Fatima”.  According to Mujukhoeva, 
“Black Fatima” follows the bombers to make sure they detonate – and triggers the 
detonation by remote if they do not.  If this story has any truth to it, one wonders how 
Mujukhoeva could have lived to tell her story, given that she put her fully charged, bomb-
filled backpack down on the streets of Moscow while trying to abandon her mission.  Why 
would “Black Fatima” not have detonated Mujukhoeva’s bomb by remote?31  It seems more 
likely that this is merely a rumor that originated with Mujukhoeva (wanting to deny all 
responsibility for her criminal actions and later admitting to many lies), that was then 
amplified by a Russian press unable to grasp the reality of the motivations leading Chechen 
women into suicide terrorism – women who are not coerced, but are in fact willing 
volunteers.32
 
Indirect Pressures 
Pursuant to her interviews with family members of female Palestinian bombers, Barbara 
Victor33 argued that strict and narrow role assignments in a tightly controlled society made 
the choice of martyrdom seem more attractive to those women who were unable or 
unwilling to fulfill their prescribed social roles (due to infertility, discovery of an illicit sexual 
relationship or pregnancy, etc.).  Certainly, this was true of female Tamil Tiger suicide 
bombers who were raped at checkpoints by their enemies and thus rendered unable to 
return to the “normal” roles of becoming wives and mothers.  Although this set of 
circumstances applied only to a minority of female Tamil bombers, the result was to leave 
those women who were affected the choice of becoming prostitutes, militants or bombers.34  
For other reasons (e.g., cancer, infertility, etc.) we found the same problem of inability to 
fulfill “normal” roles operating among female Chechen bombers, though this motivator was 
always entirely secondary to that of deep personal traumatization.35  
 
Indeed, recent interviews with “would be” female Palestinian bombers imprisoned in Israel 
suggest that the inability to fulfill “normal” roles is little more than a marginal motivator.  
One respondent laughed when asked about Victor’s theories, arguing that they are 
implausible.  “For this you want to explode yourself?  For infertility?  This is stupidity.  For 
                                                          
31  The only person actually killed by the bomb was the security officer who tried to defuse it. 
32  Speckhard & Akhmedova 2005  The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism, Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism (in press). 
33  Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers, Rodale Books, 
2003. 
34  See Mia Bloom (2005) Dying to Kill: the Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Francois Gere, personal 
communication Feb 2005 likewise remarks that Tamil propaganda often exaggerated the frequency of these 
cases of females raped at checkpoints, but the majority of their bombers appeared not to be coming from such 
cases. 
35  Speckhard & Akhmedova 2005  The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism, Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism (in press). 
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having had illicit sexual relations?  You will die for this?  No.  I can speak to God and He 
will forgive me.”  She went on to say that people often search for such explanations, 
especially with regard to female bombers, and explained, “Every girl can decide for 
herself…if you want to die and you know you want to die.  This is what is going on with 
exploding ourselves.”36
 
Limited Options for Responding to Traumatic Stress 
 
Even so, a serious and relevant difference between men and women suicide bombers is that 
men who are seeking to fight back against a powerful enemy – or who are trying to take 
flight from the same – have many more options than do their female counterparts in 
conservative societies.  Militant organizations in conservative societies are often unwilling to 
arm women to fight in battles or even to allow women to “martyr” themselves in shoot-outs 
or other scenarios in which they are likely to be killed.  Similarly, there is some evidence that 
girls are more likely to employ the dissociative defense in response to traumatic experiences 
than are boys, who often manifest the impact of traumatic stress through conduct disorders 
and hyperactivity.  Hence, the restricted options and roles presented to women in 
conservative societies, if these do indeed impact the decisions of female suicide bombers, 
most likely do so in a more focused rather than in a more generalized way.  By limiting 
women’s possible responses to traumatic stress (and, in particular, giving them few ways in 
which to either fight back against or flee the sources of that stress) conservative societies 
might prompt some women to get stuck in a dissociative mode, which in turn makes them 
more amenable than they would be otherwise to the option of becoming a human bomb. 
 
Zacharia Zubeidi, the leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in Jenin, seems to share this 
view.  He reports, “Girls come begging for such operations [human bombings] much more 
than boys.  Twice as many girls ask.”  When asked why he thought this was so, he answered, 
“Emotions of girls are higher than boys.  Their feelings are much deeper than boys’.  God 
created girls more sensitive.”  Then, reflecting a bit more, he added, “We decided no girls.  
No one took them since the intifada began, so this pool increased.  A guy can let a little of 
what’s inside out by going to shoot on an operation – shoot and come back.  A girl has few 
choices.  She cannot go and shoot.  Every girl has just one way – a [bombing] operation.”  
Indeed, we met a young Palestinian woman who told us that she had asked for a mission but 
was repeatedly denied.  Yet her desire for a mission continued to grow – along with her 
sense of powerlessness – each time another of her friends martyred himself or was killed by 
Israelis.37
 
Certainly, a woman who chooses to become a bomber briefly attains a sense of power in life 
– and taking on the traditionally male role of warrior is a great equalizer.  But both of these 
feelings are quite short-lived given the short career path that characterizes this role.  Hence, 
these are likely only secondary motivations following traumatic stress.  Likewise, in some 
societies a woman can attain “rock star status” only after death; a status that is very difficult 
for a woman to attain in life in most traditional societies. 
 
                                                          
36  Anne Speckhard unpublished Palestinian interviews March 2005. 
37  Anne Speckhard Palestinian interviews March 2005. 
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V.  Europe and Suicide Terrorism 
 
Though it has thus far been relatively free of suicide terrorism, Europe is no stranger to this 
phenomenon.38  Germany and Spain served as staging grounds for 9/11, with Mohammed 
Atta’s cell originating in Germany and many relevant financial transactions made in Spain.  
Similarly, three suicide bombers have originated in the United Kingdom, two of whom 
carried out their attacks in Israel, while the third would have taken down an entire planeload 
of passengers had he not been stopped39.  Furthermore, at least two groups have been 
caught using what could be characterized as “weapons of mass destruction” – that is, 
planning to carry out ricin attacks in London and Paris. 
 
Important to note is that, in Paris, the so-called Chechen cell was made up of North 
Africans who so strongly identified with the traumas of their Chechen “brothers” that they 
risked their own lives plotting to poison staff at the Russian embassy.  This is chilling 
evidence of the possibility that growing numbers of disaffected and socially alienated 
Muslims living in Europe will identify with the traumas of their “fictive kin” living outside 
the continent, and therefore act as terrorists within Europe on behalf of these others.  The 
Madrid bombings might be seen as supporting this idea. 
 
One of the current concerns in Europe is that of widespread radicalization of the Muslim 
youth living there.  A growing number of European cities have high concentrations of 
Muslim youth, many of whom are poorly integrated into local society.  Brussels, for example, 
is 20 percent Moroccan.  Given the impressive cyber infrastructure in Europe and in the 
United States, it is not hard to imagine that al-Qa’eda – which is no longer a coherent 
organization but more of a movement – could radicalize large numbers of disaffected and 
socially alienated young Muslims and then mobilize them to support suicide terrorism by 
disseminating its ideas over the Internet to target groups living on either side of the Atlantic.  
This would represent the first step in a nascent movement to mobilize individuals who might 
be willing to carry bombs outside of the already active zones of conflict.  If this threat were 
to be realized on a large scale, it would likely create even more radical changes in the way 
that Europeans and Americans currently go about and enjoy their lives. 
 
VI.  Motivational Sets for Human Bombs 
 
Nationalism, Community Defense, Self Expression, and Trauma/Revenge-Based 
Motivations 
 
As stated earlier, there appear to be two primary groups of motivations (or “motivational 
sets”) for suicide terrorism.  The first can be observed within societies that view themselves 
– rightly or wrongly – as under occupation or involved in a war.  In many ways the affected 
individuals, sponsoring organizations, and societies have the mentality of insurgents.  Their 
corporate motivations are often nationalistic and their personal motivations are trauma- and 
revenge-driven.  They often rely on dissociation as a defense.  As such, bombers with the 
“insurgent” mentality generally see themselves as acting in defense of their communities, 
                                                          
38  NOTE:  This paper was written and edited for publication prior to the July 2005 suicide attacks in 
London. 
39  Richard Reid was the shoe bomber who almost downed a plane in flight to the United States. 
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acting in an expressive manner and doing so in a way that causes pain to their enemy “other” 
in order to make that other feel “our pain”. 
 
These bombers have frequently, but not always, adopted a religious ideology that allows 
them to act as cosmic warriors – disposing of the normal boundaries for the use of violence, 
seeing that violence as part of an all or nothing battle, and demonizing their enemies.  In this 
group, we find nearly identical psychological processes that lead both men and women to 
become human bombers.  Leaders and organizations play a role by promoting suicide 
bombing as a viable and morally approved choice.  Societies and individuals enduring too 
much traumatic stress and suffering from too much psychic pain then respond to such 
messages, contribute to them and act accordingly. 
 
Alienation, Marginalization, Loss of Identity, Desire for Meaningfulness and 
Adventure, Secondary Traumatization, and a Desire for Redemption 
 
The second group of motivations (or the second “motivational set”) is entirely different 
from the first and can be observed within societies strongly affected by the problems of 
immigration, migration and/or a clash of cultures.  Among the individual suicide bombers 
whose motivations seem to lie in this second set are Mohammed Atta and his 9/11 cell 
originating in Hamburg, Germany (and finding much of its support in Europe); the 9/11 
bombers who came from Saudi Arabia; the two nightclub bombers originating in the United 
Kingdom who acted in Israel; Richard Reid, the would-be shoe bomber from the United 
Kingdom, who was a Muslim convert and who nearly took down a passenger plane heading 
for the United States; the Casablanca bombers in Morocco; the Moroccan train station 
bombers in Madrid40; and lastly those who have gone to Iraq from peaceful parts of Europe 
or the Arab world in order to carry out suicide bombing attacks.  In this group to date we 
find few women.41
 
The motivations in this second group appear to us to be comprised of a lethal cocktail of:  
 
• A sense of societal alienation and marginalization, for those temporarily (or even over 
generations) residing outside their original cultures; 
• A loss of one’s sense of self and/or loss of positive identity (both of which intersect with 
group dynamics, questions of loyalty, and a feeling of belonging to the group); 
• A desire for adventure; 
                                                          
40  The Madrid bombers did not set out as human bombs, leaving their explosives at the station and detonating 
from afar, but when nearly apprehended they detonated explosives ending their lives rather than surrender. 
41  We reason that this second motivational set is far less likely to be active in women for a number of reasons.  
First, women who have grown up in conservative cultures may be so used to playing “secondary roles”, that 
the “secondary role” of immigrant seems broadly similar to the ones they played in their home society.  As 
such, female immigrants may not perceive as large a drop in status in their host society as male immigrants do.  
Second, female immigrants often find themselves at home, closely guarded by their families.  They may thus be 
shielded from their host cultures and so prevented from integrating readily into those cultures.  This, in turn, 
might prevent immigrant women from feeling a sense of internal “corruption”.  Lastly, we believe that those 
who travel from Arab and European countries to carry out bombings in Iraq are more likely to be men than 
women because Muslim women who might otherwise wish to take part in the insurgent attacks are far less 
likely to be allowed to travel freely.  Still, it should be noted that some female Chechen bombers – albeit always 
with caretakers – have indeed traveled long distances to carry out attacks. 
                                                                                                                     ANNE SPECKHARD 19 
  
• A desire for meaning in life; 
• Secondary traumatization (e.g., identifying with the traumas and injustices visited upon 
Muslims in Chechnya or the Palestinian territories) and indirect traumatization from 
viewing images of the hardships of these populations on television and over the internet; 
and, 
• A desire for redemption from personal corruption. 
 
A sense of marginalization and alienation, the search for adventure and the desire to 
establish for oneself a positive identity are all strong motivators.  However, the last two 
motivations listed here – strong identification with the traumas of others (which is easily 
accomplished nowadays through the use of video footage, graphic images on the television 
and internet, etc.) and a history of perceived corruption by one’s host society – are perhaps 
the most important.  This is because, in combination with the first four, secondary 
traumatization and a sense of personal corruption combine to create a strong need for 
redemption.  A typical example might be that of a Muslim immigrant who has let himself go 
“wild” in the West – drinking, using drugs, chasing women – and who then decides to 
respond to this perceived corruption by returning to Islam, eventually embracing an ultra-
conservative and militant form of the religion. 
 
In so doing, many immigrants are motivated by a feeling of real sorrow over the sufferings 
of others, even as they refuse to come to terms with the “bad boy” part of themselves that 
once partially embraced the very culture they consider to have inflicted that suffering.  
Instead, as they split themselves off from their host culture, they come to project onto 
Western society the “bad boy” tendencies that they are seeking to disown, concluding, 
eventually, that the West must be either punished or destroyed.42  Moreover, in joining a 
close-knit group of militants, an individual in the above scenario can replace his negative 
self-image with a positive, adventurous, and heroic self-image – one that is in turn reinforced 
by belonging to the group.  Feelings of loyalty and other elements of group dynamics so fill 
the individual’s need for belonging and positive self image that he may become willing to 
bear the ultimate cost of being part of that group:  sacrificing his “good”/”redeemed” self 
for the group’s ultimate goal.43  In this way, a seemingly “normal”, integrated Muslim man 
can suddenly transform himself into a virulent human bomb – giving rise to horrified 
Western reactions at the notion of Muslims living and/or educated in Europe and the 
United States choosing to turn against their host societies and carry out attacks such as those 
of 9/11. 
 
                                                          
42  See Lloyd deMause, The Emotional Life of Nations New York: Karnac Books, 2002, 
43  See Marc Sageman Understanding Terror Networks University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.  Post, J., Sprinzak, 
E. & Denny, L. (2003), “The Terrorists in Their Own Words:  Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern 
Terrorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15 (1), Spring, pp. 171-184. 
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VII.  Better Understanding the Threat & Addressing Root Causes 
 
Supporting Key Research and Making Use of Our Existing Knowledge 
 
Those who wish to fight suicide terrorism and combat popular support for it need to 
understand the phenomena as they exists today, in the many settings in which they occur.  
The first step toward doing so is to support solid research aimed at learning as much as 
possible about organizational and individual motivations – and the communities that support 
them – as well as the modes of interaction or intersection among these.  In achieving such 
understanding, it becomes possible to begin to design interventions based on solid empirical 
evidence, which might then help to curb this very lethal and exponentially growing global 
threat. 
 
Likewise, it is important to put into use what we already know.  Suicide terrorism is not the 
result of poverty or illiteracy alone.44  Simply reading the statements of terror groups makes 
clear that many attempt to address failed political processes and that a number of them are 
legitimately concerned with social injustices – some of which are easier than others to begin 
to address.  Survey data collected by researcher Khalil Shiqaqi show that popular support for 
suicide terrorism among Palestinians can be seen to increase or decrease depending upon 
how threatened the society feels or how confident it is in the political process at any given 
time.45
 
Providing Alternative Views and Outlets 
 
It is also clear that suicide terrorists make use of willingly manipulated mass media.  It might 
be wise to investigate the possibility of voluntary self-censorship on the part of the most 
sensational reporting organizations.  Israel already does this successfully, whereas Russia’s 
President Vladimir Putin has threatened to achieve similar ends by state decree – a move that 
could well prompt the Chechen terrorists to attack more often Moscow or other major cities 
where complete state control of the media would be nearly impossible. 
 
More fundamentally, the terrorist ideologies that so successfully address feelings of social 
alienation, victimization, and trauma – and that manipulate the dissociative states that occur 
among many Muslim youths as a result of traumatization – must also find competition from 
societies that are willing and able to address, in constructive ways, these same issues of 
trauma, alienation, and the need for social justice.  Organized or informal groups, both 
within and outside affected societies, must begin to offer roles and hope to young people, so 
that they will not turn to suicide terrorism for want of alternative ways to change their lives 
and communities. 
 
Religious leaders must begin to stand up to the manipulation of Islam by jihadist militants, 
and those who speak out ought to be supported (if quietly) by the West.  However, not 
many are likely to want this role so long as the West continues to be seen by large numbers 
                                                          
44  Scott Atran, “Mishandling suicide terrorism” The Washington Quarterly 27:3 pp 67-90 Summer 2004 pg. 1; 
Ariel Merari, Suicide Terrorism,  2003. Unpublished Manuscript, pg 1, 5. 
45  Khalil Shiqaqi “The Views of Palestinian Society” in Suicide Terrorism in Countering Suicide Terrorism, 
International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, 2002. pg 155-164. 
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of their supporters as tainted by the abuses at Abu Ghraib, seemingly extralegal detentions or 
practices considered “torture lite” in places such as Guantanamo Bay, and continued reports 
of soldiers failing to act honorably in Iraq and elsewhere.  By extension, it can be argued that 
preserving cherished “Western” freedoms will require finding a means to deal with the 
conflict zones that inflame jihadist mentalities in ways that uphold democratic ideals.  This is 
no easy task, but it is necessary to prevent the spread of suicide terror as a tactic.  Already, 
the ideas and culture of suicide terrorism have made significant inroads among many groups 
and can be seen to have migrated successfully from conflict area to conflict area.  This is 
unlikely to stop if the West does not begin to address the root causes of suicide terrorism – 
including the ideologies as well as the individual’s psycho-social motivations. 
 
A Balanced Approach 
 
This is not to say that intelligence operations aimed at infiltrating terror groups or military 
operations aimed at decapitating their leadership cannot make a difference.  Israel has shown 
dramatic short-term success in this regard, although it could be argued that this success is 
bought at the cost of motivating future terrorists to action.  As U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld lamented in 2004, it is not good enough simply to kill terrorists if these are 
able replace their ranks faster than they can be killed. 
 
Especially within conflict zones, individual psychology and traumatic experiences play a huge 
role in the individual’s decision to become a bomber.  Other key factors include the failure 
of the political process to address individual grievances and sponsoring organizations’ 
willingness to exploit such failure.  Community support for suicide terrorism increases when 
threats to its well-being are perceived as high and political processes are viewed as failing to 
meet those threats. 
 
The prevention and gradual diminishment of the threat posed by suicide terrorism thus 
requires that we address root causes.  Governments must be encouraged and pressured to 
reform, so as to open avenues for economic growth and increased opportunities for the 
frustrated, disillusioned and often well-educated youth who constitute the most volatile 
sector of the societies from which suicide terrorism is coming.  All sectors of society – both 
at home and abroad – must be given a voice and all ethnic, gender, and religious groups 
must be attended to with respect so that these do not find solace in the ideologies and 
activities of radical groups.  Human rights abuses, whether at home or abroad, must neither 
be tolerated nor seen to be tolerated, even in the name of fighting terrorism.  To do so 
abandons democratic values and exchanges freedom for security, which, in the end, brings 
neither.
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Treating Terrorist Groups as 
Armed Bands: 
The Strategic Implications 
 
Joseph McMillan 1
 
If you were to ask an alumnus of any advanced military educational institution almost 
anywhere in the world, “What do you call the extension of politics by violent means?”, the 
answer would be instantaneous:  “War”!  Yet even since 9/11, it has been only slowly and 
over considerable intellectual resistance that the logical corollary of this maxim has gained 
acceptance:  that terrorism must be a form of warfare.  After all, what is terrorism if not one 
way of pursuing political objectives – broadly defined – by violent means? 
 
Put that way, it seems obvious that terrorist groups should be considered as “opposing 
armed forces”.  However, addressing the question more seriously requires that we ask 
ourselves how else terrorist groups might be viewed.  One alternative that reflects the way 
such groups have traditionally been viewed in the United States is to treat them as criminal 
organizations. 
 
I.  Terrorists as Criminals? 
 
A Historically Sensible Comparison 
 
Before the attacks of September 11, 2001, as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
(the “9/11 Commission”) pointed out, the U.S. government’s basic approach for dealing 
with terrorists was as a law enforcement problem.  At the time, this did not seem 
inappropriate.  Since terrorism, by its nature, involves the unlawful use of violence (under 
both international and domestic law), it is a natural reflex to consider it initially as a judicial 
issue and, historically, such an approach had had considerable merit.  It had worked 
reasonably well in dealing with the types of terrorism with which Americans were most 
immediately familiar.  Until recently, most terrorist acts in the United States, from the 
anarchist assassination of President McKinley in 1901 to the abortion clinic bombings of the 
1990s, were limited in scope and carried out by indigenous organizations and individuals.  
The damage done by terrorist acts was generally not much greater, and in many cases less, 
than the damage done by ordinary criminal activity.   
 
The kidnapping and bank-robbing left-wing terrorists of the 1970s, for example, fell into this 
category, as did the more recent spate of abortion clinic bombings.  These acts could be 
dealt with through the normal law enforcement mechanisms, even though the groups 
involved may have technically met the criteria for armed bands.  Even in instances when 
terrorist attacks did massive damage, such as the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal 
                                                          
1  The views expressed are the author’s own and do not reflect those of the National Defense University or the 
Department of Defense. 
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Office Building in Oklahoma City, the criminal justice system seemed to be the most 
appropriate instrument for responding. 
 
One reason to prefer the criminal justice approach is that governments are supposed to be 
able to maintain public order without the constant use of force.  A government can damage 
its legitimacy if it uses force excessively or in ways that the populace sees as outside the 
generally accepted “rules of the game”.  In the United States, those rules of the game, at least 
when dealing with U.S. citizens, include respect for the protections guaranteed by the Bill of 
Rights and specifically the right to a fair trial.  In fact, like guerrillas pursuing a protracted 
war strategy, terrorist groups often try to goad governments into attacking them in ways that 
can turn potential terrorist sympathizers into actual terrorist sympathizers. 
 
Shortcomings of the Criminal Justice Approach 
 
The problem, as perceived in retrospect in the United States, is that this legalistic approach – 
whatever its past utility – is inadequate to the task of countering modern terrorism that is 
being organized and carried out by much larger, more capable and more dangerous groups 
operating from outside the United States.  These organizations, particularly al-Qa’eda and its 
affiliates, operate on an entirely different scale than “traditional” terrorists.  In the first place, 
their motivations are profoundly different.  They no longer “…want a lot of people 
watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead,” as Brian Jenkins once 
said; they want a lot of people dead.  In the second place, globalization combined with 
modern technology has given them the range and lethality to act on their aspirations to 
commit mass murder.  In short, terrorism on the scale of September 11, 2001 or March 11, 
2004 overwhelms the capabilities of even the most highly developed criminal investigative 
and judicial systems. 
 
That al-Qa’eda was a threat of a different order of magnitude should have been clear from 
the bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, the attack on the USS Cole in 
2000, and the discovery by U.S. intelligence of even more ambitious plots in the Far East 
and Jordan that were never carried out.  But, the lesson was not absorbed, according to the 
report of the 9/11 Commission: 
 
The most important failure [leading up to the attacks] was one of imagination.  We 
do not believe leaders understood the gravity of the threat.  The terrorist danger 
from Bin Ladin and al Qaeda was not a major topic for policy debate among the 
public, the media, or in the Congress.  Indeed, it barely came up during the 2000 
presidential campaign.  Al Qaeda’s new brand of terrorism presented challenges to 
U.S. governmental institutions that they were not well-designed to meet.  Though 
top officials all told us that they understood the danger, we believe there was 
uncertainty among them as to whether this was just a new and especially venomous 
version of the ordinary terrorist threat the United States had lived with for decades, 
or it was indeed radically new, posing a threat beyond any yet experienced.2
 
The perceptual problem ran deeper than a simple miscalculation of the threat, however.  
U.S. federal laws on terrorism that placed responsibility for dealing with the issue on the law 
                                                          
2  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report:  Final Report of 
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington:  GPO, 2004)  
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enforcement community had the effect of preempting other solutions to the problem.  “The 
Attorney General shall have primary investigative responsibility for all Federal crimes of 
terrorism,”3 says the principal criminal statute on terrorism.  So it was universally expected – 
and widely applauded – that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) immediately asserted 
the Attorney General’s jurisdiction following each of the four most serious foreign terrorist 
attacks against U.S. targets leading up to 9/11:  the bombings of the Khobar Towers military 
housing complex in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam 
in 1998, and the USS Cole in Aden harbor in October 2000.   
 
The mindset that terrorism was principally a judicial issue shaped the actions of all segments 
of the government, not just the FBI.  When the Clinton Administration considered seeking 
the extradition of Osama Bin Laden from Sudan in 1996, the Justice Department opposed 
the move on the grounds that there was no indictment on which Bin Laden could be held in 
the United States.4  In reporting to the new Administration what it had learned about the 
bombing of the Cole, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysts characterized their 
assessment as “preliminary” because they were concerned that expressing judgments of 
culpability without being able to satisfy a legal standard of proof might prejudice a future 
criminal prosecution.  This apparent tentativeness in stating what the CIA actually believed to 
be quite strong proof was found by the 9/11 Commission to be partly to blame for the 
White House’s decision not to take action in retaliation for the Cole bombing.   
 
The weaknesses of the criminal justice system as the primary instrument for confronting an 
exceptionally lethal, well-organized terrorist organization of global reach now seem apparent.  
In the first place, the criminal justice system is designed to deal with individuals.  It is 
structured around proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a specific individual was 
responsible for a specific act.  It operates punitively after the fact, not preventively before 
the fact.  Effective action often takes years as a case is assembled and legal custody of the 
accused is secured.  Finally, the criminal justice system’s two wellsprings of deterrence – 
social stigma and punishment – do not work well in preventing attacks by armed bands who 
consider themselves to be at war with a society (and therefore do not fear social stigma) and 
who expect in any case to die in the course of carrying out their attacks (and therefore do 
not fear punishment). 
 
In fairness, thinking had begun in the U.S. government by at least the mid-1980s about 
handling the threat of terrorism as more than a criminal problem.  In particular, planners 
started considering the development of capabilities for offensive counterterrorism using 
military forces.  In June 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 
39, declaring that the United States saw “…terrorism as a potential threat to national security 
as well as a criminal act and [would] apply all appropriate means to combat it.”  In 
prescribing steps to be taken in response to this threat, however, the PDD still focused on the 
familiar remedies, saying that the United States would “…pursue vigorously efforts to deter 
and preempt, apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute, 
individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks.”5  Moreover, having 
recognized terrorism as a national security problem in PDD 39, the same Administration’s 
                                                          
3  10 U.S. Code 2332b(f). 
4  9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 5, “Diplomacy.”  
5  9/11 Commission, Staff Statement No. 5, “Diplomacy.” 
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PDD on counterterrorism (PDD 62 of May 22, 1998) assigned only one mission to the 
Department of Defense:  protection of Americans overseas.6  While the al-Qa’eda attacks on 
the embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi less than three months later led to a series of 
punitive military responses, it took the shock of 9/11 to cause a serious adjustment in the 
way U.S. policy-makers conceived of the problem. 
 
II.  The Concept of Terrorist Groups as Armed Bands 
 
As already suggested, the trend in the United States since 9/11 has increasingly been to view 
terrorists more as armed enemies and less as criminals – in other words, to treat them 
primarily as an opposing armed force, albeit an unlawful one.  The word “primarily” is 
important, because the two approaches are not mutually exclusive.  In fact, Abraham D. 
Sofaer and Paul R. Williams have aptly described terrorism as “unconventional warfare 
conducted by unprivileged combatants with the assistance of criminal co-conspirators 
designed primarily to terrorize and kill civilians.”7  The question is whether that approach is 
appropriate and justified.  In answering that question, two criteria have to be considered.  
The first is definitional:  is the term “armed force” applicable to terrorist groups in general or 
only to one terrorist group in particular?  The second is utilitarian:  is treating terrorist 
groups as armed forces strategically useful? 
 
At the purely taxonomic level, a terrorist group meets the definition of an armed force:  it is 
a force, and it is armed.  Various dictionaries define a “force” in this context as “a body of 
armed men”, “any body of persons combined for joint action” or “a group organized or 
available for a certain purpose”.  In fact, any terrorist group capable of mounting a 
significant threat goes well beyond this minimal standard.  Far from being simply a hodge-
podge of people with weapons, these groups have support systems, organizational structures, 
and communications networks.  Moreover, they have command and control mechanisms 
that guide and direct their operations to a greater or lesser degree.  The only thing that keeps 
them from being full-fledged “armed forces” is that they are not, in legal terms, military – 
they do not carry their arms openly, wear the distinctive markings of a military force, or 
operate according to the laws of armed conflict.  Because they are not truly military in 
character, it is probably preferable to refer to them as “armed bands” rather than an “armed 
force”.  The distinction is important not only to differentiate “them” from “us” but also to 
distinguish terrorists from those who are, under the law of armed conflict, lawful rebels or 
insurgents. 
 
More important than dictionary definitions, however, is the fact that terrorism is, as was 
touched upon briefly at the outset, essentially a form of warfare, and specifically a subspecies 
of what military planners have come to call “asymmetric warfare”.  In other words, it is a 
method by which the weaker side in a conflict can damage the stronger side, while 
preventing the stronger side from bringing its strengths to bear.  Given that military theorists 
have been absorbed for a number of years with the problem of asymmetric warfare, it may 
be surprising that it took so long for terrorism to be seen in that context.  The reason may 
                                                          
6  9/11 Commission, Staff Statement No. 6, “The Military.” 
7  Abraham D. Sofaer and Paul R. Williams, “Doing Justice in Wartime,” Policy Review 111 (2002) 4.  Sofaer and 
Williams apply this characterization specifically to the war waged by al-Qa’eda, but it is equally appropriate in 
describing other cases of terrorism as well. 
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be that, because terrorism’s modus operandi is psychological rather than military, it is initially 
difficult to recognize it as warfare at all.  If terrorist groups with their current organization, 
weapons and objectives were to launch a campaign of attacks against military, rather than 
civilian targets, we would have no difficulty thinking of them as armed bands or forces.  To 
argue that such groups are not armed bands – or armed forces – simply because they attack 
noncombatant targets by unlawful means, would be logically similar to a suggestion that the 
Gestapo’s quasi military formations should not have been fought as an armed force. 
 
The idea of treating terrorists as armed bands is particularly important to confronting the 
radical Islamist terrorists who constitute today’s gravest danger – al-Qa’eda and its allies and 
affiliates.  Al-Qa’eda’s leaders clearly saw themselves as being in a state of war with the 
United States well before 9/11, even if the United States did not realize it.  Osama Bin 
Laden had issued a formal “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land 
of the Two Holy Places” five years earlier, followed up by a collective “Statement Urging 
Jihad against Jews and Crusaders” in 1998.  Al-Qa’eda obviously functioned as an armed 
force in Afghanistan.  It provided thousands of trained, armed fighters in support of the 
Taliban in its war against the Northern Alliance and later in opposing the U.S.-led invasion 
in 2001.  It also reportedly provides such fighters for the anti-Russian guerrilla war in 
Chechnya.  Al-Qa’eda has – or had – the highly articulated organizational structure 
characteristic of armed forces.  As the 9/11 commission pointed out, at the time of the 
attacks on New York and Washington, al-Qa’eda possessed all the elements of leadership, 
personnel management, training, command and control, intelligence, logistics, and financial 
management necessary to conduct carefully synchronized operations halfway around the 
world. 
 
As suggested above, in deciding whether to treat a particular terrorist group as a criminal 
gang or an armed band, it is important to take account not only of its objectives and internal 
characteristics, but also of the damage it is able to do.  Globalization is widely recognized as 
having fueled many of the resentments on which terrorism feeds.  At the same time, it has 
also provided terrorist groups with the capability to act on those resentments with 
unprecedented efficiency and lethality.  Just as globalization has led to the rise of sub-
national actors in the economic arena, it has also led to their rise in the security arena.  
Capabilities that were once available only to governments are now within reach of private 
groups as well.  Like other sub-national actors in a globalized world, terrorist groups enjoy 
full access to open borders, instant communications, efficient international financial systems 
and modern information technology and organizational methods, and have demonstrated 
that they can use these to great advantage.  Al-Qa’eda and its allies are not the first people to 
lash out against the incursions of an alien culture, nor the first to use indiscriminate violence 
in an attempt to inflict the maximum possible damage on their enemies.  They are, however, 
the first to have the ability to strike on a global scale with such catastrophic effect. 
 
Finally, there is a sound legal basis for treating terrorist groups as hostile armed bands, 
particularly among the decisions of the United Nations and regional security organizations 
following 9/11.  The day after the attacks, the Security Council stated in Resolution 1368 
that any act of international terrorism is “…a threat to international peace and security.”  
This, in itself, suggests that the problem is beyond the realm of simple crime.  Furthermore, 
NATO and the Organization of American States both found the attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon to have been “armed attacks” within the meanings of their 
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respective charters.  “Armed attack” is a term of art in international law.  It is against “armed 
attacks” that members of the United Nations are said to have the “inherent right of self-
defense” under the Charter.  While an armed attack may also be a criminal act, there is a 
clear distinction between the two concepts.  This is also reflected in the preamble to the U.S. 
Constitution, which lists “establish justice” and “provide for the common defense” as 
separate justifications for framing the United States federal government.   
 
Strategic and Operational Advantages 
 
In this context, thinking of terrorist groups as hostile armed bands has a number of 
implications, both strategic and legal, for how governments act to counter them.  Most 
obviously, it makes available to leaders a more complete range of capabilities, including the 
use of armed forces, to counter the terrorist threat.  This does not mean that a country that 
has been attacked by terrorists is somehow barred from using non-military means against the 
terrorists and it certainly should not be read to imply that such a country would be bound to 
use the military instrument vis-à-vis every terrorist group.  The government of an attacked or 
threatened country is always at liberty to use other means of protecting its citizens and 
maintaining order, including the criminal justice system, if it judges those better suited to 
dealing with any particular threat.  The point is simply that treating terrorists primarily as 
criminals tends to rule out remedies beyond the realm of the criminal justice system, while 
treating them as hostile armed bands opens up to the decision-maker a much broader 
spectrum of responses. 
 
Failing to treat terrorist groups as hostile armed bands has the effect of conceding to the 
terrorists the competitive advantage afforded by their asymmetric strategy.  As the side 
challenging the status quo, terrorists have the clear operational initiative.  It is the terrorist 
leader who decides when, where, and what to attack from among an almost unlimited variety 
of targets.  Conversely, the state against which terrorists are operating can never defend 
every potential target everywhere at all times, especially if it is constrained by constitutional 
and legal rules (which the terrorists, of course, feel free to disregard).  Magnifying the target 
state’s dilemma is the vastly increased range and lethality of terrorist groups – a subject 
touched upon earlier in this paper.  Meanwhile, as long as an enemy group retains the 
initiative, its credibility with actual or potential supporters grows, while the morale of the 
target society declines. 
 
The resolution of the terrorist challenge therefore depends upon seizing the initiative, 
something that is impossible if the state combating terrorism is restricted to a reactive 
posture.  Terrorist forces must be discovered, disrupted, and destroyed before they can 
strike, and the environment in which they recruit and sustain themselves must be altered to 
prevent their continued survival.  To accomplish this combination of suppression and 
prevention, the state combating a terrorist threat must treat its adversary, at least 
conceptually, as being analogous to any other enemy force. 
 
The tools, methods, and rules available to the military strategist offer a much more effective 
way of seizing the strategic initiative than those employed by public prosecutors.  From the 
perspective of strategy and plans, the core competencies of military strategy offer a number 
of clear advantages.  Military strategists tend to see threats as operating entities or networks, 
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rather than as lists of individuals.  Good military strategists conceive of war as a series of 
sequential or simultaneous campaigns, each of which comprises a number of mutually 
reinforcing tactical actions and all of which ultimately lead to the achievement of a policy 
objective.  Where prosecutors often measure success in terms of indictments brought or 
convictions won, military strategists at their best, measure success in terms of the effects that 
operations have on enemy capabilities as a whole. 
 
We can illustrate the point with an example from conventional war.  If one were responding 
to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor from the standpoint of a prosecutor, the fundamental 
focus would be on the questions of exactly who ordered the attack, who carried it out, and 
how those facts could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  The objective of the exercise 
would be to punish the specific guilty individuals.  From the standpoint of a military 
commander, however, personal culpability would be a matter of indifference.  Instead, one 
would ask where other Japanese forces were, how they were supported, what factors were 
critical to the Japanese prosecution of the war, and how those factors could best be attacked.  
The point would not be to capture or kill individuals to mete out punishment but rather to 
damage the capabilities of the enemy and to defeat his strategy. 
 
Legal Advantages 
 
The Domestic Context 
From a domestic legal perspective, treating terrorist groups as enemy armed bands does not 
require decision-makers to comply with the rules of evidence required in a criminal 
proceeding.  This does not mean that one attacks a target without strong evidence that it is 
linked to the enemy organization, but that the standard of proof is less onerous – sources 
can be kept secret, hearsay evidence is admissible, and the previous record of the hostile 
organization can be taken into account in weighing the decision to act.  Under the concept 
of fighting an armed enemy, members of the terrorist organization who have as yet 
committed no indictable offense may be attacked and killed or captured without them first 
having to have broken some provision of domestic law.  Indeed, as pointed out by the staff 
of the 9/11 Commission:  “Senior legal advisers in the Clinton administration agreed that, 
under the law of armed conflict, killing a person who posed an imminent threat to the 
United States was an act of self-defense, not an assassination.”8  Similarly, the facilities and 
property of an armed enemy may be confiscated or destroyed without elaborate legal 
proceedings. 
 
Although the U.S. government has chosen not to proceed very far along this path, treating 
foreign terrorist groups operating in the United States as hostile bands – who have entered 
the country surreptitiously for the purpose of carrying out armed attacks – theoretically 
opens the legal possibility of using the U.S. military against them on home soil.  Under the 
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and related laws and regulations, the U.S. armed forces cannot 
be used “to execute the laws” except under tightly circumscribed conditions.  If actions 
against terrorist groups do not take the form of “executing the laws”, but rather that of the 
suppression of armed bands by military means, the legal barrier to the use of the armed 
forces would seem to vanish. 
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Finally, if terrorist groups are combated through military means, one of the principal 
obstacles to cooperation between intelligence and investigative agencies is negated; 
investigative information no longer has to be kept confidential for fear of compromising the 
prosecution’s legal case. 
 
The International Context 
In international legal terms, viewing terrorist groups as armed bands also yields several 
positive results.  In the first place – and as already discussed – it makes terrorist groups who 
conduct armed attacks legitimate objects for the exercise of self-defense by military or other 
means.  It also has the effect of invoking the traditional international legal principle by which 
“states are under a duty to prevent and suppress such subversive activity against foreign 
Governments as assumes the form of armed hostile expeditions…”9  Furthermore, if 
terrorist strikes are “armed attacks”, as NATO and the Organization of American States (OAS) 
found them to be, and if terrorist bands are a “threat to international peace and security”, as 
the United Nations Security Council found them to be, then military operations designed to 
combat groups that carry out such attacks are not actions against other countries’ “territorial 
integrity and political independence” but a valid exercise of the right of self-defense.10
 
The strategy for combating terrorism being pursued by the Bush Administration is implicitly 
informed by the understanding that the adversary functions as one or more hostile armed 
bands.  Thus, the first goal in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003) is “defeat 
terrorists and their organizations [emphasis added].”  One of the specific objectives under that 
goal is to “destroy terrorists and their organizations,” so as to “eliminate capabilities that allow 
terrorists to exist and operate [emphasis added].”  The strategy contends that “we cannot 
wait for terrorists to attack and then respond” and that “the best way to defeat terrorism is 
to isolate and localize its activities and then destroy it through intensive, sustained action.”  
This is not the language of investigation, evidence, trial, conviction and punishment.  At this 
point, it is not even the language of tit-for-tat retaliation.  It is the language of a war strategy.  
 
Risks and Limitations 
 
Resolving the Status of Captured Terrorists 
While using the concept of terrorist groups as hostile armed bands has enormous utility in 
framing strategy and broadening the array of lawful measures available to counter them, it is 
not without its risks and disadvantages. 
 
Of these disadvantages, the one that has probably caused the most resistance to viewing 
terrorists as “armed forces” is the effect such a view is perceived as having on the legal status 
of captured terrorists.  The U.S. Administration’s efforts to place such captives into a 
category apart from those comprehending accused criminals (with Constitutionally 
guaranteed rights) or prisoners of war (with Geneva Convention-guaranteed protections) is 
too well known to require rehearsal here.  Suffice it to say that the quandary is a serious one. 
 
                                                          
9  L. Oppenheim, International Law:  A Treatise, 8th ed. (London:  Longmans, Green, 1955) I:292-93. 
10  Joseph McMillan, “Apocalyptic Terrorism:  The Case for Preventive Action,” Strategic Forum No. 212 
(November 2004). 
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Still, such considerations need not limit the use of the concept outlined here as a tool of 
strategic analysis and operational planning; as the U.S. Supreme Court suggested in an 1897 
case involving a U.S. ship engaged in providing support to insurgents in South America, a 
distinction can easily be made “…between recognition of belligerency and recognition of a 
condition of revolt; between recognition of the existence of war in a material sense, and of 
war in a legal sense.”11  It is possible to act upon the reality that terrorist groups function as 
armed forces without conceding that they have the legal standing of armed forces. 
 
Playing into the Terrorists’ “Warrior” Image 
A related disadvantage to treating terrorist groups as analogous to enemy armed forces is 
that it can play into the warrior image that the terrorists seek to cultivate within their own 
societies and around the world.  One reason that al-Qa’eda relies so heavily in its propaganda 
on images from early Islamic history is that these reinforce Osama Bin Laden’s mythic 
stature as a Muslim hero – a ghazi – in the line of the early conquerors.  Unfortunately, this 
carefully nurtured image is widely accepted in much of the Islamic community. 
 
Seeking to be identified as soldiers is not peculiar to al-Qa’eda.  As Bruce Hoffman has 
pointed out, “terrorists…deliberately cloak themselves in the terminology of military 
jargon,” partly as an argument for being treated as prisoners of war if captured, but more 
importantly as a way of justifying their actions – equating them with the military actions of 
the states against which they are fighting.12  Here again, this risk should not restrict us from 
thinking of al-Qa’eda as an armed force in our strategic analysis, even if we have to be careful 
about how that analysis carries forward into our public rhetoric. 
 
Refining the Use of Military Options 
A second broad category of risk associated with viewing terrorist groups as analogous to 
enemy armed forces is that it can lead decision-makers to emphasize exclusively military 
options for combating them, rather than looking to the full range of instruments of national 
power.  In principle, the U.S. Administration is fully aware of the need to think outside the 
purely military “box”.  The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is quite clear, for instance, 
that the United States and its allies must also apply diplomatic, intelligence, investigative, 
prosecutorial, economic, financial, informational and developmental resources to “deny 
sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists” and to “diminish the underlying 
conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.”  And in a now famous memorandum from 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to his staff, he made clear his understanding that a 
purely military approach risks creating new terrorists faster than the existing ones could be 
eliminated.  Nevertheless, it has been only slowly that the U.S. government has gotten itself 
organized and oriented toward this more comprehensive conception of war against these 
armed bands, and much remains to be done before it can truly be said that all fronts are 
being covered. 
 
Simply acknowledging that terrorism is inherently a tactic of war and that terrorist groups are 
armed bands conducting unlawful warfare does not sweep away the conceptual obstacles and 
pitfalls to fighting these groups effectively, even at a purely military level.  Modern military 
theorists often take for granted that breaking the enemy’s will is preferable to destroying his 
                                                          
11  The Three Friends (166 U.S. 1) 
12  Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York:  Columbia UP, 1998) 33-34. 
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capabilities because the former is generally held to be less costly and more likely to lead to an 
enduring post-war peace.  This approach has significant merit when operating against a 
conventional state.  However, when attacking terrorist leaders, structures and operatives, the 
same principles of cost-effectiveness dictate a primary focus on capabilities rather than 
intentions.  This is because operating against intentions requires a sufficient understanding 
of the enemy’s motivations and a high level of confidence in our ability to affect his calculus 
(and will).  With terrorist operatives we usually have neither of these. 
 
On the contrary, two of the most intractable problems in dealing with the contemporary 
terrorist threat are our inability to understand what motivates someone to become a suicide 
bomber and the difficulty of structuring a set of negative consequences that could lead him 
or her to abandon a course of intentional martyrdom.  Of course, not all terrorist 
organizations and operatives share a commitment to martyrdom.  Nevertheless, planners 
must constantly keep in mind the differences between fighting an actual state with the 
population, territory and infrastructure of a state, and the much more elusive enemy that is a 
terrorist insurgency. 
 
III.  The Future Terrorist Threat: 
Adaptability Combined with Information Technology 
 
The most serious terrorist threats today are presented by decentralized, loosely affiliated 
networks, not by easily identifiable and geographically locatable formal structures.  This was 
already true at the time of 9/11, and, as former CIA Director George Tenet reported to 
Congress in the summer of 2004, it has become increasingly the case since the U.S. military’s 
massive disruption of al-Qa’eda operations in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  As Tenet said, al-Qa’eda itself seems to be less an organization than a movement:  
a source of motivation for the like-minded everywhere in the world, rather than a clearly 
defined organization providing equipment, training and command and control.  In the U.S. 
view, the commuter train bombings in Madrid in 2004 were the clearest manifestation of this 
trend.  They were apparently not carried out at the behest of Osama Bin Laden or Ayman al-
Zawahiri, but were nevertheless inspired by al-Qa’eda’s methods and rhetoric. 
 
This trend away from clearly defined organizations has been facilitated by the information 
revolution.  As was recognized soon after 9/11, modern information technology has greatly 
facilitated terrorist groups’ ability to operate in multiple locations simultaneously.  Given the 
extensive amount of information that is readily available on the World Wide Web and the 
ease and speed of communications over the internet, operations can be planned, 
coordinated, commanded and controlled from any computer with a modem and a phone 
line.  Al-Qa’eda operatives have proven quite adept at using anonymous access to the internet 
and sophisticated means of covert electronic communication.  Indeed, the information 
revolution is a major facilitator of almost anything a terrorist group would want to do, from 
collecting intelligence to propagating its ideological message to recruiting, indoctrinating, and 
training new personnel. 
 
In other words, if the pressure brought to bear on terrorist groups by the international 
community in the wake of 9/11 has forced those groups to change their style of organization 
and operation, the information revolution has made it possible for them to make the 
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necessary changes and to continue operating with considerable – if somewhat diminished – 
effectiveness.  Terrorist groups have long relied on Leninist-style cell structures to ensure 
operational security while modern communications allow these structures to become even 
more impersonal and anonymous.  Moreover, some groups have taken advantage of these 
technologies to flatten their organizational structures.  They now find themselves able to 
operate securely without burdensome and complex levels of middle management.  Using 
well-chosen technological media, top leaders can communicate with field operatives with the 
same isolation and security formerly provided by layers of intermediaries. 
 
Thus far, however, these groups have only scratched the surface of the possibilities 
presented by the information revolution.  Thorough indoctrination in what soldiers would 
call the “commander’s intent”, coupled with the most sporadic of communications, could 
yield an unprecedented degree of fluidity and unpredictability in terrorist operations.  An 
apocalyptic terrorist agenda, that has the objective to inflict maximum damage and chaos 
(rather than to conduct a carefully structured campaign aimed at extracting political 
concessions), would be particularly suited to such a loose, unstructured organizational 
approach.  Often there is no obvious organizational center of gravity and no clear state 
sponsor presenting an obvious target for military action.  The lack of a centralized terrorist 
command and control structure renders irrelevant much recent military operational theory 
that focuses on attacking the enemy’s decision-making capabilities.  Meanwhile, the nature of 
the informal, shifting ties among different terrorist groups reduces the utility of attacking 
those ties in the ways that one might attack the key nodes that connect the members of a 
traditional alliance.  Full realization by terrorist groups of the potential presented by modern 
information technology would be a major challenge to planners of counterterrorist strategies. 
 
In conclusion, while the insights and operational advantages that come from thinking of 
terrorist groups as hostile armed forces – or armed bands – are enormously useful, a 
comprehensive strategy to defeat Islamist-inspired terrorism on a global scale cannot be 
based on this concept alone.  We began this discussion with the observation that terrorism is 
simply an unlawful means of applying violence in pursuit of a political agenda.  In the view 
of many U.S. analysts (and as reflected in U.S. policy pronouncements) that political agenda 
in the case of al-Qa’eda and its ideological allies is nothing less than a transnational insurgency 
aimed not only at the conservative regimes of the Middle East but at the entire international 
state system.  Whatever its objectives, however, it is clearly an insurgency being carried out 
by terrorist means.  As with any insurgency, combating the insurgent forces – in this case 
armed terrorist bands – is not sufficient to defeat the insurgency in the long run.  But 
combating those forces is necessary, and to combat them successfully we must apply the 
methods, analytical and operational, appropriate to fighting an armed force.
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Future Terrorist Weapons 
 
Jill Dekker-Bellamy 
 
In 1972, when the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was opened for signature, a 
primary concern was state research and development of offensive biological weapons.  Since 
that time, the threat of terrorist or “rogue” state use of unconventional weapons has 
changed significantly.  Advances in bio-technology and in conventional weapons – such as 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) that are capable of carrying CBRN payloads – along 
with the proliferation of missile technology, have increased the risk of unconventional 
weapons use.  At the same time, there is a serious risk of “sub-state” terrorist acquisition and 
use of less technologically advanced weapons or of CBRN in material form (versus more 
advanced strategic weapons).  Of course, neither rogue states nor terrorists heed the 
provisions of international treaties. 
 
The distinction between sub-state groups with few state associations or assets and state-
sponsored terrorist cells – those empowered by governments – is important in divining the 
types of weapons that terrorists are likely to employ in the future. 
 
I.  Sub-State Terrorist Groups and the CBRN Threat: 
The Chechen Example 
 
The terrorists in Chechnya are loosely supported by a number of foreign and international 
terror groups, but they have fewer sophisticated capabilities than those groups.  Still, the 
Chechen terrorists have been able to achieve horrific results.  The September 2004 tragedy in 
Beslan – similar to that of 9/11 – is of special concern because these terrorists, who, several 
years ago, were responsible for planting a radiological dispersal device (RDD) containing 
cesium 137 in a Moscow park, have shown themselves willing to cross threshold after 
threshold of ethical and moral depravity in order to carry out mass-casualty attacks.  
Although the typical RDD is relatively unsophisticated, it is still capable both of inflicting 
collateral damage and of instilling a general sense of terror within the affected population. 
 
The terror network that carried out the Beslan attack is run by Shamil Basayev, a Chechen.  
Members of Basayev’s network also carried out the Moscow Dubrovka theatre siege in 
October 2002, in which 175 people were ultimately killed.  In 1999, Basayev’s group 
detonated a canister of toxic agents in a village near Grozny. 
 
Since that time, there has been a steady increase in the number of reports indicating that 
Chechens have been carrying out surveillance of sensitive Russian facilities, presumably in 
order to attack them or to find ways to access them – and thus acquire dangerous materials.1  
Basayev has expressed an interest in biological weapons.  This should be of grave concern to 
the international community, given that, depending on the pathogen, much of the world 
would be at risk of feeling the effects of a successful biological attack, no matter where it 
                                                          
1  Bale, Jeffrey M., “The Chechen Resistance and Radiological Terrorism”, Center for Non-proliferation 
Studies, April 2004.  URL:  http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_47b.html
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may be carried out.  The risk becomes even higher if the biological attack is perpetrated 
within a country with limited public health resources and no infrastructure for detecting or 
containing an act of biological terrorism.  Moreover, Basayev’s apparent interest in biological 
weapons may suggest that other terror groups are also taking a more active interest in CBRN 
materials acquisition.  Led by Basayev, the Riyadus-Salikhin Battalion issued a warning on 
November 20, 2002 that it would henceforth target various European bodies along with 
NATO because of their allegedly hypocritical pro-Russian stances.2
 
Given the extensive structures of the former Soviet Union’s Biopreparat pharmaceutical and 
bio-defense programs, the security of laboratories within Russia and within other states that 
played host to key containment facilities – such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Georgia – is 
critical to international security.  Equally vital are those programs that: 
 
• Convert laboratories originally designed to produce dangerous materials for use in non-
threatening bio-technology sectors; and 
• Redirect highly trained biological weapons scientists into productive roles. 
 
Because terrorists are likely to be extremely creative and flexible as they choose, design, and 
employ all manner of weapon in the future, national counter-measures must be equally agile 
and inventive.  Heavily basing our estimates on past events has already proven disastrous.  
Therefore, we must carefully consider the past, but also think “outside the box”, when 
attempting to address the question of future weapons use by terrorist groups. 
 
II.  State Threats and Future Terrorist Weapons: 
The North Korean Example 
 
Assessing the threat of future terrorist weapons is not as straightforward as it may seem.  
This is partially because rogue states that are known proliferators of advanced missile 
technologies may make such technology more accessible to sub-state terrorists. 
 
Rogue states that are both intent on developing a CBRN capability and armed with strategic 
weapons and advanced delivery systems pose an increasing threat to the international 
community as a whole.  A good example of the complex nature of the rogue regime threat is 
North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK).  North Korea’s 
proliferation of missile technology is a serious concern and Western intelligence agencies 
that now believe that the country may have been able to weaponize smallpox and plague, in 
particular.  Current estimates suggest that the DPRK’s biological warfare programs are 
focused almost exclusively on these two specific agents and that what the country has 
weaponized it has also deployed. 
 
The DPRK’s programs are alarming because the country’s posture is difficult to track; because 
it possesses sophisticated long-range strategic weapons; and because, again, a strike against 
any nation or group of nations by a rogue state with weaponized Category A agents is likely 
to put the international community as a whole at immediate risk within a few hours of such a 
                                                          
2  Bale, Jeffrey M., “The Chechen Resistance and Radiological Terrorism”, Center for Non-proliferation 
Studies, April 2004.  URL:  http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_47b.html
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strike.  As noted by United States Congressman Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY), Chairman of 
the House International Relations Committee and head of a special advisory panel on North 
Korea, “It is now believed that two types of North Korean Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
can strike the continental United States with weapons of mass destruction.”  He continued, 
“For the first time in our history, we are within missile range of an arguably irrational rogue 
regime.  Regrettably, we cannot defend against that threat.” 
 
III.  Facing the Threat 
 
Those who present reduced threat scenarios, arguing that some combination of insufficient 
technology sophistication, acquisition difficulties, and the inherent challenge of successfully 
deploying unconventional weapons will help prevent sub-state terrorists from causing 
serious harm, should carefully consider the following factors. 
 
Some factors arguing for a more “serious” risk assessment include: 
 
• The stated intent of terrorists to use CBRN. 
 
• The recovery of documents from former al-Qa’eda training camps that, at the very 
minimum, indicate intent to acquire and use unconventional weapons. 
 
• The potential of a rogue state to supply the range of technology and knowledge needed 
to advance sub-state objectives and unsophisticated programs. 
 
• Terrorists’ advocacy of – and engagement in – mass casualty and catastrophic attacks. 
 
There is strong evidence that terrorist s are interested in acquiring and using unconventional 
weapons while some states continue to pursue CBRN programs and are non-compliant with 
international treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Indeed, there is no 
evidence to suggest either a decline in terrorist interest in CBRN capabilities or increased 
adherence by rogue states to various treaties that would limit their use of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).3  Thus, the potential for unconventional weapons use by terrorists 
and/or rogue states – either in a material or a fully weaponized form – does not appear likely 
to go into sudden decline. 
 
Given this conclusion, transatlantic cooperation is an essential tool for reducing the danger 
such weapons – and potential terrorist possession of them – pose to the world.  The 
technological superiority of the United States and its outstanding defense capabilities are 
certainly one side of the equation while the European Union has vast expertise to offer in 
terms of preventive diplomacy and constructive engagement. 
 
                                                          
3  Indeed, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick has 
accumulated “credible evidence” that a number of terrorist groups and/or nations have obtained – or are trying 
to obtain – clandestine stocks of smallpox and that they are actively trying to produce weaponized armaments 
based upon the virus.  However, confidence about the available smallpox evidence varies somewhat among the 
14 U.S. intelligence agencies and departments. 
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While terrorists may rely primarily on conventional weapons and munitions to perpetrate 
future attacks, nations must now fully prepare for: 
 
• The potential of an increase in the scope and scale of terrorist attacks,  
 
• The use of unconventional weapons (or the deployment of conventional weapons in 
new and unexpected ways), 
 
• The use of select agents as a tool for provoking widespread fear and/or gaining 
economic leverage rather than to exact high death tolls, and, 
 
• The broadening of the range of potential targets.   
 
In light of this, perhaps the key challenge is not to determine the exact type of weapons 
terrorists plan to employ, but to concentrate national efforts on the integration of their 
capabilities to deter and protect against a highly skilled, often highly-educated and creative 
enemy with no moral or ethical inhibitions to CBRN use. 
39 
  
Future Terrorist Weapons 
 
Darryl Howlett and Jez Littlewood 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Terrorist use of WMD or CBRN devices is now regarded as a key aspect of the contemporary 
international security agenda.  Events in the 1990’s that resulted in mass casualties, such as 
the bombing of community housing in Buenos Aires in 1994; the attack against the U.S. 
government building in Oklahoma in April 1995; the truck bomb against the Central Bank in 
Colombo, Sri Lanka in 1996; the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 
1998; and the bombing of a Moscow apartment complex in 1999, revealed the extent of 
damage and loss of life that could be caused by terrorism.1  While these instances involved 
traditional methods of inflicting damage, the use of a nerve agent (sarin) in an underground 
train network in central Tokyo in March 1995 has been viewed as representing a quantum 
change in methods.  Concerns about this change in method have intensified since the tragic 
events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), when the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center 
were destroyed and the Pentagon was severely damaged by a coordinated attack using 
civilian aircraft as the method of destruction.  The attack not only produced mass casualties; 
it also changed assumptions about terrorist use of CBRN capabilities.2
 
In considering future terrorist weapons, analysts must presume that explosives, small arms 
and other light weapons, such as shoulder-launched anti-tank weapons, will remain in the 
terrorist arsenal.  In addition, existing and new conventional weapons will be used in novel 
ways, whether against aircraft, ships or other targets.  In this paper the sole focus is CBRN 
weapons from the perspective of what is currently in the hands of terrorist groups, what 
terrorist groups are likely considering and/or developing at the CBRN level, and how likely 
they are to use such weapons. 
 
II. The Threat of CBRN Terrorism 
 
The threat of CBRN terrorism, inevitably, will change over time and thus what constituted the 
threat in 1996 is not what constituted it in 2001, and the threat will likely be different a 
decade hence.  Similarly, the assumption that a devastating CBRN attack is inevitable may 
prove to be incorrect.  Nonetheless, such an attack may happen and policies and procedures 
have to be designed and implemented to reduce the risks, thwart attempted attacks, and 
manage the possible consequences.  
 
The first assumption that informs this analysis is that the possibility cannot be ruled out that 
a group with resources and global reach, such as al-Qa’eda, will use CBRN as a means to kill 
(or attempt to kill) a large number of people.  One qualification is that while it is not 
impossible to cause thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of casualties, such a catastrophe 
                                                          
1  Chris Quillen, ‘Mass Casualty Bombings Chronology’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 25:5 (September-
October 2002) pp. 293-302 
2  Paul Wilkinson, ‘Implications of attacks of 9/11 for the future of terrorism’ Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn 
(Editors) Global Responses to Terrorism (London, Routledge, 2003) p. 34. 
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should not be construed as either inevitable or easy to achieve.  Nor is it impossible to devise 
strategies to counter the possibility; indeed, much has already been accomplished in this 
context. 
 
The second assumption is the need for a balanced perspective concerning contemporary 
international terrorism and its actual capabilities in the CBRN area.  This is because certain 
types of CBRN weapons are most likely still beyond the wherewithal of even the most 
sophisticated transnational non-state actors.  Measures such as international agreements, 
national control procedures and export controls, coupled with the need for relevant 
scientific and engineering skills to manufacture deliverable and useable weapons, continue to 
impede non-state actors from acquiring high-end CBRN weaponry.  At the lower-end of the 
CBRN spectrum, however, the sources of supply are more numerous, difficult to control and 
can be obtained from the internet and elsewhere. 
 
Technology and globalization are key drivers in this area.  While the latter has had a 
transforming effect on transnational terrorist networks over the past decade, the former 
continues to raise issues such as those associated with dual-use technologies.  For example, 
new forms of weaponry might emerge on the back of the biotechnology and information 
technology revolutions, which some view as having a significant impact on terrorism.3
 
Regardless of the weapons of choice, the threat of international terrorism is likely to require 
the following:  responses over a long period of time; the involvement of both the public and 
private sectors; the continuing enhancement of international agreements, ranging from 
disease monitoring and control to more traditional arms control and disarmament; the 
employment of traditional means for prevention, detection, defense and consequence 
management as well as the implementation of new measures; the development of specific 
initiatives designed to address particular situations or weapons types; and the pursuit of 
cooperation at all levels (bilateral, regional and global).  A principal conclusion of this 
research is that policy responses should seek to encompass all phases of a potential use or 
threat of use of CBRN:  the pre-attack, attack, and the post-attack phases. 
 
In this analysis of the threat posed by CBRN, some of the conceptual and methodological 
aspects associated with CBRN and international terrorism are assessed.  Following this, the 
actual threat posed by CBRN weapons is subjected to a scoping exercise.  This is undertaken 
as a means to explore the possibility that these factors may be important in determining 
which weapons terrorist groups are likely to seek and use in the next few years.  In the 
conclusion of this analysis, the types of weapons that pose the greatest problems and biggest 
challenges are considered.  In addition, the conclusion suggests that immediate and short-
term planning to counter and respond to the threat has to be based on the contemporary 
picture. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3  See for example, Christopher F. Chyba and Alex L. Greniger, ‘Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An 
Unprecedented World’ Survival 46:2 (summer 2004) pp. 143-162. 
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CBRN:  Some Conceptual and Methodological Issues 
 
Many writers have viewed the events of 9/11 as a defining moment in international security.  
Few doubt that 9/11 threw traditional assumptions about terrorist motivations and methods 
into doubt.  No longer was it considered unlikely that international terrorists would shrink 
from the use of WMD if they were in possession of such weapons.  In particular, it was felt 
that 9/11 heralded a new era because it was an attack that, inter alia:  led to the death of the 
direct perpetrators; involved a new delivery method in a coordinated assault on civilian and 
military targets; suggested that asymmetric forms of conflict would be the wave of the 
future; killed more than three thousand people rather than tens or hundreds, including many 
first responders; involved an international network based in a ‘failing state’; used new forms 
of information and communication technologies for planning and execution; and was seen 
to have no short- or medium-term political motives.  Taken separately, none of these 
elements was necessarily new.  But taken together, they were seen as a portent of 
international terrorism where existing verities were no longer operative. 
 
The scale of 9/11 inevitably led to a focus on the question:  “What if the terrorists had 
access to CBRN?”  A substantial body of literature on terrorism and CBRN weapons existed 
before 9/11.  Within this corpus of knowledge, it was apparent that there was an assumption 
that terrorists would use CBRN if they could, based on the evidence that Aum Shinrikyo had 
made attempts to disseminate biological material, and had also used chemical weapons in 
Japan.  This cult represented no obvious political cause and apparently had investigated 
several options for inflicting mass destruction.  Concerns over CBRN terrorism were 
enhanced when the military intervention in Afghanistan produced evidence that al-Qa’eda 
had been investigating the possibilities of nuclear, radiological and biological attacks in its 
training camps and research facilities, and might have had links to individuals involved in 
state-based nuclear weapon programs.4
 
There is, however, a lack of hard data on the probabilities of a CBRN event and what the 
consequences would be from such an event.  As in the state-to-state case, CBRN attacks will 
produce both different levels of threat and different results, some of which may not 
necessarily be greater than previous attacks, let alone 9/11.  Assessing the precise 
motivations underlying such attacks and the capabilities that might be used is also fraught 
with complexity.  One early study conducted by the International Task Force on Prevention 
of Nuclear Terrorism concluded that it was possible for a dedicated terrorist group to build a 
crude nuclear device provided it had sufficient quantities of chemical high-explosives and 
weapons-usable fissile materials.  More significantly perhaps, in terms of thinking about the 
risks involved, it was felt that such a group would be more interested in causing panic and 
social disruption by making a credible nuclear threat, rather than by actually detonating a 
nuclear device and causing mass death and destruction.5   
 
                                                          
4  Julian Borger, ‘Al-Qaida videos show poison gas tests’ The Guardian 20 August 2002 p. 11; Haig Simonian & 
Mark Huband, ‘Risk of al-Qa’eda strike “has reached new dimension”’ Financial Times 6 November 2002, p. 8; 
Barton Gellman, ‘Al Qaeda Near Biological, Chemical Arms Production’ Washington Post 23 March 2003 A01; 
Edith M. Lederer, ‘U.N. Report Warns of al-Qaida WMD Risk’ Associated Press, 15 November 2003 (09.44) 
5  Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, ‘Preventing Nuclear Terrorism’ (Lexington, Mass. and Toronto, 
Lexington Books, 1987) 
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Today, the assumptions underpinning such assessments have been challenged by the advent of 
new forms of international terrorism.  The question this raises is:  “To what extent are the 
patterns exhibited by changes in motivation also mirrored by changes in access to weapons?”  
The key aspect is that any terrorist group emulating this acquisition scenario would still need to 
have sufficient financial resources, a haven in which to develop the weapon, access to a cadre 
of scientific personnel and, crucially, possession of the necessary fissile material.6
 
Adding to the complexity is the proposition that terrorist use of CBRN could involve both 
direct and focused use against a specific target and attacks on military and civil facilities that 
would generate CBRN-type effects.  Thus, contemporary concerns are not only about artifacts 
that are portable and recognizably ‘weapons’, but also fixed facilities that if attacked by 
aircraft or explosives or other means could produce similar local or regional effects.  
Whether or not this latter scenario would actually constitute WMD-terrorism is a moot point, 
but in the current international security climate it is likely to be portrayed as a WMD-attack by 
terrorists. 
 
This raises the question of whether the concept of WMD is still relevant as a means for 
understanding the complexity and dynamics of life in the early decades of the 21st century.  
Several terms have entered the lexicon of proliferation language, especially since 9/11.  These 
have included ‘mass casualty terrorism’, ‘weapons of mass disruption’ and ‘weapons of mass 
effect’.  Additionally, as already indicated in this paper, in recent years the term CBRN has 
appeared and, for many analysts, this represents a more appropriate basis for characterizing the 
spectrum of weapon types (highlighting their differences) that needs to be dealt with. 
 
The concept of WMD stems from debates within the United Nations immediately after the 
organization was founded.  In 1948, the United Nations Commission for Conventional 
Armaments introduced a categorical distinction between what were termed ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’ and ‘conventional ordnance’.7  As the Commission outlined the category, WMD 
included, “…atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and 
biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics 
comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned 
above.”8  This categorical definition subsequently formed the consensual basis for negotiation 
of international agreements such as the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT); but the interpretation of WMD has changed over time because the distinction 
between ‘lethal’ and ‘non-lethal’ (or more accurately, incapacitating) biological and chemical 
weapons disappeared in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1993 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
 
Some analysts now consider that the term WMD should be revisited because each weapon type 
has different effects (lethality), has different methods of production, and generates different 
                                                          
6  Jessica Stern, ‘Getting and Using Weapons’ Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Editors), Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism (Guilford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2000) pp. 158-171 
7  John Simpson, ‘The UN’s Role in Disarmament: Retrospect’ Contemporary Security Policy, 15:1 April 1994, pp. 55-
67. 
8  United Nations, Document UN S/C.3/SC.3/7/Rev.1 1947 
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challenges for international security.9  The term CBRN incorporates both the means of 
production and acquisition as well as the spectrum of effects that each weapon-type produces.  
At the same time, analysts should not lose sight of the important characteristics associated with 
the WMD concept, as this has formed a basis for international policy responses for over 50 
years.  Moreover, it may still provide the consensual platform for future responses to 
international terrorism.  The analysis that follows thus begins with the most destructive end of 
the spectrum by discussing nuclear weapons, and moves towards the other end where 
chemical weapons are situated. 
 
Nuclear Weapons 
 
The term ‘nuclear weapon’ is used to describe two types of devices:  atomic (fission) and 
thermonuclear (hydrogen).  It is most unlikely that a terrorist group would seek to 
manufacture a thermonuclear device, while the probability that they could acquire one by 
theft from one of the seven (or eight) states known to possess such weapons is extremely 
remote.  Even if they did, reconfiguring it to explode at a time and place of their choosing, 
or successfully triggering a thermonuclear explosion by external means such as exploding 
conventional explosives alongside it, would be difficult.  Consequently, only international 
terrorist acquisition or manufacture of atomic devices is considered in this paper. 
 
Two materials that are difficult to obtain – uranium highly enriched in its isotope 235 and/or 
plutonium with a high content of its isotope 239 – are necessary either alone or in 
combination to generate a fission explosion.  While the knowledge of certain aspects of 
nuclear weapon manufacture has become more commonplace, some consider that 
developing a reliable, fully deliverable weapon is still beyond the reach of even the most 
sophisticated group.10  The fissile material involved has to be manufactured through 
processes that are relatively complex.  Similarly, developing the non-nuclear assembly 
involves material and technologies, which, although more readily available, are restricted in 
their uses and thus, their manufacture and distribution is controlled internationally. 
 
One consequence of this is that for any terrorist group to acquire a nuclear weapon there 
would be two generic routes:  theft, capture or purchase of a nuclear weapon produced by a 
state; or theft or purchase of the necessary fissile materials and their configuration into the 
shapes required for a basic nuclear device.  In a recent study, the range of possibilities that 
might be available were identified as:  theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon, theft 
or purchase of fissile material leading to an improvised nuclear device (IND) or crude nuclear 
weapon, attacks and/or sabotage of nuclear facilities and unauthorized acquisition of 
radioactive materials contributing to a Radiological Dispersal Device.11  With regard to 
deployable nuclear weapons, unless assisted, any theft, capture, or purchase would have to 
overcome not only the security at the installation where the weapon is stored but also the 
                                                          
9  Wolfgang K.H Panofsky, ‘Dismantling The Concept of “Weapons of Mass Destruction”’ Arms Control Today, 
28:3, April 1998, pp. 3-8.  Christopher F. Chyba and Alex L. Greniger, ‘Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An 
Unprecedented World’ Survival 46:2 (summer 2004) pp. 143-162. 
10  Alexander Kelle and Annette Schaper, ‘Terrorism using biological and nuclear weapons’ PRIF Research Report 
No. 64, p. 18 
11  Charles D. Ferguson, William C. Potter with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wihling, The Four 
Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004) p. 3 
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locks and codes that prevent unauthorized use.12  Thus, the scenario that some consider to 
be more realistic, but not inevitable, would be the acquisition of a weapon from either North 
Korea or Pakistan, or possibly through theft from the Russian Federation.13
 
In addition, in a submission to the WMD Commission (Blix Commission), it was suggested 
that an appropriate means for understanding terrorist use of a nuclear device was via a ‘chain 
of causation’ model.  Based on a Harvard University study of March 2003, the analysts 
considered that this ‘chain’ incorporated a sequential progression involving:  motivational 
objectives; a decision to engage in nuclear terrorism; acquisition of the necessary materials 
through gift, purchase, theft, or diversion; an ability to transport and deliver the weapon to 
the target; and an ability to carry out the attack.14
 
The sources of nuclear materials that could be used to manufacture a rudimentary device – 
in contrast to a fully operational nuclear weapon – range much wider.  It remains unclear, for 
example, whether unrecorded caches of fissile material exist in the states of the former 
Soviet Union, or whether it would be possible to steal such material from locations in the 
Russian Federation itself.  A key aspect in making judgments in this area remains the 
availability of reliable data.  As a study by the Monterrey Institute for International Studies 
observed: 
 
Attempts to discern patterns and trends in illicit nuclear trafficking are complicated 
by at least three data limitations.  First, the number of confirmed cases is relatively 
small.  Second, there is a high probability that the actual number of cases is much 
larger and that the sample we have discerned is unrepresentative of the larger 
universe of incidents.  Third, the quality and scope of available information is very 
uneven and often is contradictory.15
 
While the study concluded by noting that more information was becoming available, it 
accepted that assessments would still be limited.  Nevertheless, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) lists 540 illicit trafficking incidents 
“…reported or otherwise confirmed…between 1993 and December 2003….182 incidents 
involved nuclear material, 335 incidents involved radioactive material other than nuclear 
material, and 23 incidents involved both nuclear and other radioactive materials.”16
 
A means of delivering the device would also need to be found.  A terrorist group is not likely 
to be able to use a ballistic missile as the method of delivery.  Rather, any device would have 
to be brought in by sea, a navigable river or a conventional air or land route.  In the latter 
cases, the artifact would still be very heavy and of a significant size.  This assessment could 
change if the reports that the former Soviet Union produced more compact nuclear weapons 
                                                          
12  Jessica Stern, ‘Getting and Using Weapons’ Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Editors), Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism (Guilford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2000) p. 164 
13  Amitai Etzioni, ‘Pre-empting Nuclear Terrorism in a New Global Order’ The Foreign Policy Centre 
(October 2004) http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/314.pdf
14  Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, ‘Improvised Nuclear Devices and Nuclear Terrorism’ Paper No. 
2 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.  http://www.wmdcommission.org/
15  William C. Potter and Elena Sokova, `Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS: What’s New? What’s True?’, The 
Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2002, p. 16. 
16  International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) 1993-2003’ 
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/PDF/itdb_31122003.pdf
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were confirmed, and if not all such weapons had subsequently been accounted for.  If such 
weapons were available to international terrorist groups, then it must be presumed that this 
would allow for greater ease of delivery. 
 
One observation stemming from recent analyses of the issues is that, “…nuclear terrorism 
experts generally agree that the nuclear terror acts with the highest consequences are the 
least likely to occur because they are the most difficult to accomplish.”17  In addition, it was 
noted that an IND represents the most challenging type of nuclear terrorism to perpetrate 
because it requires extensive financial and technological resources, as well as a secure facility 
to develop and produce the weapon itself – even before it is transported to the target.18  
There is, however, recognition that certain types of weapon design may be attainable: 
 
In principle, it remains possible for a highly motivated and financially well-endowed 
terror organisation to acquire the technical abilities necessary to manufacture an 
ignition mechanism for a nuclear explosive device.  Most informed observers are of 
the view that a gun-type device could be developed by terrorists.  However, this 
would require enormous efforts.  Various specialists would have to acquire the 
necessary knowledge and skills in university study abroad.…The organisation would 
need shelter for several years, where they can work undisturbed and carry out the 
necessary experiments.19
 
As a consequence, it is felt that only an international group with global resources and strong 
motivation could undertake an operation of this kind.  Thus: 
 
Al-Qa’eda is likely the only network with all the requisite characteristics…to pursue 
nuclear terrorism of the most extreme form, either by acquiring or developing a 
nuclear weapon.  While other terrorist groups might show an interest in nuclear 
terrorism, their interest will most likely be in less extreme forms of nuclear 
terrorism, and their abilities to operationalize such an interest may be limited.20
 
Consensus emerges on the key factor being access to fissile material, most notably access to 
highly enriched uranium (HEU).  A recent assessment characterized the implications of this: 
 
Preventing nuclear terrorism will require a comprehensive strategy:  one that denies 
access to weapons and materials at their source, defends every route by which a 
weapon could be delivered, and addresses motives as well as means.…The 
centerpiece of a serious campaign to prevent nuclear terrorism – a strategy based on 
three no’s (no loose nukes, no new nascent nukes, and no new nuclear weapons 
states) – should be denying terrorists access to weapons and their components.21
 
Notwithstanding any discussion of what would be required to implement such a 
comprehensive strategy, the principal lesson is a pertinent one:  preventing access to HEU, 
                                                          
17  Charles D. Ferguson, William C. Potter with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wihling, The Four 
Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004) p. 5 
18  Ibid, p.35 
19  Alexander Kelle and Annette Schaper, ‘Terrorism using biological and nuclear weapons’ PRIF Research Report 
No. 64 p. 19 
20  Charles D. Ferguson, William C. Potter with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wihling, ‘The 
Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism’ (Monterey, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004) p. 37 
21  Graham Allison, ‘How to Stop Nuclear Terror’ Foreign Affairs 83:1 (January/February 2004) pp. 68-69 
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Plutonium and the materials required for a radiological device is the key to stemming nuclear 
terrorism. 
 
Other analysts concur on this point.  For example, Charles Ferguson and William Potter 
advocate four steps to reduce such threats:  (1) adopt an HEU-first policy, whereby securing 
HEU takes precedence over attempting to secure weapons-grade plutonium; (2) secure 
Russia’s most vulnerable nuclear weapons; (3) focus on South and Central Asia as the zone 
where Islamic militant groups are active and access to nuclear materials – in parts of 
Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – is highest; and (4) promote stringent global security 
standards for the physical protection of nuclear material.22  Similarly, Matthew Bunn and 
George Bunn consider that there is an urgent need for a multilateral initiative that has as its 
long-term goal the protection and accounting for of weapons-usable nuclear materials that is 
as rigorously applied “…as the nuclear weapons states protect and account for nuclear 
weapons themselves.”23
 
Radiological Weapons or Radiological Dispersal Devices 
 
Radiological weapons and RDDs are intended as a means for denying the use of territory or 
for spreading radioactive materials over as wide an area as possible, thereby causing 
contamination and human casualties.  These devices usually involve conventional high 
explosives in combination with radioactive material.  Both elements necessary for this 
category of ordnance are more accessible than those necessary for nuclear weapons; 
conventional explosives like Semtex can be obtained relatively easily, while sources of 
radioactive material can be found in a variety of industrial, medical and power-generating 
locations.24
 
Radiological weapons can also be disseminated by both active and passive means.  The 
material could originate from a nuclear reactor in the form of used fuel rods or the waste 
produced; from medical uses in hospitals (such as for cancer treatment); from agricultural 
uses (such as for pest control or the preservation of fresh food); and from industrial sources 
(such as for examining welds and for oil well logging).  Many radioactive sources exist in 
both the advanced, industrial parts of the world and in the areas that are less economically 
advanced.  The number of potential sources and their wide distribution also make it difficult 
to prevent unauthorized or terrorist acquisition.  In some countries, particularly those that 
once formed part of the Soviet Union, there is a problem of ‘orphaned sources’, where 
records of the nature and localities of the radioactive materials created and distributed prior 
to 1991 have ceased to exist or are not readily accessible.  Such materials were either used to 
generate power in remote locations or to irradiate food for long-term preservation.  And 
because radiological sources of this nature may be accessible, relatively small, and safe, they 
can also be of greater portability when placed in a shielded container. 
                                                          
22  Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, ‘Improvised Nuclear Devices and Nuclear Terrorism’ Paper No. 
2 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.  Available at: http://www.wmdcommission.org/
23  Matthew Bunn and George Bunn, ‘Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage’ IAEA-   SM-
367/4/08, p. 15  http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/Nuclear_Terrorism/bunn02.pdf
24  See:  Annette Schaper, ‘Nuclear terrorism: risk analysis after 11 September 2001’ Disarmament Forum 2003:2 
p.13.  Tonya L. Putnam, ‘Communicating Nuclear Risk: Informing the Public about the Risks and Realities of 
Nuclear Terrorism’ Workshop Report May, 20, 2002.  October 2002. pp. 7-10 http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/20063/NuclearRisk.pdf
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Used fuel is found in several locations worldwide but is less easily accessible than many of 
the materials discussed above, as it is usually located in underwater storage ponds.  This 
source of material is larger in composition, weighs more than other sources and is likely to 
be more radioactive, making it difficult to shield when removed from a pond.  On the other 
hand, this source of radiological material may be less well guarded than those used in nuclear 
weapons and it is often stored either at power stations or research reactors – or moved to a 
central location for storage and reprocessing. 
 
Three general types of radiological dispersion situations or RDDs can be envisaged.  One is 
the active dispersion of such material by wrapping it around a conventional explosive whose 
blast effects would then distribute the material.  A second is to use some type of passive 
distribution device (e.g., a car) to spread the material around a locality or via a ventilation 
system.  This would probably be injurious to the health of the individuals involved, and thus 
border on being a suicide activity.  The third would be to attempt to breach the containment 
of a nuclear power station, a used nuclear fuel cooling pond or a highly active waste storage 
facility using explosives or kinetic energy.  The latter scenario, although likely to generate a 
long-term effect (as the Chernobyl experience indicated), would be a very difficult operation 
to execute.  It would require either very skilled piloting of a large aircraft (acting as a fuel-air 
explosive) to make an accurate impact on the designated target or a large force using 
significant amounts of plastic explosive. 
 
An additional concern in this context is the potential for sabotage of research reactors.  In 
2003 specialists in this area concluded that: 
 
Terrorists could do considerable damage through a sabotage attack on a research 
reactor of medium or larger size, and that these reactors are generally not as well 
protected from outside attackers as nuclear power reactors.  The consequences of a 
successful sabotage attack could be significant radioactive release and contamination 
of an area near the reactor site.  Since many research reactors, unlike most power 
reactors, are located within or close to populated areas, they may present a greater 
threat of disruption to the public from a sabotage attack than do most power 
reactors.25
 
A caveat may also apply in the case of the first scenario outlined above.  Any group seeking 
an RDD capability would find technical impediments to construction and to the eventual 
dissemination of radioactivity to a target.  This is due to the nature of the radioactive 
substance and its heat-generating propensities, the type of physical environment where the 
RDD is released and the climatic conditions at the time.  Cities, especially, are considered to 
present difficulties to potential attackers because the buildings would absorb certain amounts 
of the radiation.  One scenario using an RDD led to the conclusion that “…[f]urther than a 
few blocks from the detonation site, the blast exposure dose would not exceed the level of 
everyday environmental background exposure.”26
                                                          
25  George Bunn, Chaim Braun, Alexander Glaser, Edward Lyman, Fritz Steinhausler, ‘Research Reactor 
Vulnerability to Sabotage by Terrorists’ Science and Global Security 11 (2003) p.103. 
26  Tonya L. Putnam, ‘Communicating Nuclear Risk: Informing the Public about the Risks and Realities of 
Nuclear Terrorism’ Workshop Report May, 20, 2002.  October 2002. p.7  http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/20063/NuclearRisk.pdf  See also, Jessica Stern, ‘Getting and Using Weapons’ Russell D. 
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The physical impact of an RDD would be a product of the radioactivity of the material being 
dispersed, the quantity of material involved and the concentration of the material achieved 
by the distributing device.  As such, unless large quantities of highly radioactive material 
were involved, it seems likely that a lack of concentration of the material would limit the 
immediate deaths and leave the medium- and long-term casualties from cancers and other 
causes uncertain. 
 
Yet if a device, or more passive means of delivery, were used in such a way as to deliver 
radiological material to high-value economic or governmental sites in state capitals or major 
cities, the impact would be much greater than the use of explosives alone.  Significant social, 
economic, and political consequences could result.  Thus, this type of RDD use might best be 
characterized as creating a mass disruptive, rather than mass destructive, impact.  The first 
use of an RDD could also stimulate interest in this activity among terrorist groups with more 
political aims if mass disruption, but not major loss of life, were to result.27
 
Biological Weapons 
 
A biological weapon is essentially the deliberate use of disease and includes any biological 
agent – whether bacteria, virus, fungi or other (e.g., prion) – although only some pathogens 
are of real utility in terms of biological warfare and/or bioterrorism.28  Bioterrorism should 
not, however, be understood as only encompassing human or zoonotic pathogens; it must 
include anti-animal and anti-plant pathogens.  The latter elements have generally been 
brought together under the term ‘agricultural terrorism’, given that the likely targets are 
related to crops and animal husbandry.  The best example of the potential impact of this 
type of terrorism is the 2001 Foot and Mouth virus (FMV) outbreak in the United Kingdom, 
which was a natural occurrence of FMV.29  Bioterrorism must also take account of the 
distinctions between ‘lethal’ and ‘non-lethal’ pathogens. 
 
Sources of the pathogens exist across the world in culture collections, laboratories, civil and 
military facilities, and naturally in the environment.  The possibility of access to the 
pathogens is therefore theoretically high, but this must be tempered with the degree of 
knowledge required to exploit a pathogen to achieve the desired objective.  Although there 
are general concerns, that cannot be ignored, about the potentially devastating consequences 
of bioterrorism, a number of caveats need to be considered.  First, the theoretical potential 
of biological agents as weapons has been based on extensive studies of the military quantity 
and military quality of a pathogen, usually delivered via an aerosol.  The outcome here is likely 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Editors), Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Guilford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2000) pp. 
162-3.   
27  For a discussion see:  Charles D. Ferguson, Tahseen Kazi and Judith Perera, ‘Commercial Radioactive 
Sources: Surveying the Security Risks’, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional Paper No.11 (January 2003); 
Charles D. Ferguson, William C. Potter with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wihling, ‘The Four 
Faces of Nuclear Terrorism’ (Monterey, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004). 
28  In the UK the ‘Category A’ agents, those deemed of particular risk, are: Anthrax, Smallpox, Botulism, 
Plague, Tularaemia, and viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHF) such as Lassa, Marburg and Ebola.  
http://hpa.org.uk/infections/topics_az/deliberate_release/categoryaagentsmatrix.asp
29  Virginia Gewin, ‘Agricultural Shock’ Nature 421 9 January 2003, pp106-108; Mark Townsend, ‘Bioterrorists 
may mount foot and mouth attack’ Observer 5 January 2003, p. 8 
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to be in the thousands, and possibly hundreds of thousands, of casualties, though 
meteorological and environmental conditions would affect the overall effectiveness of the 
weapon.  Second, there is no large-scale, deliberate use of biological weapons documented in 
history that has produced hundreds of thousands of casualties.  There are, however, a 
number of naturally occurring outbreaks of disease that have produced such numbers of 
casualties.  Third, effective dissemination of a biological weapon to cause mass casualties (in 
terms of thousands) would most likely be via an aerosol, and that poses a number of 
significant technical problems.  Fourth, dissemination itself is no guarantee of ‘success’ 
because not everyone exposed will become infected, all infected will not necessarily progress 
to the disease, and not all those with the disease will necessarily die from it.  These four 
factors are not to be interpreted as discounting the threat posed by bioterrorism; they do 
suggest, however, that scenarios involving military quantities of a military quality pathogen 
may be poor indicators of future events and trends.30
 
Delivery via non-airborne means, such as water supplies or the food supply, presents a 
greater number of historical examples and has recently come back into focus.  While 
instances of contamination of food and water had certainly occurred prior to the advent of 
the current terrorist threat, the risk posed by contamination in this new context has to be put 
into perspective.  Attacking the food supply at the point of delivery to the general population 
limits the numbers at risk or that can be targeted.  Examples of this would be the Rajneeshee 
cult attack on salad bars in 1984 with salmonella typhimurium that resulted in 751 casualties, or 
extortion attempts against supermarkets and companies.  Attacking the food supply at the 
point of preparation (i.e., the processing and manufacturing plant), would require the 
perpetrator(s) to circumvent existing food safety and management procedures within the 
facility.  While not impossible, carrying out such an attack on a large scale without anyone 
noticing – or without the contamination being picked up by quality control and safety checks 
– is difficult.  The food industry is highly-regulated and food safety management is of 
significant importance, not least in terms of product branding and public confidence.     
 
A similar qualification is required when considering threats to the water supply.  Mandatory 
water treatment procedures would locate many contaminants as part of the day-to-day safety 
checks.  In addition, legislation designed to ensure water safety – buttressed by public 
expectations of a safe water supply – acts as a major sentinel in this area.  Under existing 
regulations governing the supply of drinking water, contamination is part of everyday risk 
management.  Moreover, the sheer scale of an attacker’s task, in terms of the millions of 
gallons of water involved and thus, the amount of contaminant required to overcome the 
natural dilution effect, should not be underestimated.  So, while there are a number of new 
challenges posed by the terrorist threat, many basic procedures through which to prevent, 
detect, and respond to an attack are already in place.31
 
                                                          
30  Milton Leitenberg, The Problem of Biological Weapons (Stockholm, Swedish National Defence College, 2004) p. 
120; Clive Cookson, ‘Scientists play down risk of bioterrorism’ Financial Times 30 January 2003, p. 6; ‘CIA: Small 
al-Qaida Attacks More Likely’ Associated Press, 3 June 2003 (12.23) 
31  Valerie Seefried, ‘Keeping our drinking water safe’ Homeland Security & Resilience Monitor 2:9 (December 
2003/January 2004) pp. 12-15. See also Annex 5 ‘Precautions Against the sabotage of drinking-water, food, and 
other products’ World Health Organization, Public health response to biological and chemical weapons: WHO guidance 
(WHO, Geneva, 2004) pp. 294-319 
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Chemical Weapons 
 
The West has been dealing with the threat posed by chemical weapons for many years from 
the military perspective, but investigation of the use of toxic chemicals has been a regular law 
enforcement issue for an even greater length of time.32  Additionally, other emergency 
services have dealt with numerous chemical incidents caused either by accidents or deliberate 
contamination.  It is important to note that here we are talking about all chemical agents, 
because under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention ‘toxic chemical’ means:  
 
Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, 
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.  This includes 
all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and 
regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere. 
 
The main point is that any chemical – and not simply those referred to as classic chemical 
weapons – may pose a threat.  Moreover, the use of chemicals to achieve death or harm to 
humans is in no way a ‘new’ or a ‘mass destruction’ issue.  For example, the chemical agent 
“…that has thus far figured most commonly in deliberate releases in the United States has 
been not some deadly nerve gas, but butyric acid, which is a malodorant.”33  However, 
concerns over chemical terrorism have increased because of two well-known sets of attacks:  
those perpetrated by Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, notably on the Tokyo subway system in 1995, 
and those employing anthrax, which took place in the United States in October and 
November of 2001.  Fears of chemical attack were also enhanced when the military 
intervention in Afghanistan produced evidence of an al-Qa’eda interest in CBRN. 
 
Despite the considerable amount of money spent by Aum Shinrikyo and the freedom granted 
to the group – under then existing Japanese legislation – to research, develop and produce 
chemical weapons on Japanese territory, the quality of the sarin produced was deemed to 
have been poor (at least in Tokyo).  That ‘freedom’ has in effect been removed, and any 
group attempting today to produce the kind of chemical weapon capability Aum Shinrikyo 
attempted to develop, in a Western state, would find more barriers in its way.  Additionally, 
shifting quantities of dangerous chemicals across continents is not a simple task. 
 
Attacks on industrial chemical plants pose a different type of threat, whether by sabotage or 
direct attack using explosives or other means.  Although health-related and fire emergency 
services are already geared up to respond to chemical plant incidents and chemical accidents, 
the risk in this area is much greater.  Toxic industrial chemicals and toxin industrial materials 
were ranked by NATO’s International Task Force-25 (ITF-25) in 1998 in a hazard index.  On 
the high hazard list are chemicals such as chlorine, formaldehyde, hydrogen cyanide, and 
nitric acid.  On the medium hazard list, methyl isocyanate was the chemical responsible for 
at least 2,500 deaths in December 1984 in Bhopal, India.34  Many chemical plants and the 
chemicals within them are not fully protected against potential terrorist attacks.  In the 
United States, for example, one report stated that: 
                                                          
32  Katherine Watson, Poisoned Lives: English Poisoners and Their Victims (London, Hambledon & London, 2003) 
33  World Health Organization, ‘Public health response to biological and chemical weapons: WHO guidance’ 
(WHO, Geneva, 2004) p.19. 
34  Gustav Lindstrom, ‘Protecting the European Homeland: The CBR dimension’ Chaillot Paper no. 69 (July 2004) 
EU Institute for Security Studies, p. 22. 
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Across the country, each of 123 plants could endanger more than 1 million people if 
a terrorist attack released toxic clouds.  Another 700 plants could threaten 100,000 
people each.  Another 3,000 plants could threaten 10,000 people each.35
 
The basis of that report has subsequently been revised by the United States, but the original 
data is indicative of the scale of the problem.  As with biological weapons, attacking the food 
supply at point of preparation would require the perpetrator(s) to circumvent existing food 
safety and management procedures within the plant.  Attacks on agriculture with chemical 
weapons are a possibility but their effect would be limited in terms of human casualties if 
that was the aim.  Again, as with biological weapons threats to the water supply, the sheer 
scale of the task in terms of the millions of gallons of water involved vis-à-vis the amount of 
contaminant required, and the natural dilution effect should not be underestimated.36
 
Scoping the Threat 
 
Basing the immediate future on assessments of the past is fraught with difficulty, but in the 
area of CBRN it is also necessary.  Although there is no linear progression of lethality and 
terrorist use of CBRN on which accurate predictions or threat assessments can be made, there 
is value in taking account of the past when assessing the current and future threat.  Placing 
current events in context, however, is a necessary precautionary measure.  Studies up to the 
end of 2002 suggest that there is little increase in the actual number of CBRN incidents.37
 
The authors of the WMD Terrorism chronology recognize that the data set is too small to 
draw any significant conclusions, but the observations from the data in the full report are 
interesting.  For example:38
 Incidents involving CBRN materials in 2002 have dropped worldwide, primarily as a 
result of the dramatic reduction in the number of anthrax hoaxes; 
 In terms of CBRN use, the locus has shifted away from the United States and Canada 
to become more diffused worldwide; and 
 Biological agents are still the preferred material of hoax perpetrators, chemical 
materials are the “agent of choice” for actual usage and “household” chemicals with 
a low probability of inflicting massive casualties are found in the majority of 
recorded incidents. 
 
The evidence of terrorist interest in CBRN weapons certainly exists, but, as a selection of 
chemical and nuclear incidents after 9/11 according to other open sources reveals, interest in 
CBRN and successful use of these capabilities are not the same.  The evidence suggests that 
the current CBRN threat would appear to be based on fairly basic and crude weapons.  Of 
course, the groups involved may have learnt lessons by reading the open literature and threat 
assessments produced since 2001 and might have already developed – or be developing – a 
                                                          
35  ‘Chemical terrorism’ The Charlotte Observer [online edition] 9 June 2003 
36  Valerie Seefried, ‘Keeping our drinking water safe’ Homeland Security & Resilience Monitor 2:9 (December 
2003/January 2004) pp. 12-15 
37  Wayne Turnbull and Praveen Abhayaratne, ‘2002 WMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-
National Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials’ Center for Nonproliferation Studies 
2003 at:  http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/conv2k2.pdf
38  Ibid., p. 7 
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more sophisticated approach to CBRN.  However, in terms of qualifying the threat 
assessments, we can use, and revise slightly, Ron Purver’s 1995 typology of 5 types of ‘threat’ 
with chemical and biological weapons.39  A revised typology including all CBRN might look 
thus: 
(1) Threats to use CBRN weapons without any evidence of actual capabilities; 
(2) Unsuccessful attempts to acquire CBRN weapons; 
(3) Actual possession of CBRN weapon(s); 
(4) Attempted, unsuccessful use of such CBRN weapons; 
(5) Successful use of CBRN weapons. 
 
While there have been no spectacular attacks, all five have materialized with different 
weapons.  Two additional studies of the principal cases often cited in the literature also 
reveal a mixed bag of attempts and threats.40  Much of the information that is available in the 
public domain cannot be comprehensively validated, but a range of groups and individuals 
have historically expressed an interest in or attempted to develop CBRN weapons.  This 
includes, left wing groups {Weather Underground (1970), Red Army Faction (1980)}, radical 
ecoterrorists {R.I.S.E. (1972)}, religious cults {Rajneeshees (1984), Aum Shinrikyo (1995)}, 
national liberation movements {Tamil Guerrillas (1980)}, right wing, Aryan, and Christian 
fundamentalists {Minnesota Patriots Council (1991) individuals such as Larry Wayne Harris 
(1995 & 1998) Chechen groups (mid-1990s onwards), radical Islamists (1988 onwards)}, as 
well as opportunistic individuals or criminals, as in the 1972 Oak Ridge incident.  
 
Using Purver’s typology, at this stage we appear to be in the area of (1) to (3): 
unsubstantiated threats; unsuccessful attempts at acquisition; and, limited actual possession 
of certain CBRN weapons.  Unsuccessful use (4) has occurred and the 1995 incidents in 
Japan, the anthrax mailings in the United States, and reports of chemical-related incidents in 
2003 and 2004 can also be categorized as (5) in terms of ‘successful’ use.   
 
The principal lesson, however, is that the threat is not yet in the realm of mass destruction.  
Indeed, to date most of the CBRN incidents are not that sophisticated.  Awareness and 
caution are certainly warranted in this area and governments and policy-makers are wise to 
put in place additional security measures to protect vulnerable facilities and possible targets.  
This includes also, preparing to deal with incidents and attacks via consequence 
management.  That said, any assessment of the threat and risks involved in CBRN terrorism 
should not be blinded by hyperbole. 
 
III. Some Conclusions 
 
Two obvious conclusions can be extrapolated from the limited available evidence.  First, that 
it is at the lower end of the CBRN spectrum where potentially the most significant challenges 
are, at least for the immediate future.  Adam Dolnik, for example, has observed that when 
particular groups have used CBRN, ‘the primary weapons of choice have been chemical 
                                                          
39.  Ron Purver, ‘Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to Open Literature’ (Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service) Unclassified June 1995 p. 33 
40.  Jonathan B. Tucker (Editor), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (MIT Press, 
Cambridge Mass., 2001); and Nadine Gurr & Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from weapons of 
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(CW).’41  These are everyday chemicals and other materials widely available in civil, industrial, 
and municipal facilities.  The second lesson is that there could still be an opportunity to 
thwart or delay capabilities at the other end of the spectrum emerging.  To be clear, while 
analysis and assessment cannot discount the threat of sophisticated CBRN weapons, or true 
WMD, the evidence from both state-level WMD programs and from the available information 
to date on terrorist development and use of CBRN suggests that the technical barriers to 
development, production, dissemination and/or use remain significant.   
 
In considering the choice of weapon in the future, increases in the number of casualties and 
disruption have been achieved with conventional rather than CBRN weapons.  In terms of 
technology, acquisition, costs and funding, transport, and deployability, conventional 
weapons may still be regarded as the ‘superior’ weapon of choice as such weapons can 
achieve the required symbolism in an attack.  This could change, and may already be 
changing, as the capacity to develop new forms of weapon become available through 
globalization and technological revolution. 
 
With regard to CBRN terrorism Bruce Hoffman has observed that, inter alia, terrorism as a 
whole is becoming more diffuse, amorphous, less centralized, and with more opaque 
command and control relationships.  As he indicates, this not only required a change in how 
terrorism is countered, studied and understood, but also a recognition of the different kinds 
of threat terrorists – and especially those who might use CBRN – operate.42  At the same time, 
there are factors that may delay or prevent certain types of CBRN acquisition occurring.  The 
safe haven, time, networks, freedom, access, and surprise required to tilt the odds in favor of 
a group seeking to develop, produce, weaponize, and use true mass destruction weapons are 
all diminishing.  If that continues to be the case, it is both a success of efforts in the war on 
terrorism and efforts to reduce the CBRN threat.  It is not a reason to be complacent: but, it 
is a reason to suggest that the success of relative ‘non-use’ to date can be built upon.   
 
How might this be accomplished?  Both before and after 9/11 there was recognition that a 
layered and integrated approach to the CBRN issue was required.  The conceptual approach 
was not unlike the state-to-state one more familiar to many defense and security specialists.  
Thus thinking remained in terms of deterrence, detection, pre-emption, interdiction, defense, 
prevention, and consequence management.43  The layered approach is not novel either in 
terms of state security threats and problems or in dealing with international terrorism.  For 
example, in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism the U.S. approach is:44
 
A strategy of direct and continuous action against terrorist groups, the cumulative effect of 
which will initially disrupt, over time degrade, and ultimately destroy the terrorist 
                                                          
41.  Adam Dolnik, ‘Die and Let Die: Exploring the Links between Suicide Terrorism and Terrorist Use of 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons.’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26:1 (January-February 
2003) p. 31 
42.  Bruce Hoffman, ‘The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism’ Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 27:6 (November-December 2004) p. 556 
43.  John Simpson and Jez Littlewood, ‘A Framework for Assessing UK Responses to CBRN Terrorism’ BISA 
28th Annual Conference University of Birmingham, 17 December 2003 
44.   United States, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003, p.2 
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organizations.  The more frequently and relentlessly we strike the terrorists across all fronts, 
using all tools of statecraft, the more effective we will be. 
 
This strategy also drew attention to a ‘4D’ approach of defeat, deny, diminish, and defend and 
called for the defeat of ‘terrorist organizations of global reach through the direct or indirect 
use of diplomatic, economic, information, law enforcement, military, financial, intelligence, 
and other instruments of power.’45  Similarly, the U.S. Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of 
Mass Destruction noted the requirement for an integrated approach that emphasizes non-
proliferation, counter-proliferation, and consequence management.46   
 
Others have pointed to the broader beneficial outcomes that stem from dual-use measures.  
John Parachini endorsed the idea of dual-use measures that benefit society on a daily basis 
and also help prevent terrorism because ‘[e]liminating all possibility of terrorist groups or 
individuals using CBRN weapons is impossible.’47  The World Health Organization also 
underlined the importance of using existing systems to protect public health and augment 
these where appropriate as a response to biological and chemical weapons.48  Thus, 
integrating dual-use type measures into more traditional emergency and disaster responses, 
while at the same time augmenting capacities where necessary, could provide the basis for a 
robust and durable preparedness program.49
 
The way forward could be the pursuit of an integrated strategy that involves the 
management of CBRN threats over the long term, while also paying attention to novel or 
short-term situations and risks.  Consequently, prevention includes upholding the normative 
and legal prohibitions related to WMD in the NPT, BWC, and CWC as well as the supplemental 
agreements that support them such as the export control arrangements, the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, and other regional and multilateral agreements.  It also embraces other 
regulatory approaches to disease monitoring and prevention while acknowledging that the 
security and safety of facilities and laboratories has to be supported where controls are sub-
standard, as in the Co-operative Threat Reduction activities under the G8 Global 
Partnership.  Equally, it embraces the requirement for more effective regulation, control and 
oversight of materials, equipment and knowledge within a state itself.  In summary, 
countering CBRN terrorism requires a similar approach to countering WMD in all forms; a 
strategy stretching from the individual to the international. 
 
Research on terrorism at the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies is funded by the ESRC grant on 
the Domestic Management of Terrorist Attacks conducted by St Andrews University and the University of 
Southampton.  The above represents aspects of that work, which will be published in 2005. 
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Observations on the Nature of the 
Terrorist Threat 
 
Amy E. Smithson, Ph.D. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In the absence of a crystal ball and wishing to avoid speculation, responsible analysts are 
compelled to examine history and to pour over statistics to make projections about what 
terrorists are most likely to do in the years to come.  Such sources point to conventional 
weapons as the tools that terrorists probably will turn to for the foreseeable future, followed 
in declining order by chemical, radiological, and biological weapons.  Depending on whether 
one sees the glass as half empty or half full, the terrorist track record with unconventional 
weapons can provide both reassurance and concern. 
 
When projecting the likelihood of whether terrorists will successfully acquire and use more 
technically demanding weapons, analysts should also consider not just the technical 
challenge but the sociological factors that could influence whether terrorists can or cannot 
obtain and successfully wield unconventional weapons.  Many analyses slight sociological 
factors in favor of more tangible discussions of whether terrorists can afford or operate 
widget “x.”  However, sociological factors can play a determining role in whether terrorist 
groups are able to achieve their objectives.  In the case of Aum Shinrikyo, sociological factors 
were very influential in the cult’s failure to master chemical and biological weapons.  Aum’s 
members and many of its carefully recruited scientists were brain washed, drugged, famished, 
and sleep deprived.  Such conditions are hardly conducive to high-level scientific and 
technical performance and may be a major reason why Aum’s corps of scientists and 
technicians made such juvenile mistakes as using a sprayer that sprayed backwards, donning 
amateurish self-protection gear, and employing safety practices that jeopardized worker 
safety.1  More clear-headed scientists would probably not have made these types of technical 
gaffes.  To the extent that terrorist groups seeking to cross into the use of unconventional 
weapons impair themselves by placing the individuals assigned that mission in an 
environment that can distort their ability to resolve technical problems, they are likely to fall 
short of the mark. 
 
Another factor that needs to be taken into consideration when analyzing terrorist capabilities 
is the tendency for nations/groups to aggrandize the enemy, particularly in the aftermath of 
a horrific attack or when a threat is sharply perceived.  Following Aum Shinrikyo’s 20 March 
1995 sarin gas attack against Tokyo subway commuters, the cult was credited with causing 
far more injuries than in fact occurred and with achieving weapons capabilities that it never 
possessed.  For instance, countless media accounts use the casualty statistic 5,500, which is a 
one hundred-fold exaggeration of the serious and critical injuries from the attack.  
                                                          
1  For a more thorough description of Aum’s chemical and biological weapons programs, see Amy E. 
Smithson, “Rethinking the Lessons of Tokyo,” in Ataxia:  The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the U.S. 
Response, Amy E. Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, report no. 35 (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 
October 2000), 71-111.  
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Additionally, it was asserted that Aum Shinrikyo attacked Tokyo’s citizenry on numerous 
occasions with anthrax and botulinum toxin, when the cult never obtained virulent strains of 
either disease, much less dispersed them in a manner that would cause infections.  Aum 
Shinrikyo’s activities gave rise to many forecasts from analysts and politicians of pending, 
even imminent, catastrophic terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.  Aum 
Shinrikyo may not be the beacon that lures terrorists to go in this direction.  A decade later, 
those predictions have not, thankfully, materialized. 
 
The Jihadist organizations that have dominated many terrorist threat assessments for the 
past few years exhibit a trend toward indiscriminate violence that runs counter to the 
moderation of violence that more traditional terrorist groups have staged to gain attention 
while winning sympathy for their designated cause.  Some Jihadist organizations embrace 
apocalyptic and nihilistic philosophies that would make them more likely than traditional 
terrorist groups to employ any weapon they can get their hands on, no matter how 
destructive.  Al-Qa’eda and its affiliates have also garnered a reputation for using Western 
infrastructure as tools of attack (e.g., aircraft, transportation nodes).  When reviewing 
terrorist activities, one can discern a trend toward chemical and biological activities.  
Certainly, the number of plots and attempts to acquire these materials are on the rise. 
 
II. Deciphering Terrorist Activities 
 
According to the RAND/MIPT Terrorism Incident Database that records international 
terrorist activities dating back to 1968, the 1980s saw a dramatic rise in the number of 
terrorist attacks.  In 1986, there were over 450 attacks with another spike in activity in 1991 
before the number of terrorist attacks began to dwindle.  From 1998 forward, the 
RAND/MIPT statistics combine international and domestic terrorist events, so the cumulative 
numbers are much higher.  In 2002, the database shows over 2,645 terrorist attacks, and the 
number declined to 1,942 in 2004.  Records show that terrorists are most likely to attack, in 
descending order, private citizens and property, businesses, government entities, and 
diplomatic targets.  Big corporate enterprises such as McDonalds and Citibank are targeted 
more often than less prominent companies.  By far, the favored weapon of terrorists is 
bombs⎯pipe bombs, truck bombs, and even boat bombs.  Suicide bombing has been a 
particularly prominent tactic in the Middle East.  Of the 11,922 attacks in the RAND/MIPT 
database that terrorists executed from 1997 to 2004, 11,884 of them involved conventional 
weapons or materials. 
 
Terrorism through Unconventional Weaponry 
 
Although less than one half of one percent the number of terrorist attacks has involved 
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons or substances, a closer look at terrorist activities 
with unconventional weapons reveals issues of concern and interest.  Other than Aum 
Shinrikyo, several terrorist groups and individuals have experimented with chemical and 
biological substances, but these unconventional materials are not often delivered in a manner 
that will cause more than a few casualties.  One group that is known for its intent to cause 
massive, indiscriminate casualties, al-Qa’eda, is trying to acquire chemical weapons.  U.S. 
troops found chemical weapons cookbooks in Afghanistan after toppling the Taliban 
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government and CNN has aired videotapes of al-Qa’eda’s supposed chemical weapons tests, 
which show dogs succumbing perhaps to cyanide or to a nerve agent.2
 
No one should be particularly surprised when al-Qa’eda or other terrorists figure out how to 
synthesize small quantities of various chemical warfare agents.  With the availability of agent 
formulas, ingredients, and equipment, making poison gas in a beaker is not a technical feat, 
but it is much tougher to produce significant quantities of warfare agents.  When the U.S. 
government first attempted to mass-produce sarin, the production line had to be re-
engineered.  The inability to scale-up production was one factor that disrupted Aum 
Shinrikyo’s aspirations of a mass casualty chemical attack.  Aum built a state-of-the-art 
production facility to make sarin, but never managed to get it to operate.  Unlike the 
formulas for the classic chemical warfare agents, the technical know-how associated with 
working with large quantities of super-toxic and highly caustic chemicals is not contained in 
textbooks.  Terrorists are unlikely to cause mass casualties with a small amount of a chemical 
agent unless they employ a brutally efficient dispersal method (e.g., via a building’s air 
circulation system).  Should terrorists tap into the effective use of mini-reactors, however, a 
fairly new private sector technology, they may be able to decipher more quickly how to 
produce more significant quantities of chemical agents. 
 
If the objective of terrorists is to cause widespread indiscriminate death, one would have to 
wonder why terrorists would go to such extensive trouble to make scale-up quantities of 
sarin or other warfare agents when hundreds of industrial chemicals can produce that type of 
outcome.  Extremely hazardous industrial chemicals, known generically by emergency 
response and industry personnel as “ethyl-methyl-bad-stuff,” are produced, processed, 
consumed, and stored in hundreds of thousands of locations in the United States and 
Europe.  On both continents, chemical plants are located in and around major metropolitan 
areas.  Whether by insider sabotage or a targeted attack from the outside, the results of 
attacks on industrial facilities could be as bad or worse as the 1984 incident at Bhopal, India, 
where roughly 3,800 died and more than 11,000 were injured in a matter of hours.3  Given 
the proclivity of al-Qa’eda to turn Western infrastructure against Western society, the 
targeting of chemical industry facilities is a genuinely worrisome prospect. 
 
With regard to nuclear weapons and radiological dispersal devices (RDDs), the former is 
unlikely to be a terrorist weapon of choice because of the significant expense and level of 
technical skill required either to acquire a black market weapon or produce one from scratch.  
Considerable resources have been devoted through the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program to secure and dismantle, whenever possible, the remnants of the former Soviet 
Union’s prodigious nuclear weapons arsenal, reducing the possibility that terrorists might be 
able to purchase a full-up nuclear round on the black market.  Even if terrorists did manage 
to get their hands on a nuclear weapon, their efforts to detonate the weapon could be 
stymied by the safeguards placed on many munitions to prevent accidental and/or 
unauthorized launch.  To construct a nuclear weapon on their own, terrorists would have to 
                                                          
2  Judith Miller, “Qaeda Videos Seem to Show Chemical Tests,” New York Times (19 August 2002). 
3  Robert D. McFadden, “India Disaster: Chronicle of Nightmare,” New York Times (10 December 1984); 
Ashok S. Kalelkar, “Investigation of Large Magnitude Incidents Bhopal as a Case Study,” presentation to the 
Institution of Chemical Engineers Conference on Preventing Major Chemical Accidents, London, United 
Kingdom, May 1988. 
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acquire either 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium or four kilograms of plutonium.4  
Not only is manufacture of these materials very expensive, it is also time-consuming and 
technically demanding.  These reasons account for the projection that terrorist detonation of 
a thermonuclear weapon is among the more unlikely scenarios discussed. 
 
The Threat of Radiological Dispersal Devices 
In contrast, terrorist groups could find the assembly of radiological dispersion devices 
(RDDs) much easier.  An RDD essentially marries radiological materials with explosives.   The 
effects of RDDs are a combination of blast and fragmentation at the bombsite, dispersal of 
radiation, and fear.5  Quelling public panic and decontamination of the attack site are likely 
to be the most significant challenges for the jurisdiction attacked in this manner. 
 
The reason that RDDs are a more noteworthy possibility is that terrorists already have know-
how and operational experience with explosives and potentially could tap into one of many 
commercial radiation sources to make such devices.  The overwhelming majority are low-
level radiation sources such as the waste from medical, industrial, or research facilities.  A 
small number of high-level radiation sources are of considerable concern, namely 
Americanium-241, Californium-252, plutonium-238, strontium-90, cesium-137, cobalt-60, 
and iridium-192.  Anyone working with these higher-level radiation sources would need to 
take serious safety precautions to avoid injury.  For example, a bomb with 10,000 curies of 
radiation would need to be surrounded by over 300 pounds of lead to protect those carrying 
it.6   
 
As for whether terrorists have been able to amass sufficient materials to date to construct 
such RDDs, the track record breeds both comfort and worry.  Numerous attempts have been 
made to smuggle nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union, and in all known incidents 
the perpetrators have been caught.  Whether all smuggling has been detected is another 
question, but it is doubtful that all diversion has been detected.  The International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) records 540 incidents of illegal trafficking in nuclear materials from 
1993 to 2003.  This tally includes 335 incidents involving radioactive materials, 7 involving 
plutonium, 10 involving highly enriched uranium, 131 involving natural uranium, depleted 
uranium, or thorium, and 63 involving low enriched uranium.  Terrorists in search of a high-
risk radiation source might turn to the approximately 1,000 lighthouses that ring the former 
Soviet Union.  Located in remote coastal areas, each of these lighthouses is powered by a 
generator that contains 30,000 to 300,000 curies of strontium-90.7
 
The potential to divert radioactive materials is not constrained to the former Soviet Union.  
In the United States, the IAEA states that between 500,000 and 2,000,000 radiation sources 
are no longer needed and 375 radiation sources are “orphaned” every year.  This term refers 
                                                          
4  Steven Erlanger, “Lax Nuclear Security in Russia is Cited as Way for Bin Laden to Get Arms,” New York 
Times (12 November 2001). 
5  Ronald Kotulak and Peter Gorner, “With ‘Dirty Bomb,’ Chaos Could Be Main Fallout,” Chicago Tribune (11 
June 2002). 
6  James L. Ford, “Radiological Dispersion Devices: Assessing the Transnational Threat,” Strategic Forum, no. 
136 (March 1998). 
7  To date, there have been two cases of tampering reported with these lighthouses, although the vandals 
appear to have been more interested in the other metals rather than in the radiation source.  Norway has a 
program to convert these lighthouses to other power sources. 
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to the inappropriate disposal of a radiation source, which would make such materials more 
vulnerable to terrorist diversion, theft, or purchase.  Across the European Union there are 
30,000 unneeded radiation sources, with 70 being orphaned annually.  As if the availability of 
dirty bomb materials were not enough cause for concern, in 2003 British intelligence 
released documentary evidence that al-Qa’eda had already built a small RDD in Afghanistan.8  
 
With the abundance of radiological materials on the planet, one would expect databases to 
contain a fair number of RDD incidents.  Instead, the annals contain an aborted plot or two 
and one more fully developed incident.  In 1995, Chechen rebels placed a thirty-pound 
container with a small amount of cesium-137 in Izhmailovsky Park, a popular Moscow flea 
market.  The device was not detonated.9
 
The Prospects of Bioterrorism 
As for the prospects of bioterrorism, the threat received a great deal of attention following 
the 2001 mailing of anthrax to prominent U.S. politicians and media figures.  The agents of 
most likely interest to terrorists are the classical biowarfare agents such as anthrax, plague, 
and the other agents that nations are known to have researched, developed, tested, and 
produced for their germ weapons programs.  Biowarfare agents can be delivered in a wet 
slurry or in a freeze-dried form.  Both delivery methods have advantages and drawbacks, the 
latter of which can frustrate terrorists.  The advantage of a slurry is that the post-production 
preparation is not required.  The downside to a wet slurry is that the agent, which must 
arrive alive at its intended target in the appropriate microscopic size (e.g., 1 to 10 microns for 
humans), will be more susceptible to environmental stresses such as ultraviolet rays and heat, 
increasing the kill rate for the organisms after release.  Moreover, the sheer mechanical 
forces involved in dispersing a wet agent through a sprayer can kill large numbers of 
microbes.  Producing a dried agent, which is more resistant to environmental stresses after 
its release, requires a much higher level of technical skill and biosafety.10
 
The most extensive known terrorist effort to date to master biological efforts is that 
mounted by Aum Shinrikyo.  For the most part, the dozen or so scientists that the cult 
recruited never managed to get off the mark.  They were unable to obtain virulent strains of 
anthrax or botulinum toxin, and their efforts to spread a wet slurry material resulted in glops 
of stuff, not the ultra-microscopic mist required to infect humans.  The Aum case shows that 
technical hurdles can hinder even well financed and technically sophisticated terrorist 
groups.  If Aum Shinrikyo’s scientists were unable to get anywhere after a few years of 
laboratory and field work, the discussion about terrorists by-passing classic bio-weapons 
agents for engineered designer bugs would appear to be somewhat premature. 
 
Having said that, however, one must acknowledge the technical revolution underway in the 
life sciences and the worldwide growth of the biopharmaceutical industry will gradually make 
the equipment and know-how more widely available.  Also, universities are now teaching 
                                                          
8  The purported RDD was constructed from medical equipment in a laboratory in Herat, Afghanistan.  British 
intelligence also uncovered a training manual on the effective use of RDDs and other documentation to support 
their assertion that Al Qa’eda should be considered RDD-capable.  Josh Meyer, “Al Qaeda Feared to Have ‘Dirty 
Bombs,’” Los Angeles Times (8 February 2003).  
9  Michael Specter, “Chechen Insurgents Take Their Struggle to Moscow Park,” New York Times (24 November 
1995). 
10  For more detail, see pages 37-56 of Ataxia.  Op cit. 
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combination skill sets that used to be taught in isolation, such that a weapons acquisition 
process that occupied tens of thousands of former Soviet scientists and technicians can now 
be accomplished with much less manpower.  At some point, in other words, terrorist groups 
will probably scale the technical hurdles to bio-weapons acquisition and use.  The individual 
or group that sent the anthrax letters in 2001 clearly overcame those hurdles, although those 
who have been dabbling in ricin thus far have not. 
 
Al-Qa’eda leader Osama Bin Laden has told his followers that it is their duty to acquire 
weapons of mass destruction,11 so one can assume that efforts to obtain biological agents are 
underway.  When U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan, they found instructions pertinent to bio-
weapons manufacture as well as rudimentary laboratory capabilities.  Al-Qa’eda is rumored to 
have acquired some agents (e.g., anthrax, botulinum toxin, salmonella), but none were found 
in these laboratories.12  Furthermore, rumors do not equate to facts, so it is important to 
resist the temptation at this juncture to credit al-Qa’eda with a bona fide bio-weapons 
capability.  Any terrorist group trying to acquire biological weapons will experience a fair 
number of technical nightmares, and those that wish to jumpstart their efforts would court 
the thousands of scientists that powered the former USSR’s vast bio-weapons program, 
seeking seed cultures, cookbooks, and expertise. 
 
Putting the Threat of Unconventional Weapons into Perspective  
 
Poring through the terrorism database that the Monterey Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies maintains, the overwhelming majority of unconventional terrorism incidents 
involving chemical or biological substances are plots, pranks, and hoaxes.  In many cases 
when people begin to dabble with these materials, they try to assassinate specific individuals 
rather than to inflict mass casualties.  Such cases are usually classified as criminal rather than 
terrorist cases.  In roughly half of the cases where terrorists have actually used a chemical or 
biological substance, the substance either can be attributed to Aum Shinrikyo or was a “low 
end,” or not very dangerous material, such as butyric acid.  Monterey categorizes all use 
cases according to the delivery method employed.  The most prevalent delivery methods are 
not conducive to mass casualties, such as injecting a substance or sending it in the mail.  
Aerosolization is the delivery method of concern since many people can be simultaneously 
exposed if the execution is successful.  To date, Aum Shinrikyo is responsible for all aerosol 
delivery attempts involving chemical or biological substances.  Despite erroneous media 
reports that inflate the cult’s accomplishments, all of Aum Shinrikyo’s aerosol delivery 
attempts failed for one reason or another. 
 
Other interesting statistics from the Monterey database relate to casualties.  The largest death 
toll from a chemical or biological attack is twelve.  This number pales in contrast to the huge 
death tolls for September 11th, the African embassy bombings, and other well-known 
conventional attacks.  Moreover, in over 90 percent of the cases where terrorists have used a 
chemical or a biological substance, the attacks have killed or injured three or fewer people.  
                                                          
11  On 23 December 1998, Osama Bin Laden was interviewed by Time magazine, saying “And if I seek to 
acquire [nuclear and chemical weapons], I am carrying out a duty.  It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to 
possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on the Muslims.”  Rahimullah 
Yasufzai, “Wrath of God: Osama bin Laden Lashes Out Against the West,” Time (11 January 1999), 16. 
12  Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Says It Found Qaeda Lab Being Built to Produce Anthrax,” New York Times (23 
March 2002). 
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In over half of the cases where terrorists have used a chemical or biological substance, no 
injuries have resulted.  These statistics indicate that to date terrorists have not been able to 
master the intricacies of chemical and biological weapons or they have not aimed to harm 
more than a handful when using them. 
 
One can gain further perspective on the prospects for unconventional terrorism by again 
tapping the RAND/MIPT database.  From 1997 to 2004, this database records a total of 
11,922 terrorist events.  Of that total, 15 events involved biological materials.  Twelve of the 
15 biological cases relate to the 2001 anthrax letter attacks, which killed five.  Just over 45 
events involved chemical substances and no events involved radiological materials.  During 
this time period, there were also 11 events involving contamination of a food or water 
supply.  These incidents killed four and injured 118.  These 62 chemical and biological cases 
also include eight assassination attempts and three kidnappings during which six of the 
victims died.  Pondering the terrorist use patterns of chemical and biological substances thus 
far, perhaps the terrorists have looked at the most prominent case to date, namely Aum 
Shinrikyo, in a different light than many Western analysts.  Aum Shinrikyo’s Tokyo subway 
attack killed a dozen and seriously wounded about 150.  This tally, while notable and very 
sad, is not nearly as high as the crashing of an airliner or the bigger bombings that al-Qa’eda 
has engineered.  The Tokyo attack was spooky and spectacular, but so was September 11th, 
and it was not nearly as technically complicated to execute.  Terrorists do place a premium 
on symbolism, and for now the weight of symbolism rests largely in the target itself (e.g., the 
Pentagon, a U.S. naval vessel) more than in the method of attack.  If terrorists can claim 
victory by hitting the intended target, it is questionable whether the victory becomes more 
valid or valuable because they wielded an unconventional weapon.  Absent access to the 
inner thinking of contemporary terrorist masterminds, it is not possible to know what is 
really driving their behavior patterns. 
 
Outcomes and Perceptions 
 
Among the lessons that terrorists may be considering is whether, aside from perpetuating 
fear, their actions have the desired impact.  For example, Aum Shinrikyo did not achieve its 
goal of toppling the Japanese government, nor did al-Qa’eda’s September 11th attack cause 
the United States and its allies to withdraw from Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries.13  
The bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City did not foster the collapse of the 
U.S. government.  Similarly, the bombings at the Khobar Towers, the African embassies, 
and the USS Cole do not appear to have furthered other aspects of al-Qa’eda’s stated agenda, 
such as the establishment of an Islamic caliphate.  Instead, these events prompted the 
nation(s) attacked to pursue and attempt to render ineffective the group(s) responsible. 
 
On the other hand, terrorists may perceive the outcome of the Madrid train bombing 
differently than many Western officials and analysts.  If they are not well-informed, terrorists 
may think that the Spanish government decided to withdraw its troops from Iraq as a result 
of that bombing, when in fact the withdrawal decision was taken beforehand.  Terrorists 
may also claim that the bombing significantly influenced the outcome of the Spanish election 
because the incumbent government was defeated.  The misperception that European nations 
                                                          
13  The United States did, however, take U.S. troops least off shore from Lebanon when terrorists bombed the 
Marine barracks there in 1983. 
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may make certain concessions to reduce the chance of future attacks, should it be believed in 
terrorist circles, could make European targets more attractive to terrorists.  If the view in 
terrorist ranks is that easily assembled backpack bombs can deliver some of the desired 
results, terrorists may, for the time being, not see the value in going to the trouble and risk of 
escalating to chemical, biological, or radiological weapons. 
 
III. Concluding Thoughts 
 
With each succeeding high-profile attack, Western governments have ratcheted up the 
physical security around key target buildings, assets, and sites.  These actions will shape the 
ability of terrorists to execute these types of attacks in the future.  If guards and barriers 
prevent a truck from being pulled in close proximity to a target, the attack will be muted or 
terrorists will choose a different target.  Other factors influencing the ability of terrorists to 
carry out an attack include heightened border security; better international intelligence 
cooperation and better coordination among federal and local law enforcement authorities; 
increased tracking and blocking of terrorist-linked finances, more concentrated interception 
of terrorist communications, heightened efforts of concerned nations to capture and/or kill 
known terrorists, and more successful efforts to shadow individuals with links to terrorist 
organizations and more concerted efforts to infiltrate terrorist groups.  All of these activities 
will hamper the ability of terrorists to operate successfully, no matter what type of weapon 
they employ. 
 
Yet, terrorist groups that are patient and innovative may still hit their marks.  Given the 
number of possible targets, staying ahead of determined terrorist groups will prove to be 
very difficult, if not impossible.  As governments struggle with how to contain and combat 
terrorism, their biggest challenge in combating terrorism will be to fight this “war” without 
transforming major cities into armed camps and destroying the civil liberties that are a 
hallmark of Western societies. 
 
Overcoming the technical challenges associated with the successful production and dispersal 
of chemical and biological agents will continue to prove difficult for most terrorists, even 
those who are fairly sophisticated.  Attacks with conventional means will remain the most 
prevalent.  The next likeliest method of attack will probably be the sabotage of commercial 
chemical plants or the release of chemical agents, which are the most accessible and easiest 
to manufacture and disperse in small quantities.  Also, should a terrorist group manage to 
execute a chemical or biological attack that has September 11th casualty toll; other terrorists 
will be more likely to copycat the activity.  Governments concerned with the prospect of 
such attacks should not just harden targets and engage in other counter-terrorist activities, 
they should also enhance the preparedness of local emergency response personnel.  Such 
initiatives are well advised because they will save lives whether the cause of a disaster is a 
natural event, an industrial accident, or a terrorist attack. 
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Future Terrorist Targets 
 
Aris A. Pappas 
 
I. The Issue 
 
What targets are terrorists most likely to strike?  That is the question that has been posed, 
but cannot be answered, simply because no one can see the future with that clarity.  Hardly 
surprising, but profoundly true.  Our inability to see into tomorrow is the reason the 
question is so important:  we don’t know where the terrorists will strike, we don’t know what 
they will strike, and we don’t know when they will strike.  Anyone who can answer with 
certainty just one of those questions would earn the gratitude of the millions who could have 
been counted among the next casualties.  Uncertainty, however, is the very essence of terror.  
 
We must, therefore, consider the many unknowns that comprise the universe containing our 
elusive answers.  Through this scrutiny we might be able to somehow bound the problem, or 
at least discover linkages, that could make some tidbit of future information useful to us in 
deterring an attack or eliminating the attackers. 
 
II. Targets 
 
At the risk of sounding stereotypically academic, we must first deconstruct a deceptively easy 
question: what is a target?  The range is enormous, extending from the personal—an 
individual; to the physical — an aircraft, or a building, or a city; or to something less precise, 
e.g., the internet.  Vastly different kinds of targets, surely, but interconnected in a way that 
makes events at any part of the scale reverberate up and down the whole. 
 
It is still generally true that a single soldier’s death in battle is not an event that draws the 
entire war effort into question.  As civilized peoples, we accept that the value of even one 
life is immeasurable, yet we can also easily define situations in which countless numbers will 
be risked and sacrificed in pursuit of a greater good.  Throughout history, that rationalization 
has been the moral justification for war. 
 
Terrorism is not war and the effect of death on the larger enterprise is different in an 
important respect: the loss of life, a single life, is considered a battle lost.  It is the very 
randomness of the act that “strikes terror,” magnifying the event and causing a reverberation 
that to a terrorist is analogous to the slight tremor that can destroy a mighty dam.   
 
We are attempting to protect free and open societies.  Where we see individual citizens 
deserving of life and protection, the terrorist sees nothing more than a school of fish, 
anonymous and interchangeable, deserving only death.  In history, the assassination of a 
leader will leave a greater mark than the death of an ordinary citizen, which is why such 
murder is afforded its own specialized term.  But in our societies the basis of governance is 
that protections are afforded, legally and morally, to all.  As a result, we must start our list of 
targets at the most elemental level, the individual.  We are forced to measure our success by 
the ability to protect that single individual.  For ourselves we have set an incredibly high 
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standard that is morally and socially inviolate, yet ridiculously easy for the terrorists to 
overcome. 
 
The most commonly recognized targets are those physical things that we hold dear; the 
symbols of our civilization that inspire and define our community.  Because the quality of 
our lives is something we value, we also must defend what is now termed our “critical 
infrastructures.”  As with individual citizens, no single element can be declared expendable. 
 
This does not mean that we must defend all equally, all the time.  Those involved in the 
protection of that critical infrastructure have strived diligently to bring a professional 
approach to the concept of risk assessment to allow them to allocate scarce resources to the 
“most critical” of our critical infrastructures.  Surely, the explosion of a major chemical 
plant, resulting in the deaths of many thousands is somehow worse, more horrible, than a 
more minor attack and the deaths of tens or hundreds.  So, from the perspective of the 
defense, the protective situation calls for something akin to triage, the prioritization of 
otherwise unacceptable outcomes. 
 
What we choose to protect, however, only limits the choices a terrorist might have, and, we 
hope, reduces potential consequences.  The terrorist knows that even a limited attack, if 
successfully accomplished, will produce the anticipated effect of terror; exacerbating feelings 
of insecurity and vulnerability without regard to the relative significance of the target.  
Indeed, the argument could be made that an attack or a series of attacks on necessarily less 
well-protected facilities could have a greater effect than one larger attack.  The chemical 
plant attack is largely driven by perceptions of consequences: the noxious green cloud 
enveloping and killing the peaceful village.  It would be difficult to argue that anyone felt 
anything for the plant itself. 
 
That is not the case with other parts of the physical target range, where a strike can affect 
even more deeply our perceptions of security and vulnerability.  Tragically, many of those 
things we value the most are the same things that there is little we can do to protect.  Thus, 
the unspeakable horror of the recent attack on the Beslan School No. 1 in Russia.  Scale is, 
essentially, irrelevant.  A successful attack on the smallest pre-school would stir the same 
feelings of loss and insecurity that would attend an assault on a university campus – perhaps 
more.  Our recent experience with the so-called “DC Snipers” is an excellent example of this 
relationship.  Two men, in a broken down car and armed with a single rifle managed to 
create a pervasive sense of fear and concern throughout the entire Washington metropolitan 
region.  
 
The targets considered thus far have been individual or multiples of the individual, whether 
human or physical.  The cloak of protection must cover the entire spectrum from the 
particulate through the aggregate, but the purposes of terror can be served anywhere along 
the spectrum.  Stepping back and looking at the elements under attack, we can perceive 
another kind of target:  economic disruption.  Attacks on aircraft combine the worst fears of 
the flying public with the kind of physical vulnerability that defines any object suspended 
thousands of feet in the air.  They also directly affect the economic well being of the airlines, 
which in turn affects the economic stability of a nation.  It is hard to find so large an 
economic sector that exhibits the vulnerabilities and fragilities of the airlines.  The 
consequences of their collapse or significant diminishment are enormous.  
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An examination of the target range, therefore, is not terribly useful in helping us defeat 
terrorism.  Quite simply, terrorist targets can be, and are, any single person or thing or set of 
persons or things, that is vulnerable to attack without warning.  The size of such a list is 
simply incomprehensible. 
 
Analyzing Terrorist Objectives as an Aid to Target Prediction 
 
If it is difficult for us to distinguish or predict likely targets, perhaps a more useful approach 
would be to understand more accurately terrorist objectives and how they might affect target 
selection. 
 
Terror, like violence perhaps, is rarely senseless and does solve some things although not 
always as its practitioners intend.  Political terror seeks to persuade the victim to negotiate a 
settlement.  Ideological terror seeks millennial ends that present the victim with no options 
but total surrender or a fight to the death.  In both cases, terror is intended to provoke the 
attacked into a reaction that itself sets the conditions for change.  The first goal of terrorists 
is change. 
 
In modern times, terror most often has been used to weaken public support for policies, 
external or internal.  One species of terrorist — the Provisional IRA or the Basque ETA for 
example — has objectives that, in theory at least, are susceptible to negotiated settlement.  A 
more terrifying species — anarchists or al-Qa’eda — demands unconditional surrender.  In 
this last instance, the finer points of distinction between method and ideology are 
meaningless. 
 
Clearly, al-Qa’eda wants the United States, and the influence of western culture, out of the 
Middle East, and is willing to go to terrible lengths to accomplish that objective.  The events 
of 9/11 are seared in our memories.  To some degree, the memory itself suits al-Qa’eda’s 
purposes.  Terror and uncertainty must be maintained over time to achieve their full effect.  
Without attempting to divine the thinking of murderous thugs sprung from the 7th Century, 
we can dispassionately describe al-Qa’eda’s objective as a change in U.S. policy.  A profound 
change, to be sure. 
 
An Aberrant Terror Campaign 
The al-Qa’eda campaign against the United States differs from any other terrorist situation in 
the world today in that it is not, inherently, an incipient civil war. It is an attack from 
without, conducted, literally, by foreigners whose objectives do not include lasting change 
for themselves within the American society or polity.  The Irish and British, the Chechens 
and Russians, the Basque and Spanish, even the situation between the Palestinians and 
Israelis all represent the use of terror to affect change within a society, to obtain rights and 
benefits, or to express violently some segment’s disaffection and isolation within a given 
polity.   
 
In this sense, al-Qa’eda’s closest parallel is the Anarchist Movement, whose appeal was 
international in the years from the 19th to the early 20th centuries.  The Anarchist Movement 
was widespread, uncoordinated, yet effective in disrupting the affairs of nations and set the 
spark for the First World War.  The subsequent collapse of the monarchies defined the 
course of Europe, and ultimately the rest of the world, for the next 100 years. The 
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Anarchists pursued change for change’s sake, convinced that nothing could be worse than 
the present and secure in their faith that the destruction of governments would be replaced 
by a society founded on the progressive goodness of man.  What happened was not quite 
what the anarchists expected.  Their disparate efforts to topple the retrospectively benign 
monarchies of the 19th century led directly to the emergence, worldwide, of the modern and 
temporarily effective tyrannies of Fascism and Communism. 
 
To achieve that objective, Osama bin Laden engineered an assault on the United States that 
is designed to take advantage of the openness and freedom that so offend his beliefs.  And, 
on a case-by-case basis, he has the advantage.  As we saw above, he only has to be right 
once, while we cannot afford to be wrong ever.  Not good odds when multiple encounters 
are anticipated. 
 
The terrorists hold additional advantages as well.  Open societies and integrated economies 
rely on free travel and a degree of privacy, indeed anonymity, that make the job of finding 
the clever terrorist difficult and more dependent on luck than we would like to admit. 
 
Militarily, we would call those tactical, if not operational, advantages.  But, what of the 
strategic balance?  There, al-Qa’eda may not be as well off, particularly with regard to the 
United States.  Osama bin Laden may be facing the same kind of problem that has stumped 
strategic war planners since the days of early aviation enthusiasts  (such as Billy Mitchell) and 
the advent of strategic bombardment concepts arguing that the application of overwhelming 
force, deeply and throughout a nation’s infrastructure, can have the effect of so demoralizing 
a population that they capitulate.  The problem with the theory is that it has never worked in 
modern times.  Indeed, history shows that almost exactly the opposite happens.  The 
application of force, even overwhelming force, absent what is now commonly referred to as 
“boots on the ground” results in a strengthening of resolve and a deepened desire for 
revenge.  History teaches that enraged democracies are the most implacable. 
 
No one knows, for example, just what bin Laden and the Taliban were thinking would 
happen as a result of their attacks on New York and Washington, but it is not a conceit to 
argue that the successful invasion of Afghanistan and destruction of the Taliban, all within 
90 days or so, would not have made their list.  
 
The application of force against modern, integrated societies does not produce the same 
kind of result it once did in the era of Mongol hordes or of eradication on the level of 
Carthage.  We last saw that kind of potential in the Cold War, and the world wisely has 
stepped away.  Absent such raw power, the application of force has to be carefully measured 
against consequences intended and unintended.  Capitulation by the West, or the United 
States in particular, is a highly unlikely outcome, therefore, of the current challenge.  
Whether bin Laden and his followers understand this is unknown. 
 
Some have argued that this is fight to the death.  Perhaps, but there is no real evidence that it 
is seen that way by both sides.  Despite the rhetoric, for example, it is difficult to argue that 
the West considers itself in a life or death battle based upon the resources and priorities 
assigned to the war on terrorism writ large.  Indeed, one of the great dangers of the current 
situation is that one side is tactically deadly and has strategically absolute objectives that 
could result in massive losses of human life and lucre, while the other is engaged in a 
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concerted effort to protect itself and to mitigate its vulnerabilities, but is not necessarily 
pursuing traditionally aggressive and pro-active war aims.  In short, al-Qa’eda would see us all 
dead, for reasons of philosophy, religion and culture, while what the West really wants is for 
it all to go away. 
 
Image Manipulation as a Strategic Objective of Terrorism 
Another important element of terrorist objectives is more tactical:  they must not be seen to 
fail.  Of course, no one wants to lose, least of all an ideological movement that believes it is 
carrying out the wishes of God.  The question of why God would allow his chosen to fail 
has undermined more than one theologically based movement.  The issue here is one of 
public perception.  In order for terror to work, its perpetrators must be perceived as threats 
that are outside the normal course of events.  Murders happen every day, as do automobile 
accidents, and the death tolls from both are high and arguably unacceptable.  But, these 
occurrences are accepted as “normal” and do not evoke unusual fear or panic.  With the 
dramatic exception of 9/11, the work of terrorists rarely exceeds the routine mayhem of 
society in terms of blood spilt or resources lost.   
 
Terrorists seek to evoke panic by appearing to be unstoppable, unavoidable, and random.  
They depend on developing and maintaining a palpable sense of vulnerability amongst their 
opponents, matched with a sense of their own invulnerability fostered by perceptions of 
secrecy and brutality.  This has significance in terms of targets and objectives because it 
argues that effective protective measures can limit terrorist target selection.   
 
Although one could plausibly argue that an attack on the White House would be quite 
attractive to al-Qa’eda, it poses real psychological risks to the movement itself.  They would 
be forced to contemplate the very real possibility that some damage might be done, but that 
the leading stories spread around the world would be accompanied by pictures of all or most 
of the attackers dead on the grounds, with black suited Secret Service agents standing over 
them.  Martyrdom aside, such an outcome and images do not serve the purpose of terror.  
The same group could more easily identify a fundamentally unprotected shopping center, 
where their attack would have a very dramatic impact, regardless of the survival of the 
terrorists themselves. 
 
Considering the difficulty terrorists have in preparing and equipping themselves to directly 
confront trained, professional, and alerted security, we can conclude that robust protection 
of high-value, high consequence targets can be effective in deselecting that target from the 
terrorist’s list. 
 
All this is particularly pertinent to any attempt to predict “targets” in Europe.  What we have 
seen is that the attack may be directed at virtually anything, but its strategic objective could 
limit or otherwise define those targets. 
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Europe: A Critical Battlefield  
 
Much has been written and said about Europe’s vulnerability simply because it is an open 
society inimical to the same fanaticism that hates the United States.  We will not add to this 
discussion but will instead consider another facet of more immediate consequence. 
Osama bin Laden and his movement have global pretensions.  They hope to gain the 
support of Muslim populations, or significant portions of them, all around the world.  The 
single most critical factor in the al-Qa’eda-based terrorist threat in Europe, therefore, is the 
status of Europe’s Muslim population.  Descriptions of the lot of the 20 million European 
Muslims are invariably accompanied by dire stories of their disaffection and dissatisfaction 
with their position in the various European societies.  Although those conditions differ from 
place to place, overall they are bad enough to foster almost precisely the kind of condition 
suited to al-Qa’eda development and recruitment.  The critical factor, in fact, is not the 
disaffection of immigrants, but of second and third generation European Muslims.  
Educated, motivated, but not assimilated, they are prototypical candidates for the kind of 
arguments propounded by al-Qa’eda. 
 
We have already seen the connection between support by European networks and the 9/11 
perpetrators.  It is significant to point out that while there is some heated debate over the 
presence of al-Qa’eda “sleeper cells” within the United States, there is little or none over their 
existence in Europe.  In the United States, the war on terror has been largely absent any 
degree of reaction against the indigenous Muslim population.  And, although some of us 
would like to see a more active resistance to al-Qa’eda by U.S. Muslims, it is also fair to say 
that their cooperation with counterterrorist efforts has far outstripped any general or specific 
support seen for al-Qa’eda.  This is not to say that the U.S. Muslim population does not 
support Muslim issues worldwide, but there is the important distinction to be made between 
that and support for deadly terrorism. 
 
The distinction is in the issue of assimilation, acceptance, and a favorable projection of their 
position in society.  The United States is a melting pot, if an imperfect one, where becoming 
a real part of the polity is possible in the first generation of emigration as Henry Kissinger or 
Arnold Schwartzenegger could attest.  Further, the United States has taken great pains to 
disassociate the war on terrorism from any criticism of its Muslim communities.  Thus, the 
external imposition of the attack results in the ability for those communities to disassociate 
themselves from it, while maintaining their Muslim beliefs and general support for Muslim 
issues. 
 
Reports of conditions and attitudes within the European Muslim communities are quite 
different, leading to the potential, not only for al-Qa’eda recruitment against generalized 
objectives, but more directly in the form of terrorism akin to that conducted by the IRA, the 
Basques, or even the Palestinians.  Thus, unlike the United States, Europe faces violence 
rooted in an indigenous and disaffected population. 
 
Europe, then, holds appeal to al-Qa’eda as a source of recruitment and support, but also as a 
means of fortifying its very roots.  The ability to do this is aided by the very loose 
organizational structure al-Qa’eda.  Independent al-Qa’eda “franchises” can contribute to the 
movement without necessarily compromising their own particular objectives.  I’d venture to 
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guess that bin Laden would simply prefer that the Muslim Diasporas collapse back to their 
Holy Lands of origin.  The objectives of European Muslims, however, may be somewhat 
different, and have more to do with their place in European society.  This may be a circle 
that cannot be rationally squared, but in its initial stages, the goals and objectives of the 
European Muslims and al-Qa’eda will likely show a great many parallels.  The ultimate 
outcome, much like the unintended consequences that affected the anarchists of the last 
century, may be very different than anyone can imagine.  But the path to that outcome could 
be deadly. 
 
Having identified the objective as Muslim support and adherence, specific targets may be 
assessed as having high or low probability, dependent upon their ability to influence this 
projected outcome.  The specific definition of those targets will require profound 
understanding of not only al-Qa’eda but of the indigenous Muslim populations, whose 
loyalties and perceptions are at the heart of support at both the lowest tactical and highest 
strategic levels. 
 
Attacks like the one in Madrid can serve multiple goals.  On the one hand, they can support 
external objectives like weakening the power and stability of the coalition that is threatening 
to bring 21st century ideals and benefits to an oppressed Islamic society.  On the other, they 
can also demonstrate the inability of a government to protect its citizens and serve as object 
lessons to those considering ways to express their growing grievances with that same society.  
In that sense, Madrid was doubly successful and can be seen a model for future efforts. 
 
The marriage of intense dissatisfaction to very powerful weapons makes the European 
targeting issue one of critical significance.  Europe is not an ancillary sideshow in this war; it 
may be its most critical battlefield.  If al-Qa’eda can be defeated in its attempt to enlist the 
Muslim populations, an almost inconceivable threat can be reduced to much more 
manageable proportions.  Terrorist rhetoric emphasizes the United States, but its content 
reveals its more widespread threat to Western ideals and progress. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
Europe has dealt with terrorism before, and justifiably considers itself prepared to deal with 
its more recent incarnations.  Which model will more correctly represent the threat:  
independent and relatively small scale attacks by autonomous groups with specific political 
aims, or coordinated and now much more deadly attacks by a league of cells professing 
adherence to a millennial end?  More and more, the latter seems to be the emergent threat, 
making immediate corrective and protective actions an absolute necessity. 
 
Homeland security must become a European priority ranking at least equal to the imperative 
of counterterrorism.  Perhaps even more importantly, significant efforts must be made to 
deal with the terrorists’ growth medium, the Muslim populations.  Their concerns and 
complaints need to be addressed with the same kind of attention that in previous times we 
have given other displaced and disaffected populations.  Frankly, this is not in the European 
tradition, and will require some difficult and potentially risky, unpopular decisions.  But to 
do less is to risk those unanticipated consequences, those releases of dark forces that so 
totally dominated the landscape of the last century. 
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What are the targets in Europe?  The target is Europe, in a way and to a degree that 
surpasses even the threat now felt by the United States.  It is a threat that has the potential to 
change the very core of those many societies whose insularity has weakened their ability to 
assimilate the mass ethnic migrations that now so define the modern world scene.  The 
economic interdependence of the world is matched by a degree of ethnic interaction that 
results in throwback ideologies like al-Qa’eda’s; ideologies that, like Hitlerism, contain the 
seeds of their own destruction, but whose course can consume the innocents of a modern 
age. 
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Future Terrorist Targets 
 
S. Gorka 
 
I.  Just what is al-Qa’eda? 
 
Al-Qa’eda’s Rhetoric and Its Implications 
 
Western experts and intelligence community analysts are still coming to terms with the 
nature of al-Qa’eda and the ways in which it differs as an organization from the terrorist 
groups we were familiar with during the Cold War.  One of the most obvious differences 
between the likes of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and al-
Qa’eda are the alleged end-states that they wish to achieve.  The former groups strove, or still 
strive, to achieve goals that are at least theoretically possible, and are solely political in nature 
(such as the re-annexation of Northern Ireland to Eire, greater autonomy for the Basque 
lands).  Al-Qa’eda goes beyond the political into what one strategist, the provocative Ralph 
Peters, calls the transcendental — a vision informed, in this case, by religion.  Given the 
amount of exposure bin Laden has guaranteed for himself, and the sheer amount of 
propaganda material he and his lieutenants have released in the last thirteen years, it seems 
obvious that a closer examination of the group’s rhetoric will afford a better insight into the 
minds of those people behind the attacks of September 11th and March 11th.  In fact, in a 
statement made just prior to the 2004 U.S. presidential election, bin Laden emphasized how 
al-Qa’eda can only be understood through its statements. 
 
The Evolution of bin Laden’s Ideology 
Bin Laden’s ideological beginnings were shaped at university, by Abdallah Azzam and 
through his experiences in the Afghan resistance to the Soviets.  Following Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait, bin Laden failed in his attempt to convince the Saudi royal family that he and his 
Mujahedeen should be allowed to protect his homeland from Saddam Hussein’s army.  
When bin Laden learned that the United States would be permitted to take on this role, his 
alienation from the Saudi government became complete as he considered infidel protection 
an affront to Arab sovereignty.   
 
At this point bin Laden’s ideology moved from concepts of a more limited ‘defensive jihad’ 
to targeting of U.S. interests and the Saudi regime itself.  He viewed the United States and its 
allies as the aggressors, having attacked the integrity of the Muslim world with its actions in 
the Gulf and with its protracted support of Israel.  His actions and attitudes prompted the 
Saudi government to strip him of his Saudi citizenship and the now exiled bin Laden went 
further in solidifying his mantra until he issued a personal call to jihad in 1996, a struggle 
against the cabal of “Jews and Christians” and their proxies – apostate Arab/Muslim elites in 
non theocratic countries.  
 
During the next several years, bin Laden’s ultimate goal became more and more apparent, as 
did the extent of the target affinity group.  Interviews from the internet and the Pakistani 
media make it clear that his message/target was the entire Muslim world and that he 
considered the populations of secular states such as Iraq as potential recruits and allies in the 
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battle against their own leaders and the West.  His goal was and remains to make national 
borders meaningless in a new Caliphate-type structure that would develop throughout 
Central Asia and the Middle East, halting and reversing the ‘crusades’ of the Christians.  In 
this vision, repeated references are made to the Taliban regime of Afghanistan as the model 
for future universal theocracy.  This was soon followed by bin Laden’s issuance – without 
any reasonable clerical authority – of a fatwa against the United States in which attacks 
against civilians were justified:  “We call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes 
to be rewarded to comply with Allah’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money 
wherever and whenever they find it.”  Shortly after this fatwa the 9/11 attacks were 
executed. 
 
Mixed Messages: Rational and Irrational at the Same Time? 
One of the signatures of al-Qa’eda’s rhetoric is the way in which it has, over time, mingled the 
transcendental and irrational with the feasible or politically realistic.  In the video statement 
bin Laden prepared for the invasion of Afghanistan, very concrete demands were made with 
regard to U.S. troops withdrawing from Saudi Arabia and for the creation of a free and 
independent Palestine.  Such classic demands, very reminiscent of those of Cold War terror 
groups, are difficult to associate with the far more extreme visions concerning the creation 
of a global Caliphate.  More recent statements do, however, give clues to what could be 
happening. 
 
The fact that al-Qa’eda has a communications council suggests that such mixed messages are 
unlikely to be accidental.  Over the past year, several statements have been aimed at new 
audiences or made in a new voice.  Statements clearly aimed at the governments of Europe 
before and after the Madrid bombings are meant to make bin Laden look more moderate, 
more of a political leader.  At the same time, other statements aimed clearly at the broader 
Muslim community or umma reflect a protracted struggle against the economic strengths of 
the United States and its allies.  This does not diminish, however, the importance of the 
more transcendental demands.  To quote a recent study by the US Congressional Research 
Service:  
 
Bin Laden has outlined specific political demands that support the image of al-Qa’eda as a 
pliable, pragmatic political actor. Nevertheless, al Qa’eda’s operational record seems to 
indicate that its leaders’ commitment to specific national causes and strategic objectives are 
rhetorical tools designed to elicit support for their broader ideological agenda of 
confrontation with the West and puritanical reform in the Islamic world. 
  
Given all the evidence to date, we would agree that despite an increase in worldly, immediate 
demands, the overarching aim of the organization and its leaders remains the creation of a 
global Caliphate.  As a result, al-Qa’eda is not a group to be negotiated with and is unlikely 
ever to become such. 
 
Tactical Evidence  
In addition to the dozens of first person statements, there exist now, especially after the 
invasion of Afghanistan and the investigation of several al-Qa’eda safe-houses and camps, 
more and more samples of al-Qa’eda’s internal documents.  These include the “Super Bomb” 
guide found by a CNN team in Kabul and the so-called ‘al-Qa’eda Manual’.  These documents 
go beyond the purely operational to include the political and ideological.  For example, the 
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al-Qa’eda Manual suggests that, “Islamic governments have never and will never be 
established through peaceful and cooperative council [viz. the Loya Jirga]. They are established 
as they always have been: by pen and gun; word and bullet; tongue and teeth.” 
 
The Manual discusses in detail how it is justified to take hostages, to use violence against 
them and eventually even to kill them, as we see now in Iraq.  It also discusses the 
justifications behind breaking the Islamic religious codes relating to proper dress and prayer 
in the case of individuals functioning as covert al-Qa’eda operatives within Western nations.  
Lest one think that these documents are vague concoctions of religious ideas and simple 
tactical guidelines, the truth is that many issues crucial to covert operations are dealt with in a 
systematic and clear-headed fashion, with distinctions being made between classified and 
open source materials and even the importance of culture and its effect on intelligence 
gathering. 
 
In Knights under the Prophet’s Banner, published in London, Ayman al-Zawahiri clearly 
enumerates, in a very holistic sense, the strategic tools that the West, including Russia, are 
using against the Islamists.  These include the United Nations, multinational corporations, 
international communications and data exchange systems, satellite media channels and 
international relief agencies, which are used to camouflage covert operations targeting al-
Qa’eda.  The treatise also sheds light upon the new generation of al-Qa’eda recruits, ‘mujahid 
youths’ who have abandoned their families, country, wealth, studies, and jobs in search of 
jihad.”  Many of these new recruits, as a result of the ‘Jewish crusade,’ become “like orphans 
in a banquet for the villains.”  These comments confirm analyses from European members 
of the international intelligence community, especially the German foreign intelligence 
agency (BND), that the organization is continually renewing its membership, with each tier 
having a different common denominator:  Generation One is linked by the Afghan 
resistance, Generation Two by involvement in Bosnia and Chechnya and the newest, third 
Generation, by shared experiences in the Middle East, especially at the more fundamentalist 
universities.  
 
The Generations of al-Qa’eda 
 
As the violent attacks in Iraq have multiplied, it is becoming evident that the moniker, al-
Qa’eda, has been unwisely overused, fueling the potentially dangerous misrepresentation that 
the United States and its allies are facing a monolithic and unitary foe responsible for all 
Islamist violence on the globe.  In fact, responsibility for attacks across the world points to a 
completely different analysis.  Based upon information from a variety of European sources, 
including the BND, it is not possible to discuss what is, in effect, the next generation of 
Osama bin Laden's network.  Where the first generation of al-Qa’eda was a homogenous 
core, the next generations could be described as heterogeneous, both in experience and in 
background. 
 
Generation One: Down But Not Out 
Demographically and socially, the first generation of the al-Qa’eda network is made up of 
individuals in their 40s or 50s.  This core membership is tied together by the common 
experience of having fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s.  In fact, their link to 
this war imbues (or at least imbued) them with a distinct status amongst Muslim 
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fundamentalists.  This generation had a monolithic and unitary structure that functioned very 
much on the basis of personal acquaintance. 
  
The majority of agencies and open-source analysts agree that the original generation of al-
Qa’eda has been severely degraded as a result of the military operations in Afghanistan that 
disposed of the Taliban regime.  Osama bin-Laden’s generation of al-Qa’eda has always relied 
on a central base of operations.  Since becoming involved in recruiting and training fighters 
to resist the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and through his usurpation of the Bureau of 
Services for Mujahedeen and its transformation into the Base (al-Qa’eda), bin Laden has 
required a safe-haven to operate his headquarters.  His migration from Pakistan to Sudan 
and then to Afghanistan after 1989 suggests not only his operational flexibility, but also his 
need at every point to have a physical center for his organization.  
 
While much has been made of the institutional and human weaknesses that led to the U.S. 
security and intelligence failures prior to the 9/11 attack, it seems clear that the post-9/11 
response has so far been effective.  Although bin Laden is still at large, most of the 29 
recognized leaders of the original al-Qa’eda structure are now dead or in custody.  The fact 
that almost four years after the attacks, despite all its bluster and bin Laden's various 
pronouncements, the organization has been unable to execute an attack of similarly 
catastrophic proportions, speaks to the operational weakness of the al-Qa’eda network.  
However, investigations of the still significant but somewhat smaller-scale bombings in Bali 
and Madrid indicate that the tactical initiative has moved to new, younger groups of 
terrorists that are less strictly linked to the original cadre of Mujahedeen fighters.1
 
Generations Two and Three:  An Even Harder-core Adversary? 
The first regional group that sprang from the patronage of the original Arab Mujahedeen 
fighters, the so-called Afghan Arabs, was associated with the fighting in Bosnia.  Numerical 
estimates by the BND put the original group at approximately 30,000 operatives and the 
second generation at 20,000.  It should be noted that the majority of terrorist arrests made 
within EU territory since 9/11 have involved individuals in their 30s, most having combat 
experience from the Balkans, and Bosnia in particular.  
 
Recently, a new sub-set of terrorists that could be identified with al-Qa’eda, or which 
identifies itself with the broader aims of the original group, has emerged.  These Islamists are 
tied to the fighting in Chechnya, or to the former Soviet Republic of Georgia.  Usually in 
their 20s, they are not linked by any particular campaign or by having trained together in one 
of the original al-Qa’eda camps.  Rather, these Islamists have shared experiences at certain 
universities across the Arab and Muslim world, most often in Pakistan, which is home to the 
more virulent strains of the fundamentalist interpretations of Islam.  Interestingly, in the case 
of some of the individuals that have been successfully identified or apprehended, these 
terrorists and potential terrorists are the sons or sons-in-law of first generation members of 
the original al-Qa’eda network.  This is first and foremost an intellectual network, less reliant 
on the person-to-person contact so common to the original group.  As a result, these cells 
have been found to be even more autonomous than was previously posited.  They represent 
a broad outer circle, far more diverse than the original al-Qa’eda network. 
 
                                                          
1 NOTE:  This paper was written and edited for publication prior to the July 7, 2005 London bombings. 
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Aspects of the New al-Qa’eda 
The new generations of fundamentalist terrorists do not share the same group history as the 
one the United States and its allies have been fighting most frequently since 9/11.  The non-
aligned nature of many of the new cells established in Europe and Austral-Asia, for example, 
have a more international identity, greater independence and looser structures.  Almost all 
the 9/11 hijackers were of one nationality, Saudi Arabian.  Today, however, law enforcement 
agencies are, more often than not, apprehending or learning of cells with an extremely 
heterogeneous make-up.  Good examples of this are the group that attempted a gas attack 
on the Paris metro in 2003, and those responsible for the simultaneous bombings in March 
2004 of the Madrid railway.  
 
In fact, we now know that, contrary to the government line, the Hamburg cell which had 
provided logistical support to the 9/11 leader Mohamed Atta was not effectively dismantled 
after the attacks.  Instead, it reconstituted itself in the months following in order to play a 
crucial role in the Madrid bombings more than two years later.  Likewise, more and more 
cells have been unearthed, the members of which are from North Africa and Asia.  This led 
one senior European intelligence specialist to state that, “It is not al-Qa’eda that is the 
problem anymore.  The next generation sees the original one as gone soft, or too 
vulnerable.” 
 
Furthermore, a pattern seems to be emerging in regard to how these new iterations have 
managed to sustain themselves.  Training facilities have moved from Central Asia to Asia: 
particularly Indonesia (the Sulawesi region especially), the Philippines, Bangladesh and 
Nepal.  And more often, it appears that operational planners have begun isolating specific 
Islamic centers, mosques or madrasas for operational targeting and recruiting.  They take 
control of an existing facility, typically with the assistance of a radical Imam with a suitably 
fundamentalist or Salafi message, and turn this facility into a recruiting center for those who 
will be later sent to one of the new training camps.  The creeping take-over of these centers 
reflects, in a methodological sense, the manner in which the original Bureau of Services 
subsumed previously innocuous charities and organizations all over the globe before al-
Qa’eda was created. 
 
II.  The Global War on Terror: Europe’s Response & its Role 
 
The ramifications of the 9/11 attacks, and its lessons, have been understood differently in 
various parts of the world.  Most striking, perhaps, is the apparent difference in response 
between Europe and the United States.  How can we explain the growing number of voices 
that speak of irrevocable damage done to European-US relations caused by the radical shift 
in White House policies? 
 
Crumbling Transatlantic Link? 
 
Much has been made of the fact that in its responses to the attacks, the United States has 
demonstrated a propensity not only to a Machiavellian view of the world – divided among 
simply the good and the bad – but also a renewed unilateralism that favors force over 
political or diplomatic tools.  Such a shift has been said to exacerbate tension between 
Washington and various capitals in Europe.  While in many instances such a categorization 
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of U.S. policies may indeed be valid, a judicious examination of foreign policy and defense 
initiatives under the previous two Democratic administrations results in a more nuanced 
appreciation of the current U.S. stance.  It should not be forgotten that prior to 9/11, the 
Clinton White House was often prepared to use force unilaterally, in theaters such as 
Somalia, Afghanistan, and the Sudan – especially in response to terrorism.  Likewise it was 
prepared more than once to commit sizeable defense assets to prolonged military operations 
in other parts of the world without a specific UN mandate (viz. Bosnia and Kosovo). 
 
Operational Realities versus Political Transience 
 
With the exception of the Madrid bombings in March 2004, al-Qa’eda-instigated mass-
casualty terrorism has yet to make its presence felt throughout Europe.2  As a result, the 
general sense of vulnerability amongst members of the public can be said to be quite low.  
Nevertheless, if we look at the history preceding the 9/11 hijackings, and also the numerous 
subsequent arrests made all across Europe, a distinctly different picture emerges.  
 
We now know, predominantly as a result of effective cooperation between the FBI and the 
police and security services of Germany, that Europe played an important part in the staging 
and preparation of the 9/11 attacks.  In fact, there is evidence that the Madrid train bombing 
was logistically underpinned by remnants of the support base used by Mohamed Atta in 
Hamburg, prior to his leaving for the United States.  More significantly, in very successful 
(often international) operations conducted in the last two years across Europe, numerous 
terrorists and cells have been interdicted in countries such as Italy, France, Germany and the 
UK.  More than once they have been found to be in possession of materials destined for use 
in a chemically-enhanced, toxic attack.  
 
Those arrested since September 11 have often been legally resident immigrants.  But in 
France, for example, non-Arab, previously non-Muslim French nationals have also been 
detained, having similar Islamic conversion stories to that of Richard Reid3.  Indeed, wide 
use is also made of fake or re-engineered EU passports.  During a number of arrests on the 
continent, no less that 28 false passports were retrieved.  The unitary Schengen frontier 
around the continental members of the European Union obviously makes EU-nation-state 
issued travel documents all the more desirable, given the freedom of movement guaranteed 
to the holder once he has crossed the Schengen border. 
 
Questioning of apprehended suspects has revealed that once inside an EU member state, the 
Arab Service Bureau system, as set-up by Osama bin Laden, continues to function on the 
continent and also in the UK.  Along with remaining bureaus, certain mosques have become 
recruiting and meeting places for lower-level operatives, especially those associated with the 
more radical and charismatic imams.  Overlapping this network is a string of charitable 
organizations, often linked to Islamist philanthropists resident in Saudi Arabia, and several 
schools which, if not overtly Islamist, are linked via board members, or in other ways, to the 
previous networks. 
 
                                                          
2  NOTE:  This paper was written and edited for publication prior to the July 7, 2005 London bombings. 
3  Richard Reid, the infamous shoe-bomber, was a UK national who had converted to the Islamic faith. 
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As a result of the numerous arrests, subsequent trials and information gathered, it is fair to 
state that operationally, Europe has indeed taken its responsibilities seriously.  Law 
enforcement officials agree in their analysis that al-Qa’eda represents a significant threat not 
only to the United States but also to the continent.  But this threat assessment is not 
universally appreciated.  As one of Europe's leading al-Qa’eda experts from the German 
Foreign Intelligence Service (BND) indicated to this analyst, there is a distinct gulf between 
the reality on the ground perceived by the agencies and the stance evinced by the political 
leaders of many nations, Germany included.  
 
Selective Targeting 
 
Despite declaring for well over a decade that the whole of the West is heretical to the 
Muslim value system and must be destroyed, Osama bin Laden’s organization has 
concentrated almost exclusively on attacking the United States.  From the first World Trade 
Center bombing, through the African embassy attacks, the USS Cole and 9/11, al-Qa’eda has 
had a United States focus in its choice of “Western” targets.  Subsequently, while operational 
officers are fully aware of the extent of penetration of the European Union and the fact that 
it may be only a matter of time until they too are attacked, politically this is a difficult reality 
for EU elites to broach, let alone openly discuss.  
 
Many in the U.S. government expected this to change after Madrid.  It was expected that the 
major nations of the EU would finally appreciate the full importance of the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) and support it more fully.  The results of the attacks were, however, quite 
the opposite of what was expected.  
 
The Madrid bombing resulted in a more dovish Spanish stance because of the incompetence 
of the then administration and the surprise results of the elections held one week later.  
Once it was clear that it was al-Qa’eda and not ETA that was responsible for the attacks, as 
had been stated almost immediately by the then Minister for the Interior, the government 
was seen as wholly incompetent and worthy of punishment.  The expected election results 
were therefore reversed and the incumbents replaced.  Since the public had “voted with their 
feet,” and since the Aznar government had been one of the GWOT’s strongest supporters, 
the new administration, in a show of appreciation, distanced itself from the previous 
hawkish, pro-GWOT stance.  It is unlikely that the same would happen if a similar attack were 
to occur in another EU state that was not on the cusp of an election and where the 
government did not make the mistake of apportioning blame incorrectly.  
 
The difference, therefore between U.S. and European understandings of the 9/11 attacks 
and their ramifications are not as large as they may seem, especially if one is able to separate 
the political from the practical. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
In identifying potential targets it is important to recognize the different motivations that 
drive today’s terrorists.  In the past, groups such as the IRA or ETA wished to influence a 
given government in a given direction by inculcating fear into the general population. 
Today’s Islamist terrorist is not necessarily interested in such an end-state.  Individuals such 
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as Osama bin Laden wish to influence the broader umma or Muslim culture, and to take acts 
that inform a broader transcendental reality.  As a result we can expect targeting to 
concentrate on greater and greater lethality, incorporating ever more symbolic targets.  It is 
no accident that the targets on 9/11 included the Pentagon, the center of US military might, 
the WTC, the symbol of western capitalism, and, according to some analysts, the U.S. Capitol. 
 
To conclude, the challenge now is to imagine what method of attack the enemy will use. 
They are very unlikely to resort once more to the methodology of 9/11.  Second, is to posit 
from their point of view what the most symbolically powerful target would be.  In this fight, 
the imagination will prove almost as important as our intelligence capabilities. 
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